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FOREWORD
Canada is a peculiar nation. Peopled
by immigrants, it is a country, paradoxically, which hates immigration.
Every single public opinion survey over the past fifty years indicates that
most Canadians - including by the way, most immigrants themselves -
do not want any substantial increase in the number of people admitted
to this country. This attitude may surprise Canadians, but historically
it should not.
It is one of our great national myths that Canada has a long history
of welcoming refugees and dissidents, of always being in the forefront
in accepting the world's oppressed and dispossessed, of being receptive
and hospitable to wave after wave of immigrants.
We Canadians like to think that racism and bigotry are European
or American in origin and play little part in our history, tradition or psyche.
We see our's as a country of vast open space and of limitless potential
which has always been open and available to the proverbial huddled
masses yearning to be free.
Yet as the recent literature in Canadian history has shown, the
Canadian record is one of which we ought not be proud. Our treatment
of our native people as well as our abysmal history in admitting blacks,
Chinese, Japanese, Indians and, during the 1930s and 1940s Jews, should
lay to rest the myth of our liberalism and enlightenment on matters of
race and immigration.
Let us face fact. For most of our history Canadian immigration laws
were racist and exclusionary. We knew precisely what kind of people
we wanted, and how to keep out those we didn't. Until the 1960s our
immigration policies divided the world into two - the ' 'preferred'' races
who were always welcome in Canada and the "non-preferred'' who rarely
were. The former were of British and European stock; the latter included
almost everybody else.
The central problem of Canadian immigration policy is that for most
of our history we did not have one. Since 1867 the country has had
precisely four immigration acts. Nor has there ever been in Canada -
neither now nor in the past - any clearly articulated national consensus
about what immigration should be or what it would do. Except for one
constant - its discriminatory aspects - our policies have had little
consistency.
There is good reason for our lack of a grand public vision: immigra-
tion is an issue that divides Canadians far more than it unites them. It
has been a political hot potato that no one in Ottawa wanted to touch.
Indeed not until 1952, fully eighty-five years after we became a nation,
and after the country had absorbed millions of newcomers, did we finally
feel it was time to create an independent Department of Immigration with
its own minister. Until then immigration was so little thought of that its
responsibilities were passed back and forth amongst various reluctant
departments - clearly an indication of how little respect, or thought, was
given to immigration policy. At one time or another it came under the
responsibility of the Departments of the Interior, Agriculture, Mines and
Natural Resources.
As a result, until recently, immigration policy was largely in the
hands of a small number of bureaucrats. Throughout most of our history
this tiny group, almost by default, orchestrated our immigration policies.
Their role, as they saw it, was not to find ways to bring people to Canada,
but rather to devise restrictions to keep them out. They were our country's
gatekeepers, yet they were determined to open the gates as little and as
narrowly as possible.
And for the greater part of our history they succeeded. It was only
in the past twenty-five years that Canada abandoned her discriminatory
policies and opened herself to immigrants from places never before recog-
nized as potential sources of immigrants - the Caribbean, India, Pakistan,
South-East Asia, and the Middle East.
It is this small group of government officials who strove so desper-
ately to fend off "offensive" peoples that is the subject of this fascinat-
ing book. Indeed, as Barbara Roberts shows, not only did they succeed
in keeping our doors closed, but they also managed to find a way to get
rid of some of those who managed to break through their carefully erected
restrictive barriers. Her story of the repugnant deportation practices in
Canada between 1900 and 1935 is a powerful indictment of Canadian
immigration policy. Using a remarkable array of sources, Dr. Roberts
brings to light for the first time, the murky activities of government officials
who used deportation to dispose of a wide variety of unwanted immigrants.
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For thirty-five years immigration officials - on their own, usually with-
out consulting Parliament or their ministers - not only decided who could
come to Canada, but how to get rid of those already here they did not
want. This handful of bureaucrafts were de facto judges and juries on
all immigration matters. Their decisions on whom to deport, as Roberts
makes clear, were not only arbitrary, they were often illegal. For years
immigration authorities broke the law with impunity in order to protect
Canada from those they deemed "undesirable'', Canada's record in deport-
ing immigrants was by far the worst in the entire British Commonwealth.
This is an important book. Roberts carefully and dispassionately
describes the behaviour of a Department of Immigration which seemed
to be, on occasion, the rogue elephant of the Canadian bureaucracy. Yet
it is important to note that the activities of these officials - illegal and
bizarre as they often were - raised scarcely a ripple of protest in Parliament
or in the country at large. After all, most Canadians, and certainly all
politicians in this period, approved of what the bureaucrats were doing
- ridding Canada of the poor and the unemployed as well as those who
might be politically unacceptable.
Canada has come a long way since the 1930s. And certainly over
the past three or four decades we have become a haven for millions of
immigrants and refugees looking for salvation and freedom. But there
are still a number of Canadians - too many - who resent what is happening
to this country, who wish to turn the immigration clock back fifty years,
who feel that Canada is beginning to look like the United Nations with
so many black, brown, and yellow faces on their streets and subways.
For them as well as for all Canadians, Whence They Came is a timely
reminder of the cruelty and inequity of an earlier immigration policy. If
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The Functions of Deportation
1 his book is a study of deportation
of immigrants from Canada to the countries whence they had come,
between 1900 and 1935. The first chapter considers the part that depor-
tation played in managing the labour supply and maintaining the social
order. The next chapter provides an overview of the legal framework for
deportation, looking also at factors that influenced the timing and specific
provisions of the pertinent sections of the legislation. Chapter 3 offers
a critical look at the official statistics on deportation, and explores some
of the misleading conclusions suggested by the official reports of the
Department of Immigration. The fourth chapter outlines the early years
of deportation, identifying the patterns developed in those years that would
be significant in subsequent decades. Chapter 5 examines in more detail
one of these patterns: the systematic deportation of radicals and dissidents
in the period immediately before and after the First World War. Next,
Chapter 6 describes the deportation practices of the mature bureaucracy
between 1920 and 1935. Chapter 7 returns to the theme of political depor-
tation to explore the use of deportation to control those who resisted the
social and economic conditions of the Great Depression of the 1930s.
The wholesale deportation of the unemployed (denied by the government)
from Canada during that same period is described in Chapter 8. Finally,
Chapter 9 considers the arbitrary and unjust manner (and often illegal)
in which deportation has been carried out.
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Although deportation played a crucial part in immigration policy,
and was from time to time the subject of controversy, it has been little
studied by historians. Perhaps this lack of interest is due to the general
impression, carefully cultivated by officials and politicians responsible for
its management, that deportation was an exceptional and infrequent occur-
rence, caused by the failing or malfeasance of individual immigrants. As
this book will show, nothing could be further from the truth. It is only
through careful examination of behind-the-scenes evidence that the fallacy
of this blame-the-victim explanation can be seen. The sources upon which
this book is based include internal records of the Department of Immigra-
tion, as well as those of municipal and provincial governments and other
federal departments; oral history interviews; first-hand accounts of victims
and their supporters; contemporary and historical legal and other
documents, and scholarly studies.
The responsibility for deportation - and immigration - has moved
from one ministry to another over the years, and operated under various
names. (For the sake of consistency, I have referred to "the Department
of Immigration" throughout.) At Confederation, immigration and quaran-
tine matters were dealt with by the Department of Agriculture. In 1892,
immigration matters were moved to the Department of the Interior, which
dealt with land settlement; a separate Immigration Branch was set
up as part of Interior in 1893. (Quarantine services remained under
Agriculture until 1918, when they, along with immigration medical inspec-
tion services, moved to the newly created Department of Health.) An inde-
pendent Department of Immigration and Colonization was established in
1917; this arrangement endured until 1936.
Although the period after that date is beyond the scope of this study,
readers may wish to know the recent history of the Department. From
1936 to 1950, Immigration was reduced to a branch of the Department
of Mines and Resources. The Department of Citizenship and Immigration
was formed in 1950 from the Immigration Branch of Mines and Resources
and the Citizenship and Citizenship Registration Branch of the Secretary
of State; this was replaced by the Department of Manpower and Immigra-
tion in 1966, which became the Canada Employment and Immigration
Commission in 1977, now part of the Ministry of Employment and
Immigration. Since 1967 deportation has been the responsibility of the
Immigration Appeal Board. Although certain features of the law, policy,
and procedures have been changed, the essentials have remained
consistent to the present day.
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Canada's deportation practices were among the most arbitrary in
the Commonwealth. Parliament and the courts were neither well informed
about, nor had significant control over, the policies and practices of the
Department of Immigration, whose bureaucrats carried out a clandestine
and illegal immigrant selection process, and deported immigrants according
to their own informal and extralegal system of justice. Immigration offi-
cials misrepresented and concealed their activities. "Deports" had fewer
rights than criminals; they were not entitled to due process, to know the
precise nature of charges against them, to confront their accusers, or to
be tried by a jury of their peers. They were presumed guilty and their
hearings took place at closed administrative tribunals.
Deportation helped to relieve employers, municipalities, and the
state from the burdens of poverty, unemployment, and political unrest.
Deportation helped the municipalities to "shovel out" some of their poor
in much the same way as emigration had helped English parishes in the
early nineteenth century, and reduced relief and other maintenance costs.
Deportation removed workers when they became useless, surplus, or
obstreperous. It helped the state to reduce maintenance costs for some
of its non-producing members, by deferring these costs to the economies
of the sending countries. It also served some function of social and polit-
ical control by eliminating social protesters. Deportation was a neces-
sary part of immigration, the equivalent of the sewage system of cities.
It was the drain through which our immigration refuse was directed, in
order to assure that ''the river of our national life'' would not be ' 'polluted
by the turbid streams"1 of the immigrant unfit, unemployed, and
unprofitable.
Deportation of the economically unfit is a practice going back to
the early days of English poor relief. Eligibility for poor relief (welfare)
was based on the right of "settlement", akin to domicile or citizenship.
Settlement was acquired through birth; women took their husband's
settlement upon marriage. By the mid-nineteenth century, settlement could
be gained in some circumstances by five years' residence. Parishes could
rid themselves of paupers or prospective paupers who did not have
settlement by a process called "removal".2 Legal removal was carried
out by an overseer of the removing parish, and took place from the parish
where the person lived but did not have settlement, to the parish of
settlement. When done legally, it was a costly process. Less expensive
alternatives were popular. One was to have the person arrested for
vagrancy. This was so common as to lead one scholar to comment that
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vagrancy laws were ' 'the penal side of the poor law.'' The vagrant could
simply be sent through parishes by cart from constable to constable until
he or she reached the home parish. The minimal costs were paid by the
parishes through which the vagrant moved. In some cases the vagrant
was punished by whipping or imprisonment, or both, before being sent
away. Another cheap method was used against pregnant women who
did not have settlement. Even non-pauper pregnant women represented
a potential cost to the parish. If their child was born in a given parish,
there it would have settlement. Single women, and married women who
may have been settled by birth, but lost their own settlement when they
married a man from another parish, were vulnerable to such removals.
Sometimes parishes tried to smuggle women over the line into the next
parish, quite late in their pregnancy. Substantial numbers of pregnant
women became vagrants because they were expelled from parishes. The
practices employed were often "bereft of both humanity and decency"3
The powers of the parish to remove were increased by the Act of
Settlement of 1662, which defined categories of removables. As long as
people did not apply for relief, they might be left alone unless it seemed
likely that they would become public charges. If they did apply for relief,
however, their removal was likely. The 1834 Poor Law Report recom-
mended some reform in this area, notably that the practice of removing
pregnant women cease, and that a child born outside of marriage take
its mother's settlement, regardless of where it was born.4
The parallels between British poor law removal in the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries and deportation from Canada in the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth are striking. In most instances, persons were
safe from expulsion if they had settlement or domicile. Expulsion was
usually contingent upon becoming a public charge. Persons who did not
apply for relief were generally untouched. Legal removal or deportation
was used to pass paupers and their relief costs back to their home parish
or country of origin, where they could not be deferred or refused. To follow
the legal procedures laid out in the legislation was costly to the removing
parish or to the federal government. Attempts were frequently made to
cut down the expenses: by sending vagrants away in carts and having
the in-transit parishes pay costs, in the one case, or forcing the
transportation companies to pay, in the other.
Deportation was intimately connected to poor relief in late nine-
teenth and early twentieth century Canada. The Department of Immigration
stated on numerous occasions (and the law confirmed it) that deportation
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was a relief to the municipalities and provinces. Canadian transportation
companies seem to have concurred in this view, as a Canadian Pacific
Railway (CPR) Passenger Agent made clear in his complaint that the CPR
was being asked by Immigration to help municipalities "shovel out'' their
paupers: "Municipalities should take care of their own poor," he said;
"there is no reason that I can see why private corporations should
participate in a matter of this kind anymore than any other tax payer."5
Deputy Minister of Agriculture J. C. Tache testified in 1877 that
All countries which receive large numbers of immigrants naturally
adopt a rule of this nature; I notice in the report of the New York
Immigration Commissioners, very considerable sums for a service of
this kind, even in prosperous years.6
States often "repatriated" foreign paupers. New York State alone
removed 1,672 public charges between 1923 and 1928, removed
177 insane immigrants in 1928, and 197 in 1929. This was in addition
to the bulk of legal deportation, which was carried out by the U.S. federal
government.7 Canada too "repatriated" immigrants; this is shown by
the Department's internal statistics on problems with British female domes-
tics in the 1920s and 1930s. "Repatriation", whether by federal or local
government, constituted an informal and extralegal system of deporta-
tion. Both informal and legal systems of deportation played an important
role in Canadian immigration policy.
The stated ideal of Canadian immigration policy was to attract a
permanent agricultural population. Behind this ideal, thinly concealed and
little denied, lay a more-or-less Wakefieldian system.8 These permanent
settlers would often be forced into wage labour, either in the short term
to accumulate the capital to start farming their own land (' 'cash stake"),
or in the long term to supplement inadequate farm earnings.9 Hidden
behind that bitter but still palatable modification of the ideal lay yet another
reality: a massive system of importing industrial workers who could hardly
claim to be farmers, even potentially. As Donald Avery has shown,
Canada's immigration policy promoted the recruitment of a large body
of unskilled industrial workers who would function (and likely remain)
as an industrial proletariat.10 Yet whether the immigrants were thought
to go straight to their Prairie homesteads, to detour briefly or intermit-
tently into wage labour, or to be permanently absorbed into the indus-
trial sector of the economy, one thing was clear: Canada claimed to expect
these immigrants to become Canadians.
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Even the severest critics of Canadian immigration policy accepted
the claim that Canada was trying to attract a permanent population.
Attempts by corporate interests to import large numbers of contract
workers for short-term jobs were refused by the government. As Avery
points out, Immigration officials ' 'time after time refused to allow industrial
workers into the country on temporary permits."11 If industrial workers
entered Canada, they came on the same legal terms as the highly prized
legitimate agriculturalists on whose work of building the nation it was
much more politically sound to focus: as landed immigrants who were
eligible for citizenship after three years. (After 1919 the period was
extended to five years.)
The federal government was uncomfortable about what they recog-
nized to be the reality of the immigrant industrial proletariat lying behind
the myth of the immigrant independent agricultural producer. But this
"reality" was little more than another myth that disguised a politically
devastating truth: "many of the Europeans who came to Canada were
in effect guest workers, who met the needs of Canadian industry and
agriculture and then went home."12 In fact, by 1920 the federal govern-
ment systematically determined how many harvesters would be needed,
and encouraged and sometimes directly supervised their importation from
the U.S. and the British Isles. Although harvesters came in as landed
immigrants, "the Annual harvest migrations to the Prairie Provinces led
to no considerable permanent movements of population," George
Haythorne (later Assistant Deputy Minister of Labour) explained in
1933.13
Agriculture's seasonably makes it easy to detect this stream of
migrant labour thinly concealed within the flow of would-be permanent
settlers. Yet other industries were equally if not more dependent upon
this type of work force. This was particularly true of lumbering, mining,
and railway construction. The Department was not particularly pleased
about this. As Avery points out, "by 1913, Immigration officials were
concerned that Canada was becoming increasingly committed to a guest-
worker form of immigration." But there was little that the Department
could do. These industries wanted "an expendable labour force [that]
takes its problems away when it is re-exported," as the American
Dillingham Commission on Immigration put it in 1910. The Department
could only refuse to issue temporary work permits.14 This did not matter
to the employers: as long as there was a flow of cheap immigrant labour,
it made little difference whether they were legally guest workers or landed
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immigrants. In fact, the latter status offered a number of advantages to
the employer, in part because it was unregulated.
Canada's concealed guest worker system offered significant
economic and political advantages to employers and the state. A migrant
work force displays certain characteristics. As Michael Burawoy has
pointed out, the functions of maintenance and reproduction of the migrant
work force invariably take place in different locations. In a migrant labour
system, the costs of renewing the work force are passed on completely
or partially to the sending economy or state. The employer of migrant
labour is "neither responsible politically nor accountable financially to
the external political and economic systems,'' that is, to the sending coun-
tries.15 The receiving, or employing, country has greatly reduced costs
for social services partly because the families of workers remain in the
sending country, where the costs of educational, medical, and other social
services are paid. These reproductive costs (of family formation, child
rearing, and labour market training) are thus of no concern to the receiving
employers or government. Migrant labour is cheap not only in terms of
lower wages paid to the migrant worker, but in terms of other maintenance
costs of the work force. Migrant workers can be kept in camps, fed en
masse, and provided with minimal welfare services. Moreover, if these
workers are injured, incapacitated, or incapable, neither the employer
nor the state is obliged to take care of them in the long term. Since, under
this system, these workers have no claim on the resources of the receiving
country or the employer, they can be sent back "home" when their
usefulness is at an end. In some instances, migrant workers may end
up becoming domestic workers as long-term residents or citizens, and
change from migrant to immigrant with a consequent improvement in
status in terms of political if not economic rights.
The situations of South African migrant miners and California farm
workers have much in common with those of immigrant industrial workers
in Canada earlier this century. South African mine tasks were allotted
according to race, workers were housed in barracks in isolated camps,
and paid enough to keep themselves going and send a bit home, but not
to save a large enough amount to stop wage work. In Canada there was
also a system of occupational segregation and subordination based on
ethnicity; many workers were housed and fed in isolated camps, often
at very low standards. Sojourners who came to Canada in boom times
may have realised their dream of returning home rich but, for many -
or possibly the majority, in times of economic depression - suddenly the
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dream could turn to ashes. The pre-First World War railway workers are
a case in point: thousands were trapped by the depression, imprisoned
in internment camps during the war, and released to the big companies
when the demand for their labour again became acute.
The alternatives for many of these immigrants, if not the majority,
were: to continue working in Canada, taking (or hoping to take) long visits
back home; to become an agricultural settler, often on land so marginal
or so expensive to put into production that continued seasonal wage work
was necessary; or to join the permanent industrial proletariat. Deciding
to remain permanently in Canada was no guarantee that they would be
permitted to do so. Unless immigrants lived here continuously long enough
to attain domicile and, ideally, citizenship, they could be deported if they
got into trouble or ceased to be productive workers. This deportation could
take place legally and formally, under the auspices of the Department,
or it could take place informally, outside the legal framework. For instance,
an immigrant thrown out of work might apply to a municipality for some
form of poor relief; the municipality would then report the immigrant to
the Department and set in motion the legal deportation process. Alterna-
tively, the municipality could refuse to grant relief. In many cases, this
would leave the immigrant little alternative but to effect his or her own
do-it-yourself "deportation". This method was even cheaper for the
municipality and the federal government, and was favoured in times of
economic distress.16
There was much less incentive to give poor relief to immigrants
in Canada than in some other places. In the British Isles in the eighteenth
century, in parts of the U.S. in the twentieth, poor relief was given to
agricultural and other workers to retain them until their labour was needed,
at which time the relief was cut off and they were forced to take the avail-
able jobs. In Canada it was not necessary to use poor relief to maintain
a readily available supply of cheap labour; immigration provided this,
particularly after the First World War when inflow was directly adjusted
to the labour requirements of certain large employers.
Deportation was one of the mechanisms that maintained a balance
between the need for cheap labour in times of economic expansion, and
the desire to cut welfare costs in times of economic contraction. Those
who were superfluous to demand or useless to production, and those who
upset or threatened the system could be removed, if they were immi-
grants - and they often were. Deportation deferred some of the costs of
maintaining and reproducing the labour force onto the sending country
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and economy. Deportation was an unheralded but important way not only
to keep the stream of immigration pure, but, more to the point, to keep
profits high and problems few. An industrial economy needs a large supply
of mobile labour. Canadian immigration policy made sure that acquiring
that labour supply was not a problem. Deportation helped to assure that
removing it was not a problem either. Deportation, both formal and infor-
mal, helped to create a hidden system of migrant labour that functioned
much like a' 'guest worker'' system, even though stated policy was that
immigrants were to be permanent settlers.17 It was a concealed but
necessary regulator of the balance between labour demand and labour
supply, which was in itself a critical determinant of Canadian immigra-
tion policy and practice between 1900 and 1935.
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The Law and Deportation
1 he legal bases for the actions of the
Department of Immigration were the Immigration Acts and amendments
passed by Parliament, supplemented by various Orders-in-Council. Depart-
mental policies, regulations, and practice were mandated to conform to
the decisions of Parliament which, with Cabinet, was responsible for
determining and overseeing the Department's activities; such was the
continuing judgement of law courts. Although Parliament passed the laws
that governed the Department, most Members of Parliament were quite
ignorant about the powers and practices of the Department, particularly
insofar as deportation was concerned. Parliament's control was tenuous
and illusory. Most of the legislation related to deportation was passed
at the instigation of the Department itself. Information given to the Minister
and to Parliament was carefully selected by functionaries in the Depart-
ment. Legislative change was as likely to legalize existing practices as
to set in motion new procedures. From 1906 onwards, laws reflected the
increasingly arbitrary practices of the Department. Fundamentals of British
justice, such as the right to trial by jury, had no legal place in the
deportation process. As long as the Department followed the laws in the
Immigration Act, it was free to utilise the most arbitrary methods. The
courts were specifically prohibited from interfering as long as no illegalities
were discernible. Because deportation was defined as an administrative
proceeding, it was not subject to public scrutiny. Parliament had no way
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of knowing, and seemed to take little interest in, the details of the normal
day-to-day operations of deportation. Thus, there were few effective checks
on the Department.
Deportation of legal immigrants was not officially permitted before
the 1906 Immigration Act was passed. Nevertheless, there had been laws
since 1869 to restrict certain kinds of immigration, and since 1889 certain
classes could be sent back whence they came. The Department of Immigra-
tion followed "a general line of action" whereby immigrants insane,
disabled, or destitute in Canada were required to be shipped back at the
transportation companies' expense, much as if they had never gained
admission. The 1906 Act allowed the Department to deport immigrants
within two years of entry for many of the same causes specified as grounds
for exclusion.1 The deportation powers lay in several clauses of the Act.
Section 28 provided that
any person landed in Canada who, within two years thereafter, has
become a charge upon the public funds, whether municipal, provincial,
or federal, or an inmate of or a charge upon any charitable institution,
may be deported and returned to the port or place whence such
immigrant came or sailed for Canada.
Section 32 stipulated that those bringing in immigrants would, under
certain circumstances, be responsible for transporting them out of Canada
All railway or transportation companies or other persons bringing
immigrants from any country into Canada shall, on the demand of
the Superintendent of Immigration, deport to the country whence he
was brought, any immigrant prohibited by this Act or any order in
council or regulation made thereunder, from being landed in Canada
who was brought in by such railway, transportation company or other
person into Canada within a period of two years prior to the date of
such demand.
Prohibited immigrants under the 1906 Act included the diseased,
infirm, disabled, handicapped and destitute. The Governor General in
Council had the right to prohibit others:2
Whenever in Canada an immigrant has within two years of his landing
in Canada committed a crime involving moral turpitude, or become
an inmate of a jail or hospital or other charitable institution, it shall
be the duty of the clerk or secretary of the municipality to forthwith
notify the Minister thereof, giving full particulars. On receipt of such
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information the Minister may, on investigating the facts, order the
deportation of such immigrant at the cost and charges of such
immigrant if he is able to pay, and if not then at the cost of the
municipality wherein he has last been regularly resident, if so ordered
by the Minister, and if he is a vagrant or tramp, or there is no such
municipality, then at the cost of the Department of Interior.3
The Act of 1910 added provisions for deportation on the grounds
of moral and political unsuitability. The moral grounds were covered in
Section 3, which listed the prohibited classes; subsections (e) and (f) were
an expansion of the 1906 provisions against prostitution and related
offences, to which now [sexual] immorality was added:
(e) prostitutes and women and girls coming to Canada for any immoral
purpose and pimps or persons living on the avails of prostitution;
(f) persons who procure or attempt to bring into Canada prostitutes
or women or girls for the purpose of prostitution or other immoral
purpose;
The political provisions were found in Section 41:
Whenever any person other than a Canadian citizen advocates in
Canada the overthrow by force or violence of the government of Great
Britain or Canada, or other British dominion, colony, possession or
dependency, or the overthrow by force or violence of constituted law
and authority, or the assassination of any official of the government
of Great Britain or Canada or other British dominion, colony, posses-
sion or dependency, or of any foreign government, or shall by word
or act create or attempt to create riot or public disorder in Canada,
or shall by common repute belong to or be suspected of belonging to
any secret society or organization which extorts money from, or in
any way attempts to control, any resident of Canada by force or threat
of bodily harm, or by blackmail; such persons for the purposes of this
Act shall be considered and classed as an undesirable immigrant, and
it shall be the duty of any officer becoming cognizant thereof, and
the duty of the clerk, secretary or other official of any municipality
in Canada wherein such a person may be, to forthwith send a written
complaint thereof to the Minister or Superintendent of Immigration,
giving full particulars.
Any immigrant in Canada contrary to the provisions of the Act
was subject to investigation by the Department, and if suspected of
belonging to the prohibited or undesirable classes, could be detained for
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examination by a Board of Inquiry composed of officials of the Depart-
ment. If, after investigation, the person were found to be a member of
the prohibited or undesirable classes as specified by the Act, they would
be deported, subject to right of appeal to the Minister.4
The provision for deportation for certain conditions or types of
offence under the 1910 Act established the legal framework for deporta-
tion that was to remain substantially unchanged until well after the Second
World War (and in some respects until the present day). Subsequent legis-
lation refined procedures; specified the steps in the processes by which
deportations were to be carried out; increased the numbers and types of
immigrants technically deportable; and expanded the already considerable
powers of the Department to act arbitrarily, as long as it adhered to the
complicated regulations. The main features of deportation, and the main
legal causes given by the Department to account for its deportations, were
established with the passage of the 1910 Act.
American practice was perhaps the single most important influence
in shaping the 1910 Canadian legislation. This influence was particularly
evident in the clauses that excluded immigrants on account of their
immorality or their political beliefs. The U.S. Act of 1903 to regulate the
immigration of aliens into the United States was "prohibitive in charac-
ter," according to a study done by a Canadian immigration official, and
unlike Canadian legislation, contained almost no provisions for the
protection of immigrants on the voyage or at landing.
Among the prohibited classes in the U.S. law of 1903 were:
anarchists, or persons who believe in or advocate the overthrow by
force or violence of the Government of the United States, or of all
government, or of all forms of law, or the assassination of public
officials.
This was; the first time in either country that immigrants were prohibited
on account of their political beliefs.5
The U.S. prohibition of anarchists marked the crest of anti-anarchist
hysteria following the 1901 assassination of President McKinley. It was
almost completely unnecessary because there were virtually no immigrant
anarchists to exclude or expel. Canada had even less reason to fear this
group, but nonetheless Canada followed the American example and by
1910 included anarchists in its prohibited classes.6
Although there were few alien anarchists in the U.S., there were
other kinds of radicals considered dangerous, such as the Industrial
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Workers of the World (IWW) and other labour "agitators" (particularly
the new industrial unionists). To U.S. immigration authorities, they were
all dangerous "anarchists". Tensions between the conservatives and
vested interests, on the one hand, and the reformers, progressives, and
radicals, on the other, were high in the U.S. Tightening up on immigra-
tion legislation, especially concerning the exclusion and expulsion of
"undesirables", was one of the responses to this tension. The situation
in Canada and the official response to it were similar to those in the United
States, so far as the Department of Immigration was concerned.
Canadian preoccupation with U.S. immigration law is on record
at least as early as 1900, when Canadian immigration authorities noted
with interest the sections on exclusion and expulsion in the U.S. Treasury
Department Digest of Immigration Laws and Decisions of 1899. In 1904
Canadian Minister of Immigration Clifford Sifton requested a comparison
between Canadian and U.S. laws, to be used in amending the Canadian
legislation. In subsequent years, the U.S. Act was again seen as a model
by various Canadian immigration officials concerned with revising Canadian
laws. These officials used as a point of reference the U.S. Act's defini-
tions of terms, of classes prohibited, classes deportable, deportation proce-
dures, and length of time during which immigrants could be deported.
Although it was not necessarily their intent to always have Canadian legis-
lation copy U.S. law, Immigration officials regarded U.S. legislation as
a model and wanted to incorporate certain of the U.S. provisions into
the Canadian Act.7
Sifton had supported this view when he was Minister from 1896
to 1905. So did his successor, Frank Oliver, although it is not clear whether
he came into office with this view or was converted to it by his staff.
The galley proofs of Oliver's proposed 1906 Bill compared in detail the
provisions of the new Canadian legislation with the existing law, explaining
the defects of the latter and the merits of the former by comparison to
U.S. legislation. Subsequent discussion in Parliament was based on this
material. Oliver also ordered the Department to make a clause-by-clause
comparison between the proposed 1906 Canadian legislation, and the
existing U.S. Act. In the new Canadian Act of 1910, there were some
departures from U.S. legislation. While the prohibited classes were essen-
tially the same, the Canadian Act did not bar anarchists from entry;
instead, it provided for their post-entry deportation. There was also a
difference in the statute of limitation for deportation, i.e., the period after
landing within which an immigrant could be deported. In Canada it had
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been two years; in the U.S., three. The Canadian period later became
the same.8
The debt owed to the U.S. legislation was acknowledged by
Canadian officials. In the Commons, Oliver explained,
while we have taken advantage of a good deal of the work that has
been done in the drafting of the United States Act we have not found
it advantageous to follow it in all its particulars.
The most compelling reason for not following it exactly seemed to be that
certain sections of the U.S. Act were not clearly worded, or did not address
Canadian conditions. Other sections were applicable in their entirety, and
were reproduced verbatim. When U.S. officials were shown the Canadian
Bill and asked to comment, the U.S. Commissioner of Immigration at Ellis
Island wrote to the Canadian Chief Medical Officer that he was gratified
indeed "to note how closely together the two Governments are working
on immigration lines."9
How U.S. laws found their way into the Canadian Immigration
Acts can be seen in the insertion into the Canadian Act of 1910 of
"immorality" as grounds for exclusion or expulsion. Before this, depor-
tations for immorality had taken place, but they were not legal deporta-
tions and officials were concerned about repercussions. In a 1907 case
the Winnipeg Commissioner of Immigration Obed Smith wrote to his
superior, Superintendent of Immigration Scott, about a Swedish man
"carrying on immoral practices to the detriment of public welfare,'' who
had been deported very rapidly when he threatened to fight the order.
Safer methods were needed. If the immigrant could be convicted of a crime
involving moral turpitude (never clearly or satisfactorily defined), they
could be deported as a criminal; there could be no appeal and no "prob-
lem". The Commissioner suggested an amendment to the Immigration
Act: an immigrant who was' 'guilty of immoral practices'' or who ' 'seems
to be unable to discriminate between right and wrong," or who "is a
moral pervert in the opinion of the Department, shall be declared an
undesirable." Without such an amendment, it was risky for the Depart-
ment to illegally deport an immigrant' 'who plainly was an undesirable,
yet [as the Commissioner himself admitted] scarcely came within the exact
wording of the Act."10
By 1908 the Department realized that laws must be passed to legal-
ize its current practices. The Department had been brought to court for
its illegalities, and had been forced to release several "deports", as they
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were called. Early that year, the Department wrote to a variety of offi-
cials, agents, medical officers and the like, soliciting suggestions for amend-
ments. T.R.E. Mclnnes, a lawyer who had done intelligence-gathering
and policy-advising immigration work for Laurier, was hired by the
Department to draft a new Act. Mclnnes worked directly with Minister
Oliver to respond to pressures from within and outside the Department
for various amendments. In Mclnnes' original draft of December 1909,
there was no immorality clause. The later draft that became law included
immorality as a ground for exclusion and deportation.11 Mclnnes had
been strongly opposed to such a provision. Superintendent Scott was
strongly in favour.
Scott had become preoccupied with the problem of "eloping
couples". In March 1909 he had complained that under the provisions
of the existing legislation he could not prevent eloping couples from
immigrating to Canada, and he wanted the power to stop them. Canada
debarred only prostitutes and those living off the revenue of prostitution.
Unless "elopers" were connected with prostitution, they could not be
legally excluded or expelled.12
Scott wanted the Canadian law to use the same language as that of
the United States. Mclnnes strongly disagreed with this suggestion. He had
deliberately left out the phrase referring to immorality from his draft of
the Act, believing that as long as it fell short of prostitution, immorality
was not "any business of an Immigration officer or of a Government."
Prostitution was a crime; immorality was not. Adultery, for instance,
although a crime in some of the American states, was not criminal
according to British or Canadian law. As well, Mclnnes decried the U.S.
"tendencies to meddle in purely personal and private affairs." Immigration
officers were "not intended to be general custodians of the morals of
passengers to Canada, nor are they qualified to regulate the exercise of
natural functions," he argued. Further, Mclnnes believed that it was a
mistake to keep out "elopers". On the contrary, he thought "the more of
them the better'' because they usually settled in agrarian districts and' 'if
they have the spunk enough to elope, they must have the makings of
citizens in them.'' But he told Scott that he would "as in duty bound . . .
lay your suggestion before the Minister." The issue languished on the
Minister's desk for nine months. Scott revived it by sending the Minister
a list of all of the suggested amendments to the Act. The new Canadian
Act, which received assent 4 May 1910, followed U.S. practice and
language in making immorality grounds for exclusion and expulsion.13
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Political exclusion and deportation provisions of the Canadian Act
were also virtual copies of U.S. legislation. Until 1910, the Amendments
to the Immigration Act were generally concerned with clarifying defini-
tions; outlining duties of immigration officials; increasing and specifying
the responsibilities of the transportation companies for delivering healthy
acceptable immigrants; providing for more widespread and thorough civil
and medical inspections; increasing the power of the Governor General
or the Minister to prohibit or control certain aspects of immigration; and
prohibiting or expelling particular types of immigrants. Before 1910,
potential immigrants had been prohibited from entering Canada when they
were deemed to have physical or mental defects; when they had already
become, or would in future likely become a public charge; or when they
were criminals. Prohibition was based on personal undesirability. As
individuals, these immigrants might constitute a danger to the public
health, the public safety, or the public purse. Immoral immigrants were
also individually undesirable, in effect a danger to public morals. The polit-
ically undesirable were another category altogether. They were not neces-
sarily undesirable on physical, mental, or moral grounds, as individuals.
Their undesirability as a class sprang from the view of the government
that they were "directly a menace to the state."14
This "dangerous" class was covered under Section 41 of the 1910
Act. According to the explanatory notes on the Bill to Amend the Act,
which was first introduced as Bill 17 in 1909, and passed as Bill 102
on 22 March 1910, Section 41 was based on Section 2 of the American
Act. The note explained the danger of this group and justified the measures
taken by the U.S. government to deal with the problem. In Washington,
a special bureau dealt with anarchists, who were increasingly seen as
a danger to society. This section of the Canadian Act, the note said, was
intended to prevent similar types of people from becoming a menace in
Canada. The wording of the Canadian Act was similar to that of the
American Act.15
Similar parallels exist between the U.S. legislation of 1917 and
1918, and the Canadian amendments of 1919. Departmental correspond-
ence shows that these parallels were deliberate. Scott wanted to include
two points in the new legislation: "certain prohibited classes", and a
limit of five years for deportations instead of three. The five-year limit
for deportations applied generally in the U.S., except in the case of
immigrants who were political offenders. For them, there was no limit;
under the U.S. Act of 1917, they could be deported at any time after
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entry. This Act was originally passed by the U.S. Congress and vetoed
by the President in 1913, and again in 1915. President Wilson was
concerned about the difficulty of distinguishing between political exiles
and anarchistic property-destroying radicals. In February 1917 Congress
overrode Wilson's second veto and the Act became law. Thus, aliens
deemed to conform to its provisions could be deported "at any time"
after legal entry. This provision was unchanged in the 1918 U.S. Act
upon which certain clauses in the Canadian legislation of 1919 were to
be based.16
The 1919 Canadian Bill to amend the Immigration Act explained
its debt to U.S. legislation. A U.S. Public Health Service definition of
' 'constitutional psychopathic inferiority'' was used, for example. Yet more
noteworthy were the similarities of the last-minute amendment rushed
through both Houses on 5 June 1919 and assented to 6 June 1919, which
made it possible for the government to deport a naturalized citizen, or
almost anyone not Canadian-born, on account of their political beliefs
or actions, no matter how long they had been in Canada. This measure
passed through the Commons with no debate, in something like seven-
and-a-half minutes, and through the Senate in perhaps ten minutes.17
The 6 June 1919 amendment affected only Section 41 of the Act.
As amended, the section read:
(1) Every person who by word or act in Canada seeks to overthrow
by force or violence the government of or constituted law and authority
in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, or Canada, or any
of the provinces of Canada, or the government of any other of His
Majesty's dominions, colonies, possessions or dependencies, or
advocates the assassination of any official of any of the said govern-
ments or of any foreign government, or who in Canada defends or
suggests the unlawful destruction of property or by word or act creates
or attempts to create any riot or public disorder in Canada, or who
without lawful authority assumes any powers of government in Canada
or in any part thereof, or who by common repute belongs to or is
suspected of belonging to any secret society or organization which
extorts money from or in any way attempts to blackmail, or who is
a member of or affiliated with any organization entertaining or teaching
disbelief in or opposition to organized government shall, for the
purposes of this Act, be deemed to belong to the prohibited or undesir-
able classes, and shall be liable to deportation in the manner provided
by this Act, and it shall be the duty of any officer becoming cognizant
thereof and of the clerk, secretary, or other official of any municipality
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to send a written complaint to the Minister, giving full particulars:
Provided, that this section shall not apply to any person who is a
British subject, either by reason of birth in Canada, or by reason of
naturalization in Canada.
(2) Proof that any person belonged to or was within the description
of any of the prohibited or undesirable classes within the meaning of
this section at any time since the fourth day of May, one thousand
nine hundred and ten, shall for all the purposes of this Act, be deemed
to establish prima facie that he still belongs to such prohibited or
undesirable class or classes.18
The 6 June amendment was aimed at the British-born leaders of the
Winnipeg General Strike19 as well as at radicals who were not deportable
under the previous law.
Although the amendment was precipitated by the Winnipeg General
Strike, its roots lay in events in Canadian society as a whole, and in what
was becoming a habit by the officials of the Department of Immigration
of following American precedent in their shaping of Canadian immigra-
tion law. By early 1919, Canada was in a state of political uproar. The
powers-that-be feared class warfare. There was much discontent among
ordinary working people because of high inflation. There had been a series
of union recognition and cost-of-living strikes during 1918 and 1919,
some of them quite serious, such as those among municipal and railway
employees. Union membership exploded as unskilled and ethnic workers
joined industrial unions in numbers not equalled again until 1943.
Organizing drives were beginning to reach mining, logging, and harvesting
workers and railroad navvies, as well as workers in the non-primary
sectors. Arthur Meighen spoke for those who feared where this would
lead when he said that radical industrial unionism simply could not be
permitted because it would line up all of the employed against their
employers, and they would be "fighting it out for supremacy."20
Discontent had political sources as well. Since the "conscription
election" of 1917, there had been angry complaints about profiteering
(which was even more distasteful in view of the rate of inflation), and
about conscription, which was seen as an "unequal sacrifice"; that is,
the rich should be required to sacrifice money if ordinary people were
to be required to sacrifice their lives. The government was understand-
ably nervous about this situation and attempted to crack down on its critics
through a series of Orders-in-Council in September 1918 designed to
suppress radicals of all kinds. Order-in-Council PC2384 was aimed mostly
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at the IWW and the Russian Social Democratic Party, but also proscribed
a number of organizations desiring to bring about economic, political,
governmental, industrial, or social change in Canada by force, violence,
or injury to any person or property. PC2786 added more names to the
list of proscribed organizations. PC2381 banned publications and litera-
ture using Finnish, Russian, Ukrainian, Hungarian, and German, for
example.21
The effect of this crackdown was to label ethnic organizations as
radical and to drive ethnics to the left. The unity among radicals that the
government had feared was in fact increased. In the face of this unity,
the Borden government appointed the Mathers Commission (Royal
Commission on Industrial Unrest), and hoped to stifle the radicals by pass-
ing a series of reforms which were essentially meaningless. John Bruce,
the chief organizer in Canada of the American Federation of Labour, and
Tom Moore of the Trades and Labour Council (TLC), were representa-
tives on the Commission. The Commission travelled the country for the
first four months of 1919, and listened to stories of discontent even from
those who described themselves as conservative.
By the week of 6 June 1919, events had reached a crisis in the
Winnipeg General Strike. At that time, the government told Bruce and
Moore that they were to sit down and write their recommendations for the
Royal Commission. They were assured that no panic action would be taken
against the strikers; rather, some measure of reform would be effected,
based on their recommendations.'' They double crossed us," said Bruce ,22
The betrayal took the form of Bill 03, an additional amendment
to the original 1919 amendments to the Immigration Act. The originally
proposed 1919 amendments would have left Section 41 substantially
unchanged, but the new amendment was draconian, at least by Canadian
standards. Significance lay in two provisions. The original 1919 Bill had
modified Section 2 (d) of the Immigration Act, to prevent the attainment
of domicile and to assure that domicile already gained was lost' 'by any
person belonging to the prohibited or undesirable classes within the mean-
ing of Section 41 of this Act." Thus, domicile was no protection against
politically motivated deportation. The stated intent of this amendment
was to allow the Department to deport anarchists and other Section 41
undesirables even after five years' residence. This would have been impos-
sible under the old provision which allowed deportation on political grounds
only if an immigrant were an anarchist at entry, or became so before
five years had elapsed.23
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This was drastic enough, but the 6 June amendment provided also
that anyone who was not a Canadian-born or naturalized citizen could
be deported for political offences. Here was a provision obviously aimed
at the British-born Winnipeg General Strike leaders. British subjects born
outside Canada gained Canadian citizenship automatically after acquir-
ing domicile, rather than by naturalization. A final provision made
Section 41 retroactive; that is, if someone had fallen "within the descrip-
tion" of the prohibited and undesirable classes within the meaning of
Section 41 "at anytime" since 4 May 1910, that person was still a
member of that group and by definition deportable under these provi-
sions. Citizens by naturalization were not safe either. Under the 1919
Amendment to the Naturalization Act, if someone were shown to be
"disaffected'' or' 'disloyal'', their naturalization could be revoked; they
would then fall under Section 41 and could then be deported.24
At the same time, the Criminal Code was amended by Order-in-
Council. The new sections, 97A and 97B, were the most directly equiva-
lent to Section 41 of the Immigration Act. Section 97A dealt with any
organization that aimed to "bring about any government, industrial, or
economic change'' in Canada by acts or threats of force, violence, or injury
to person or property, or to advocate these for the purpose of bringing
about such changes "or for any other purpose." Such a group was
an "unlawful association". The property of such an association or its
officers could be seized under the authority of the Dominion Police or the
RCMP, and forfeited to the Crown. Anyone displaying anything (such
as insignia or literature) suggesting any connection with such an unlawful
organization was by definition guilty and liable for up to twenty years'
imprisonment. In the absence of proof to the contrary, anyone going to
meetings, speaking publicly, or in any way acting on behalf of an organi-
zation, was considered a member. Anyone permitting such a meeting
to take place could be fined or jailed (up to $5,000 or five years, or
both). Judges could issue warrants to search for and seize any documents
or other evidence of membership in, or affiliation or sympathy with,
such an unlawful association. Section 97B dealt with publications, liter-
ature and advertising connected with these organizations, providing for
prison sentences of up to twenty years for anyone publishing, selling,
circulating, or importing any such materials. It also made it the duty of
any Canadian official to seize such materials found in any vehicle, or vessel,
or on docks, in stations, post offices, or otherwise being shipped or
distributed.
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These sections, later known as Section 98, were added to the Crimi-
nal Code to widen categories of political offences, acts, thoughts, or affili-
ations considered seditious.25 Earlier, such offences had been covered
mainly by Sections 132 and 133 of the Criminal Code. Section 133 had
said that certain activities were not seditious if undertaken with the proper
intent (with the idea that his Majesty was mistaken or misled in some-
thing, or if the offender were merely pointing out defects in governments
or institutions in order for these to be lawfully changed and improved),
as opposed to intentions of illegal or violent overthrow or destruction.26
Section 133 was repealed and replaced with Sections 97A and 97B.
Because these latter provided that association with unlawful or seditious
organizations or persons was itself seditious, and did not provide for
innocent intent, they were in every way more severe and less judicious
than the Section 133 they replaced.
Much has been made of the 1919 emergency amendments. It is
undeniable that they were rushed through Parliament by the Meighenite
hard liners (left in charge while Borden was off in France signing the peace
treaty), in order to use deportation to deal with the Winnipeg General
Strike leaders who could not be dealt with by the Criminal Code as it then
stood. Deportation - an essentially arbitrary, closed, administrative
proceeding - was particularly attractive in the circumstances. Although
they did not in fact succeed in deporting the British-born strike leaders,
Minister of Labour Gideon Robertson later claimed that this legislation
was used to deport ' 'a substantial number of men in different parts of
Canada" although "most . . . were not British subjects."27
The Department's subsequent claim that no British subjects were
deported under this amendment, or, alternatively, that no deportations
were made under the legislation has been accepted by historians of the
left, as well as politicians. On the other hand Gideon Robertson claimed
in 1920 that the retroactive subsection (2) had been so effective in cleaning
out all of the undesirables that it was no longer needed a year after it
had been passed.28 There is no indication in the files of the Department
that anyone was upset by Robertson's statement, or felt compelled to
correct, challenge, or deny it. At the very least, Robertson's claims made
in the Senate debates (which extended over a period of two sessions) throw
into question the validity of the Department's assertion that deportations
were not made under the 6 June 1919 amendment.
Parliament took less than an hour to augment Section 41 of the
Immigration Act with tremendously broadened and arbitrary powers to
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deport immigrants for political offences. But it was to take nine full years
to remove these added powers and return this Section to the form in which
it entered the Act in 1910.29 The delay was occasioned not by the
attempts of the Department to retain these powers (for in fact whatever
their private feelings, Immigration officials drew up several Bills for repeal)
but rather by the intransigence of the Senate, which refused on five
separate occasions to pass liberalizing or revoking measures.
The 6 June 1919 amendments to Section 41 displeased the left,
and to a certain extent some of the right. What little protest there was
from the latter, as from the mainstream, emphasized the discrimination
against British-born subjects under the amendment: aliens who had
become naturalized citizens were safe from deportation (unless of course
they had their certificates revoked), while British-born immigrants here
for the same length of time could be deported because their Canadian
citizenship was not based on naturalization. In effect, the amendment
legalized the deportation of a class of Canadian citizens. The Quebec branch
of the Great War Veterans Association protested, but not against the depor-
tation of undesirable immigrants regardless of how long they had been
in Canada - that was all to the good, as far as they were concerned. Rather,
they were upset that British-born subjects who had citizenship by domicile
were subject to such deportation.30
Labour protested the 6 June amendment. Within a week, Tom
Moore of the TLC, and other union representatives met with Premier
Borden and Minister of Immigration James Calder, to demand that the
amendment be removed. Moore wanted to return to Section 41 as it had
been in 1910, arguing that it was unfair and illegal to have different stand-
ards for deportation for political offences than for other offences under
the Immigration Act. Further, Moore argued that if a British subject got
into political trouble, he or she should ' 'be dealt with under the Criminal
Code and be made to suffer the penalty of the law in Canada rather than
be deported therefrom." Moore was not convinced by the Department's
claim that the discrimination against political offenders was based on the
fact that they were as a class "directly a menace to the state."31
The strong showing of the Progressives in the 1921 election helped
labour and other groups attempting to create pressure for changes in
repressive laws. This was certainly an important factor in attempts to
repeal the 6 June amendment, and probably explains much about the ulti-
mate achievement of this goal. The first such attempt had been made
in April 1920, however, before the Progressive federal sweep (Ontario
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and Manitoba provincial elections showed changing public opinion earlier).
The government introduced a Bill to eliminate "right away" the provi-
sion in Section 41 for the "deportation of a British subject for sedition,
conspiracy, etc." The phrase near the end of the first clause in Section 41
that kept British-born Canadians liable would be eliminated, and instead
the phrase "every person other than a Canadian citizen" would be
substituted.32
What constituted Canadian citizenship had been defined in section
2 (f) of the 1910 Immigration Act. A Canadian citizen was (1) a person
born in Canada who had not become an alien (for example, by marrying
an alien, in the case of Canadian-born women, or by taking another citizen-
ship) ; (2) a British subject who had acquired Canadian domicile (three
years' residence in 1910; five years' in 1919); or (3) a person natural-
ized as a citizen under Canadian law (after the same residence require-
ments for domicile) who had not become an alien (by marriage, for women)
or lost Canadian domicile (by living out of the country for a certain period,
for example). Anyone who was not a British subject was an alien. These
definitions set forth in the 1910 Immigration Act were unchanged in 1919
or thereafter.33
According to the Department, the changes to Section 41 proposed
in 1920 would place British subjects born outside Canada on an equal
footing with all other immigrants, and would remove subsection 2, which
had been very controversial. The Department's memo to Minister Calder,
to brief him for his presentation in Parliament, argues that this subsection
was "unfair" legislation because it was retroactive to 1910. The Depart-
ment reiterated its claim that it had not used the legislation, but wanted
nonetheless to "save considerable hard feeling" by revoking it.34
In the Senate, Minister of Labour Gideon Robertson argued on
several grounds in favour of removing the broad powers given to
Section 41 in the 1919 amendment. The first reason was that the emer-
gency that gave rise to the need for such special powers was over.
Secondly, Robertson said, labour had pointed out that it was "unfair and
un-British ... to say that a British subject should be deported without
a trial." This essentially unarguable point, he said, made the legislation
a red flag in the face of which labour would be even harder to control.
As for the claim that removing the special powers was an act of weak-
ness, he thought this almost absurd. The government claimed that the
amendment had been necessary in the first place because the Criminal
Code was inadequate, but subsequent amendments to the Criminal Code,
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passed in June 1919, had rendered it quite adequate to deal with subver-
sives. Thus, the 1919 Immigration Act amendments were legally super-
fluous, argued Robertson.
Thus far, Robertson's arguments echoed the Department's brief
used by Calder in the Commons. But flatly contradicting the Minister and
the Department of Immigration, Robertson went on to boast that the 1919
amendments were not only legally but also practically superfluous - not
because they had never been used to deport anyone, but rather because
the government had already successfully and thoroughly used the legis-
lation to rid themselves of all of the subversives and other undesirables.
Robertson claimed that there was nobody left in Canada whom the govern-
ment wanted to deport who could not be dealt with under Section 41,
as it had stood before the 6 June 1919 amendment:
Citizens of foreign countries who came to Canada and were guilty of
seditious acts and utterances merited deportation, even though these
utterances or acts were committed prior to the time the legislation was
passed [6 June 1919]. We dealt with a substantial number. Now, that
having been done, and more than a year having gone by during which
that work has been carried out and concluded, there is no necessity
for continuing on our statute books a law that will permit an officer
of the Immigration Department to cause to be deported a British subject,
who has been in this country more than five years.35
The Senators were not convinced. Alarmed by the same stirrings
that were to change the House of Commons, they believed that the unrest
of the previous year still existed. To the Senators, to remove the amend-
ment would be to announce to people like the Winnipeg strikers that they
were free to carry out their "nefarious" activities. Removing the special
powers from Section 41 was "well calculated to encourage agitators all
over Canada ... a confession of weakness on the part of the Govern-
ment, '' and would be seen as bowing to pressure from labour organiza-
tions.36 The Bill was soundly defeated.
The second attempt to remove the 1919 amendment took place
at the end of 1921 when the government introduced Bill 139 in the House
of Commons. The provisions concerning Section 41 were much as the
year before; that is, repealing subsection 2 and replacing the excepting
phrase in the end of Section 1 with the clause ' 'except for Canadian
citizens." Yet another clause in the Bill revealed more clearly the King
government's strategy of concessions to the mainstream of labour, while
The Law and Deportation 27
opposing more radical (industrial) unionism: representatives from inter-
national labour organizations were to be given easier temporary entry
as was already given to commercial travellers or professionals. This was
a concession for which the American Federation of Labor had long been
pushing. That part of the amending Bill was no problem, but the provi-
sion to amend Section 41 remained controversial. The Bill passed in the
Commons but was defeated in the Senate.37
Labour MP Woodsworth's private member's bill was the only
attempt made to change the immigration Act during the 1922 session.
The Woodsworth bill provided for trial by jury for political offences
committed in Canada, before deportation for those offences. Woodsworth
also proposed repealing subsection 2, the retroactive clause in Section 41,
and objected as well to the provision that the mere suspicion of belong-
ing to any secret organization of a proscribed type was grounds for
deportation. Woodsworth characterized the 6 June amendment as "abso-
lutely vicious in character." Minister of Immigration Charles Stewart
countered that the Woodsworth bill would "throw the gates very wide
open." Meighen, architect of the 1919 repressive measures, claimed
that his amendments ' 'had never been used arbitrarily.'' Woodsworth's
bill was eventually defeated by a wide margin. In fact, it never had
a chance: deportation without trial by jury was a fundamental part of
Canadian immigration law, a point which Woodsworth and other progres-
sives never completely understood. Until the Department worked out
alternative strategies, jury trials were unacceptable. Nonetheless, a
special committee appointed to study the bill proposed, and the Commons
agreed, that the sections permitting the deportation of non-Canadian-born
British subjects who had acquired domicile be removed from the Act in
the next session.38
Bill 136, the third attempt by the government to eliminate the 1919
amendments to Section 41, passed the Commons 11 May 1923. It
provided that "any alien in Canada'' (that is, any non-British non-citizen,
domiciled or not) who came under the list of offences outlined in the
sections should be deported. The 1923 bill clarified the language of
Section 41, repealed the section concerned with assuming the powers
of government (the phrase that had been aimed at the Strike Commit-
tee), the phrases that included offences against government or legally
constituted authority (the narrow anarchist clause), and also repealed sub-
section 2 and eliminated the clause permitting the deportation of domiciled
British subjects.39 The Bill did not pass in the Senate.
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Essentially the same process took place in 1924, with Bill 195 given
first reading in the House 24 June. The Department claimed again that
it had never deported anyone under the' 'extended authority'' of the 6 June
1919 amendment. The bill got through the House, but the amendments
to Section 41 were defeated for the fourth time in the Senate by a vote
of about twenty-five to seven, leaving the Immigration Act unchanged.40
The fifth, almost annual, attempt to remove the 1919 amendments began
early in 1926 in more or less the same fashion as its predecessors. The
bill sent to the Commons in March was the 1924 version of the amend-
ments to Section 41.
The labour members of the House, dissatisfied with the bill, wanted
more thorough amendments and in 1926 were in a position to attain them,
as the King minority government needed labour support to stay in power.
Labour's objections to Section 41 were two-fold: it allowed deportation
for political offences after a hearing by a Board of Inquiry rather than
a court conviction based on a trial by jury; it discriminated against the
British-born because they could be deported while domiciled, while an
alien naturalized as a Canadian citizen could not be deported. Bill 91
introduced in March 1926 restored Section 41 to what it had been before
the 6 June amendment. This satisfied labour's second objection but not
the first. Woodsworth demanded amendments to provide for court trials
in political deportation cases, as well as to end the discrimination against
domiciled British-born immigrants. Woodsworth did not necessarily intend
to put up a battle to prevent deportation after domicile, but was deter-
mined to end deportations for Section 41 offences ' 'unless there has been
a conviction" in a court of law.41
In response to Woodsworth's criticism, the Department prepared
two other versions of Bill 91. The first alternative would altogether repeal
Section 41 and make political deportations possible only following criminal
convictions. They thought this version would be easier to pass, and would
avoid claims that the Department was trying to increase its power. At
the same time it would satisfy the labour members. But the Department
preferred the second version, which would repeal Section 41 and at the
same time modify Section 40. Section 40, the main provision for depor-
tation in the Immigration Act, set out various grounds for deportation,
such as becoming a public charge, becoming an inmate of a hospital for
the insane or other public or charitable institution, or becoming convicted
of a criminal charge. These provisions, as a rule, did not apply to persons
who had been in Canada for more than five years and who thus had
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domicile. (For certain causes persons here more than five years could be
deported, mainly if they had not legally entered or had been at entry a
member of the prohibited classes and thus were by definition incapable
of acquiring domicile no matter how long they were here.) The Department
proposed to change Section 40 so that any alien regardless of domicile,
and any Briton who had not yet obtained domicile, could be deported
under Section 40. Thus the Department could deport domiciled aliens who
had become inmates of institutions after they had lived in Canada more
than five years. "We might not get this through, but it would strengthen
our hands if we could,'' wrote Acting Deputy Minister Frederick Blair.42
The Department recognized that there might be some objection to
strengthening its powers under Section 40 by removing the exemption
against deportation for domiciled aliens, but it did not think these objec-
tions could be upheld. "I cannot see there is any reason why we should
recognize the right of an alien to exemption from deportation after living
in the country for five years if he is an undesirable within the meaning
of Section 40," said Blair. Becoming a public charge, inmate of a public
or charitable institution, hospital for the insane and so on, or "convic-
tion for any political or other criminal offence at any time while he resides
in Canada would make him subject to deportation." Under this bill, the
only safety for aliens in Canada would be naturalization as a Canadian
citizen. "If an alien wants to remain an alien and yet be protected against
deportation, he can do so by behaving himself in Canada."43
In order for this strategy to work, the Criminal Code would have
to be amended to "save as much of Section 41 as possible" so that
offences under Section 41 would become offences under the Criminal Code.
Under the proposed scheme, a political offence would result in arrest,
court trial, and if conviction resulted, a Board of Inquiry would merely
determine that such a conviction had taken place and deportation would
be automatic. In fact, said Blair, "it would simplify matters for the
Department, if deportation for a political offence were dependent upon
a conviction in Canada."44
Blair believed that the existing provisions of Part II of the Criminal
Code were relatively adequate to replace Section 41. In a memo to the
Deputy Minister, Blair explained that Part II of the Criminal Code con-
tained Sections 73-141 which covered offences against public order and
external security. Blair thought that the offences listed in Part II were
roughly equivalent to the offences covered in Section 41 of the Immigration
Act.45
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At the same time that labour members had been successfully pres-
suring the Liberal minority government to try to amend Section 41 of
the Immigration Act, they were similarly pushing for amendments to the
Criminal Code. What Blair had not known while he was devising his scheme
to extend the powers of the Department by amending Sections 40 and
41 was that a Bill to amend the Criminal Code, by repealing Section 97A
and 97B and reinstating Section 133, was about to be introduced. The
Department of Immigration was not happy about this event. If Section 41
were repealed and deportation made contingent upon criminal convic-
tion under the Criminal Code minus Sections 97A and B, it would be harder
to get rid of immigrants for political reasons. Blair concluded that' 'there
appears to be little left in the way of political offences for which an
immigrant may be convicted."46 The Department had no objection to
political deportations requiring a court conviction rather than a Depart-
mental hearing, as long as tough provisions for seditious or subversive
offences were left in the Criminal Code.
Yet even without the help of the Criminal Code, all would not be
lost. The Department had a variety of other legal categories within which
to deport "undesirables", which also could be used to deport political
undesirables. As well, persons in trouble for political offences were likely
to have legal, economic, or social problems: loss of job, arrest on techni-
cally correct but spurious charges (such as vagrancy, riot, unlawful assem-
bly, incitement to riot, assault, resisting arrest). These problems were
likely to bring such persons "within reach of the Department," as offi-
cials often phrased it, and thus easily deportable for some violation of
the Immigration Act such as having become a public charge or having
been convicted of a crime. Further, the Department expected that the
increase in its deportation powers under a strengthened Section 40 would
make up for the loss of power if Section 41 were repealed.
In the original Bill 91 of 1926, Section 41 used the phrase, ' 'when-
ever any alien [advocates in Canada the overthrow by force etc.]"; that
is, British subjects, domiciled or not, and naturalized Canadian citizens,
could not be deported under Section 41. The 1919 Section 41 had provided
that' 'every person'' was liable for deportation on these grounds, except
for Canadian citizens by birth or naturalization.47
It was Blair's version of the 1926 Bill that was passed by the House;
non-citizens convicted of certain criminal (political) offences were deport-
able under the revised Section 40, regardless of domicile. This was the
Bill that was introduced to the Senate. Liberal Senator Raoul Dandurand,
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who introduced it, explained its merits almost word-for-word from a memo
prepared for the occasion by Blair. He repeated once again the arguments
of the past five years: the "emergency" was long past; the 1919amend-
ment put too much power in the hands of a Board of Inquiry which might
consist of just one Immigration officer with little or no legal training; and
British justice and the public interest demanded that Courts of Justice deal
with political offences. The proposed amendment would leave the country
ample protection against undesirables under Section 40 because Part II
of the Criminal Code covered political offences equivalent to those covered
in Section 41 of the Immigration Act. Finally, and surprisingly, he argued
that the 1919 amendment should be repealed because it had never been
used, so there would be no loss in being rid of it.48
No one challenged Dandurand's assertion that the 1919 powers
had never been used. Senators Tanner and Griesbach asked if there had
been no deportations; Dandurand replied that there had been none. No
one referred to Gideon Robertson's emphatic and detailed claims in the
1920 debate. Even more extraordinarily, Dandurand claimed that
Section 41 in the 1910 version had never been utilised.49
The Senators were unpersuaded. Winnipeg Tory Senator Lindrum
McMeans' comments were typical. The "Red menace" had grown, he
said: "today the country is honeycombed with people who are preach-
ing these doctrines even in the Sunday Schools.'' The government could
now get rid of a political undesirable without "the expense of charging
him with a crime or keeping him in the penitentiary." Why should the
government "charge [political agitators] with a crime and ... try them,
when you have not any evidence to convict them? Do you think anyone
of good character would be accused of sedition and deported?" he asked.
Several Senators felt that the anti-sedition sections of the Criminal Code
were not adequate replacements for Section 41, particularly if Section 133
were reinstated and Sections 97A and B and were repealed, as proposed.
It is interesting to note that Dandurand repeated the claims of the
Department of Justice that there had been "no prosecutions before our
courts anywhere in the country under these sections."50
One of the few Senators who demurred was Sir Allen Aylesworth,
a Toronto Liberal and a constitutional lawyer. Aylesworth recalled his
involvement as an MP in the 1910 Commons debates on the initial addi-
tion of Section 41 to the Immigration Act. He argued that political depor-
tation should not be a matter for a tribunal, but rather for the courts:
"I thought in 1910 that it was a most dangerous thing to deny any
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British subject the right to have his case investigated in court by judge
or jury ... I still think so." The Section was too arbitrary, took away
"British liberty'' and the right of habeas corpus, and violated the Magna
Carta. Dandurand's view was similar: he characterized political deporta-
tion by tribunal as "an arbitrary autocratic act." Liberal Senator Napolean-
Antoine Belcourt went further, suggesting Section 40 should be repealed,
' 'on stronger grounds than 41," because it permitted deportation without
court trial. Other Senators were skeptical or indifferent.51
James Calder, former Minister of Immigration, poured scorn on such
sentiments. Pointing out that the right to a court trial for political offences
had been negated by law "for a long period of years", and that there
was little essential difference between the 1919 and 1910 versions of
Section 41, he argued that the Canadian government, like its South African,
Australian, and American counterparts who simply rounded up and
deported such "undesirable persons", must have strong powers to deal
with radicals. But such powers would never be abused, he claimed:
In practice that would never take place at all. When the law was
changed in 1919 I was Minister of Immigration, and there were those
who at the time desired to have one of our immigration officers try
certain people and decide whether they should be deported or not.
I as Minister and the Government as well, would not allow that at
all. We said, "In those particular cases let the question go to the
courts." It did go to the courts , . . there has never been a case in
which any hardship has occurred under this law, either under the 1910
provision or under the amendment of 1919. There is in the law a power
that the government, through its officers, can exercise if it chooses,
but I am quite certain that in the administration of this law no Minister
of Immigration, or no government would ever allow one, two or three
immigration officers to deport a man without the full knowledge and
sanction of the government itself - not only the Minister, but of the
entire government - for deportation is a serious matter.52
Of course this was patent nonsense. And Calder was better informed
than many of the Senators, most of whom did not realize that court trials
had no place in deportation. Most understood little or nothing of the
Immigration Act or the workings of the Department of Immigration.
Apparently they had little interest in the issue, for they failed to challenge
inconsistencies, and willingly accepted conflicting and illogical claims.
Ultimately they defeated a motion to take the bill to second reading, with
a margin of nearly two to one.
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Senators not involved in the affairs of the Department had little
routine access to information about its practices. But Calder's astonish-
ing misrepresentations are another matter. It is difficult to believe that
he simply did not know or understand that his underlings routinely used
arbitrary star chamber tactics in closed hearings, in violation of British
traditions of justice (although consistent with immigration law), or even
acted illegally on occasion.53
Acting Deputy Minister Blair explained to Bruce Walker, senior
Canadian Immigration official in London,' 'No doubt Mr. Calder had refer-
ence to what was done in Winnipeg in 1919 when a special Board of
Inquiry was created and the Police Magistrate, if I remember correctly,
was made a member'' of the Board that tried and deported several non-
British Winnipeg Strike activists. Blair seems to imply by this that such
an appointment created a Board less arbitrary (albeit less legal) than one
composed only of Department officials. Nevertheless, said Blair, Calder's
statement was "absolutely incorrect as a matter of law and the Section
as it stands does just exactly what Mr. Calder said no Government would
do, viz., put into the hands of any Board of Inquiry, even if one person,
the power to order deportation."54 And such had been the case since
Section 41 was first introduced in 1910.
It was in 1928, on the sixth try, that the special powers of politi-
cal deportation given the Department by the 6 June 1919 amendment
to Section 41 were finally removed. This time the government took a differ-
ent approach, initiating the process through an Order-in-Council, then
moving to the Commons. The Commons Bill 187, which removed
Section 41 and strengthened Section 40, was introduced by Minister of
Immigration Fowke, who explained that the approach through the Order-
in-Council had been taken because the same measure had been passed
the previous session by the House but turned down by the Senate. It is
not clear if his intent was to avoid debate or merely to expedite. Because
the same bill had been approved before, it moved through the House
quickly, with little debate and few questions. The government reiterated
its argument that Section 41 was unnecessary, as political deportations
could be carried out through Section 40 of the Immigration Act and Part II
of the Criminal Code.
The bill passed easily. In the Senate, however, it hit another snag.
The debate repeated the familiar arguments that removing the 1919
powers from Section 41 would be ' 'bowing to the Reds.'' Finally the bill
was referred to a special committee. The committee amended the bill;
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they eliminated all reference to deportation by trial by jury for political
offences listed in the Criminal Code, and instead returned Section 41 to
more or less what it had been in 1910. The Section after the 1928 amend-
ment was passed read, "whenever any person other than a Canadian
citizen advocates in Canada . . . ." Subsection 2 was gone, along with
the clause that permitted the deportation of domiciled British subjects.
All of the 1919 amendments were done away with. The 1928 Act met
all of the labour objections to the provisions under which political
deportation was carried out, except for the most important: trial by
jury.55
The position of the Immigration Department remained relatively
unchanged. Deportation had always had as little to do with the courts
as possible. The Department was not accountable to the courts or to
Parliament as long as it stayed within the law. Despite the fact that they
still could, and did, deport people quite routinely for political activities
or reasons, overt political charges were usually unnecessary because there
were so many other labels that could be used. Thus the Department was
not unwilling to eliminate its unusual powers and normalize Section 41.
The Department did not overstate the case when it said that it did not
need emergency powers; normal ones were quite sufficient. As long as
deportation remained a purely administrative proceeding, and as long as
the Department acted within the law that gave it such a broad scope,
arbitrary decisions could continue to be the norm.
In the ensuing years, all attempts to curb the Department's powers
were stymied, including one proposal by Woodsworth and his labour
colleagues to abolish the Department of Immigration and Colonization,
as it was by then named. In 1931, Woodsworth's Bill 44 attempted to
ensure that someone resident in Canada for ten continuous years could
not be deported. The Department argued that this would make it impos-
sible to deport undesirables such as mental defectives, epileptics, and crimi-
nals. In 1933 and 1934 Woodsworth attempted to amend the Act to
redefine "public charge'' to exclude people receiving unemployment relief.
Again, the Department pointed out the inconvenience and expense that
would result if the Act were passed. The amendment, it claimed, was
clumsily worded and its purpose was unclear. In 1934, CCF-Labour MP
Abraham Heaps tried to amend Section 40 so that municipalities would
not have to notify the Department about immigrants who had become
public charges. The Department argued that municipalities had never con-
sidered this anything but optional.56 The issue in the 1930s was not the
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law governing deportation, but rather the way in which the Department
acted under the provisions of the law.
The Department could deport people under three broad headings:
for something they had done, or for some condition, prior to entry; for
something in their manner of entry; or for something done, or some
condition, after entry. The provisions concerned with the first category
could be found mostly in Section 3 of the Act which listed prohibited
immigrants. Prohibitions were concerned with medical conditions, with
political beliefs or activities, economic situation, criminal record, or morals,
as well as a catch-all category of those entering or remaining in Canada
contrary to the provisions of the Immigration Act. All that was neces-
sary was to show that an immigrant belonged to a prohibited class, and
therefore could not, by definition, legally enter Canada and obtain domicile.
Deportation of someone in the prohibited classes was very much like
refusing to admit them at the port of entry, and in effect, claimed the
Department, was just such a retroactive refusal to admit. Deportation for
membership in the prohibited classes was not limited by period of
residence. Theoretically an immigrant could be deported after decades of
Canadian residence. Some were.
Deportation for something connected with the manner of entry was
also fairly simple to carry out. Section 33 of the Act set out the require-
ment to submit to inspection upon entry, and to submit to questions put
by an Immigration official as part of the examination for entry. If it could
be shown that someone had entered without being inspected and legally
admitted, or someone had obtained entry by misrepresentation or fraud
(by lying about or concealing some information that might have placed
them in the prohibited classes), then such a person was not in Canada
legally and could be deported automatically once that fact were estab-
lished. This too was represented as retroactive refusal at the port of entry.
Deportation for causes arising subsequent to legal entry into Canada
was less simple. The Act set out in Sections 40 and 41 most of the major
causes for deportation under this third heading. Section 40 provided for
the deportation of persons who had become public charges, or who had
been convicted of crimes. Many of the reasons for deportation set out
in Section 40 were similar to those in Section 3 detailing the prohibited
classes; the main difference was the element of time. Under Section 40,
municipal officials were responsible for sending to the Department a written
complaint that an immigrant had become a public charge or inmate. After
ascertaining that this was indeed the case, the Department could effect
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deportation of an insane or feebleminded inmate of a hospital, either under
Section 3 or Section 40, Deportations under Section 40 were usually limited
to within five years after legal entry (after 1919; before that date, the
limit was three years). The Department found it easier to deport a domiciled
immigrant under Section 3, or even under Section 33. Time spent as an
inmate as described by Section 40, however, did not count towards getting
domicile.
Deportation was an administrative, not a judicial matter; there-
fore prospective deports did not have the rights that they would have
had in a judicial process. The administrative proceeding was based on
a hearing in front of a panel of officers of the Department who were
appointed by the Minister. In some cases one officer of the Department
could constitute the hearing body. There was provision under the Act
for warning the deport of his or her rights, however limited they were.
Theoretically they included the right to be represented by legal counsel,
although very few immigrants could afford it, and the Department was
not enthusiastic about interference by lawyers. The single operative right,
as far as most cases were concerned, was the right to appeal the deci-
sion of the Board of Inquiry to the Minister of Immigration. If the hearing
had been carried out according to the regulations, following the proce-
dures outlined in the Act, the proper forms filled out, the proper phrasing
used, and the evidence adduced in standardized ways according to direc-
tives issued by the Department, then there would seldom be a basis for
overturning the decision. In some instances cases went beyond the Depart-
ment of Immigration. The Deputy Minister might ask the Department of
Justice for an opinion on a legal technicality - usually some question about
the meaning of a phrase in the Act, or whether some evidence would
be construed as supporting a particular conclusion or line of action.
The deportation process was overturned by the courts only when
the Department got caught being sloppy in its procedures, exceeded its
legal authority under the Act (which was not easy to do, since its authority
was so broad) or, occasionally, when some flaw in the Act was discov-
ered. The Department tried to carry out its procedures so that they would
stand up to court examination if necessary. When a court decision went
against it, the Department would try to amend the Act, or issue orders
to follow procedures that would be less vulnerable to interference. The
Immigration Act gave officials of the Department the power to determine
and administer deportation, with virtually no interference from the courts
or Parliament.57
3
Incidence and Patterns of Deportation
1 he obvious place to look for infor-
mation about the extent and causes of deportation is in the published
annual reports of the Department of Immigration (under its various names
over the years). Each annual report gives the number of people deported,
and the causes for which they were deported. Yet these seemingly straight-
forward statistics are at best misleading, and at times deliberately decep-
tive. For example, in the annual report for 1933-34, the Department
pointed out that in the thirty years from 1901-02 to 1933-34, deporta-
tions amounted to only one per cent of total immigration.1 What the
Department was not so eager to discuss was the fact that the rate of depor-
tation was not constant, but rather had shown a consistent increase, from
.052 per cent in 1901-02, to 36.47 per cent in 1933-34. Individual years
showed a great deal of variation.
These tedious figures, innocuous at first glance, are puzzling when
more closely examined. For instance, the statistics indicate marked
increases and decreases in deportation. The first significant peak in the
rate of deportation was in the fiscal year 1908-09, when deportation
reached the rate of 1.18 per cent of immigration. The rate fell the next
year to below 1 per cent, and did not exceed this rate until 1914-15.
The following year the rate of deportation rose to 2.5 per cent, then fell
until 1921-22, when it rose again to more than 2 per cent. During the
mid-1920s, deportation remained above 1 per cent of immigration, and
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in 1929-30 it climbed again to above 2 per cent. The next few years saw
an unprecedented boom in deportation relative to immigration: for every
100 immigrants entering Canada during those years, between 27 and
36 were officially deported. The rate of deportation fell to a still high 9 per
cent in 1934-35, the last year considered in this study.
TABLE I2
FISCAL YEAR NUMBER OF NUMBER OF DEPORTS AS
ENDING IMMIGRANTS DEPORTS % IMMIGRANTS
1903 128,364 67 0.05
1904 130,331 85 0.06
1905 146,266 86 0.05
1906 189,064 137 0.07
1907 124,667 201 0.16
1908 262,469 825 0.31
1909 146,908 1,748 1.18
1910 208,794 734 0.35
1911 311,084 784 0.25
1912 354,237 959 0.27
1913 402,432 1,281 0.31
1914 384,878 1,834 0.47
1915 144,789 1,734 1.19
1916 48,537 1,243 2.56
1917 75,374 605 0.80
1918 79,074 527 0.66
1919 57,702 454 0.78
1920 117,336 655 0.55
1921 148,477 1,044 0.70
1922 89,999 2,046 2.27
1923 72,887 1,632 2.23
1924 148,560 2,106 1.41
1925 111,362 1,686 1.51
1926 96,064 1,716 1.78
1927 143,991 1,585 1.10
1928 151,597 1,866 1.23
1929 167,722 1,964 1.17
1930 163,288 3,963 2.42
1931 88,223 4,376 4.96
1932 25,752 7,025 27.27
1933 19,782 7,131 36.04
1934 13,903 4,474 32.18
1935 12,156 1,128 9.29
Increased rates of deportation may simply mean that the numbers
coming into Canada decreased while the numbers being deported remained
the same. Yet the increase in rates of deportation relative to immigration
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was matched fairly consistently by an increase in the absolute numbers
deported, beginning with 67 in 1902-03, and peaking at 7,131 in
1932-33. Generally speaking, deportation was higher in numbers in years
when large numbers of immigrants entered.
There were certain important exceptions to this trend. In 1907-08
there were 262,469 entrants, and 825 deports. In 1908-09, however,
there were slightly more than half the number of entrants (146,908),
but more than twice the number of deports (1,748). In 1913-14, there
were 384,878 immigrants admitted, and 1,834 deported. The following
year, entrants dropped to 144,789, while deportations remained at 1,734.
In 1918-19, immigration remained low at 57,702, with deportation cor-
respondingly low at 454. But in 1919-20, the number of immigrants more
than doubled to 117,336, while the number of deportations increased
by not quite a third to 655. For 1920-21, immigration was 148,477,
and deportation 1,044, while the next year immigration fell to 89,999
while deportation almost doubled to reach 2,046. Similarly, a striking
disjuncture between the numbers of immigrants versus deportations
appeared in 1928-29 and 1929-30, with 167,722 and 163,288
immigrants respectively, compared to 1,964 and 3,963 deportations. The
following year immigrants dwindled to 88,224 while deportations rose
to 4,376. The sharpest contrast was between the 19,782 immigrants
and the 7,131 deportations of 1933-34. This year represents the high
and the low points of the deportation-immigration work of the Department.
These relationships are clear in the following graphic.
We cannot trace a simple direct relationship between large numbers
of immigrants and large numbers of deports by fiscal year. Months or
years may have elapsed between the entrance and deportation of an
individual. In order to take this into account, it is useful to recalculate
the numbers entering over longer periods than the fiscal year in ques-
tion. Table II shows this recalculation. It gives the percentage of those
deported in relation to a moving average of those admitted. For the years
before 1919-20, a three-year moving average has been used (because
three years was the length of time necessary to establish domicile, after
which most immigrants could not be deported). For 1909, then, the
calculation represents the numbers actually entering in 1908-09, 1907-08,
and 1906-07, divided by three. The figures used for the years after
1919-20 are based on a five-year moving average (the time to establish
domicile having been increased to five years by the amendments to the
Immigration Act in 1919), so the rate for 1927-28, for instance, is based
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on the average of that year and the four previous fiscal years, including
1923-24.4
This smoothing out of irregularities is clearer in Graph II.
The rates of deportation measured against the moving averages
of immigration differ in some respects from the rates of deportation
compared to crude immigration figures by individual fiscal year. For
example,, Table II shows that the rate of deportation did not exceed 1 per
cent until fiscal 1920-21, although it did rise near to 1 per cent in
1908-09. Yet the rates of deportation for the 1920s remain as high
GRAPH I3
Immigration And Deportation By Fiscal Year
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as, and sometimes exceed, the crude rates shown in Table I. Table II
deportation rates for the 1930s, however, are as much as five times lower
than the crude rates for those years.
These tables show the proportion of deportations to immigration
(crude numbers or moving averages), while the graph below compares
the numbers of people deported to the moving averages of immigration.
This permits other comparisons. For example, the increase in deporta-
tion in 1907-08 is far sharper than the increase in immigration. Depor-
tations fall after 1908-09, hit a low in 1909-10, and then climb again
to the level of 1908-09; but during that period, immigration was increasing




(moving-averaged). Here again, there seem to be anomalies in the rela-
tionship between the numbers of people coming in and the numbers being
deported. There is a tremendous decline in entrants during the First World
War, together with a decline in numbers deported, but it was immigration
that declined more sharply. After the fiscal year 1917-18, the number
of entrants rose gradually for two years, and then climbed to the post-
war normal flow. During this same period, deportation fell gradually for
a year, then climbed far more sharply than immigration, reaching a peak
in 1921-22. During the 1920s, moving-averaged immigration increased
steadily, while deportation showed more peaks and valleys. In 1928-29,
the two streams diverged sharply: deportation soared while moving-
averaged immigration plummetted after 1930-31.
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Immigration (moving average) and Deportation
Clearly, deportation did not depend directly on the rate of immigra-
tion. It is insufficient to look at rates of deportation, or at absolute numbers
deported. Causes of deportation need to be considered.
The Department of Immigration included information on the causes
of deportation in its statistical reports each year. The five categories under
which causes were listed were: "medical causes", "public charge",
"criminality", "other civil causes", and "accompanying" (nondeport-
able members of deports' families, such as Canadian-born children).
Table III shows deportations reported by cause for each fiscal Year The
same information is depicted in Graph IV.
GRAPH III
fiscal year ending
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Table IV shows causes of deportation as a percentage of all depor-
tations within a given year. For instance, in 1923-24 the Department
listed 36 per cent of all deportations under the category of public charge.
According to statistics published by the Department, the single most
important cause of deportation for the whole period was becoming a public
charge. Their figures show a peak in public charge deportations in
1908-09, a plateau from 1913-14 to 1915-16 and, in 1921-22, another
TABLE III
NUMBERS DEPORTED, BY CAUSE
FISCAL OTHER
YEAR MEDICAL PUBLIC CRIMINAL- CIVIL ACCOM-
ENDING CAUSES CHARGE ITY CAUSES PANYING
1903 4 9 1 4 0 0 4
1904 6 1 1 9 1 1 3
1905 5 8 1 9 8 0 1
1906 110 18 1 4 4
1907 126 28 12 0 35
1908 392 309 68 30 26
1909 467 1,074 115 71 21
1910 212 348 130 44 0
1911 222 289 172 83 18
1912 229 343 242 128 17
1913 370 392 334 169 16
1914 570 715 376 163 10
1915 379 789 404 128 34
1916 206 635 329 68 5
1917 98 161 277 60 9
1918 39 91 274 84 39
1919 70 103 236 35 10
1920 123 158 334 22 18
1921 133 236 586 52 37
1922 313 950 630 105 48
1923 282 679 543 76 52
1924 649 775 511 93 78
1925 420 543 520 58 145
1926 410 506 453 189 158
1927 470 354 447 149 165
1928 519 430 426 257 254
1929 650 444 441 194 235
1930 600 2,106 591 107 559
1931 789 2,245 868 200 274
1932 697 4,507 1,006 270 545
1933 476 4,916 836 277 626
1934 301 2,991 493 250 439
1935 144 464 267 172 81
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GRAPH IV
Numbers Deported, By Cause
Fiscal Year Ending
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peak nearly as high as that resulting from the 1908 depression. From
1928-29 to 1929-30, public charge deportations increased five-fold (more
than twice the total in the 1908 depression), and doubled in the follow-
ing year. Public charge deportations peaked in 1932-33, and fell to pre-
TABLE IV
CAUSES AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL DEPORTATION BY
FISCAL YEAR (rounded nearest per cent)
FISCAL OTHER
YEAR MEDICAL PUBLIC CRIMINAL- CIVIL ACCOM-
ENDING CAUSES CHARGE ITY CAUSES PANYING
1903 73 21 00 00 06
1904 72 22 01 01 03
1905 67 22 09 00 01
1906 80 13 00 03 03
1907 63 13 06 00 17
1908 47 37 08 03 03
1909 27 61 06 04 01
1910 29 47 17 05 00
1911 28 37 22 10 01
1912 24 36 25 13 01
1913 29 31 26 13 01
1914 31 39 20 09 00
1915 22 45 23 07 02
1916 16 51 26 05 00
1917 16 26 46 10 01
1918 07 17 52 16 07
1919 15 23 52 08 02
1920 19 24 51 03 03
1921 13 23 56 05 04
1922 15 46 31 05 02
1923 17 42 33 05 03
1924 31 36 34 04 04
1925 25 32 30 03 09
1926 24 29 26 03 09
1927 30 22 28 09 10
1928 27 23 22 14 13
1929 33 23 22 10 12
1930 15 53 15 03 14
1931 18 51 20 04 06
1932 10 64 14 04 08
1933 07 69 12 04 09
1934 06 67 11 05 10
1935 13 41 24 15 07
TOTAL
1903-35 18 50 21 06 07
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Great Depression levels two years later. More than 50 per cent of all of
the deportations in the entire thirty-three-year period were listed under
the heading "public charge".
By contrast, over the entire period criminality accounted for 21 per
cent of total deportations, medical causes for 18 per cent, accompanying
for 7 per cent, and other civil causes for 6 per cent. In the early years,
nearly all of the reported deportations were for medical causes, until
1907-08 when public charge was invoked to deport more than one-third
of the cases of that year. Medical deportations did not again exceed those
for public charge until 1926-27; for the three years following that date
medical deportations increased.
Criminality did not emerge as an important cause for deportation
until 1908-09, when it almost doubled and then continued to increase
sharply for the next seven years. In the four years leading up to 1920-21,
criminality accounted for more than half of all deportations. By 1920-21,
it was the most significant single cause for deportation. Thereafter it was
superseded by other categories, although it continued to account for
substantial numbers of deportations. Less important, but waxing and
waning in small percentages that reflected the general intensity of all depor-
tation, were the categories, other civil causes, and accompanying. All
of the causes of deportation show gradual increases over the period, and
in a number of cases they rise even when the level of immigration is falling.
The Department's statistics raise a number of troublesome ques-
tions. For instance, the Department's published claim, that it had deported
only 1 per cent of the total number of immigrants entering Canada, came
at a very strange time. The Department was expelling immigrants (by
no means all of them recently arrived) at an embarrassing rate, and being
lambasted on that account in the Canadian and British press and elsewhere.
The Department's 1 per cent figure was a weak attempt to distract atten-
tion from the unprecedented high rate of deportation of the unemployed
during the Great Depression. Furthermore, this figure concealed, behind
an innocuous average, several previous heights in deportation - each one
of which was followed by a plateau higher than the previous norm, even
in the relatively prosperous 1920s. In this sense, the Department's use
of the average was a classic example of lying with statistics.
Another question is raised by the discrepancy between the peaks
in numbers expelled and numbers entering. There were four periods of
tremendous increases in deportation: 1908-09, 1913-14, 1921-24, and
1929-30. These peaks in deportation do not correlate to peaks in immigra-
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tion. For instance, from 1907-08, deportation more than doubled while
immigration was almost halved. The discrepancy between these rates
widened in the later periods. It is necessary to look beyond the sheer
numbers of immigrants, and the "bad apples in the barrel" theory for
an explanation of the marked fluctuations in deportation. What is striking
about these four periods is that they coincide with periods of severe
economic depression in Canada. Moreover, the Department's own statistics
show that the high numbers expelled at these times were largely composed
of those who had become public charges. In other words, those immigrants
who were deported in the peak depression periods were those who had
become pauperized in Canada as a result of general economic depression.
This conjuncture reveals as nonsense another common sense assumption:
that deportation was the result of individual failure for which the immi-
grants themselves were responsible. In fact, during the Great Depression,
deportation was an officially sanctioned alternative to unemployment relief
for immigrants. In times of low demand, Canada was able to export, by
legal and other forms of deportation, some of its surplus labour force.
Economic factors alone lie behind the majority of deportations as
reported by the Department. Ostensibly non-economic causes are more
difficult to explain when they show sudden rises or declines. Medical depor-
tations, for example, also show fluctuations different from those of the
immigrant stream itself. How can we explain the high numbers deported
for medical causes during the 1920s, when the rates were up to three
times those of prewar medical deportations? It is absurd to assume that
the state of health or physical condition of immigrants admitted to Canada
in the 1920s was much worse than in earlier decades, especially when
we recall that medical inspection became ever more stringent and restric-
tive. This too suggests that deportation cannot be ascribed solely or chiefly
to the qualities of the immigrants themselves.
Perhaps the most perplexing and provoking questions are raised
by the criminality category. On the surface, it seems clear cut: conviction
for a criminal offence was grounds for deportation. Yet in the nine-year
period after 1916, criminality accounted for one-third to one-half of all
deportations. There are marked variations in a rate that, by common sense
standards, should remain fairly constant. The statistics suggest recurring
crime waves among immigrants. Or is the apparent crime wave a creation
of the reporting procedure? Instead of an increasing propensity on
the part of immigrants to commit criminal acts, there may well have
been an increasing propensity on the part of the authorities to convict
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immigrants of crimes such as vagrancy, watching and besetting (picket-
ing), being a nuisance or obstruction to the police, as well as a number
of "enemy alien" infractions invented during the First World War.
The use of the criminality category to effect deportation for
"crimes" that were essentially political in nature, was a form of political
repression that continued for many years. Crime is not merely a legal,
but a socio-economic and political category.5 Criminality deportations
rose sharply in periods of political repression, for instance during the official
crackdown against the Industrial Workers of the World and other radical
industrial unionists around the First World War, and against political pro-
testors of the early 1930s. The Department's public statistics do not specify
the type of criminal activity for which immigrants were deported: political
crimes are lumped in with theft and assault. Moreover, ostensibly clear
cut violations of law may have political implications. The drug laws are
an example: supposedly intended to combat the drug traffic, the laws
were concerned with the consumption of opium by Chinese workers in
British Columbia, while ignoring the far more significant consumption of
opium by the white population (in pharmaceutical products). The Chinese
at that time were welcomed by employers as a cheap labour force; hated
by white workers who saw them as competitors; and a political hot potato
for the provincial government. Singling out the Chinese as drug offenders
made it easy to dispose of them, and to define labour issues in racial rather
than class terms. The racist focus of the drug laws also supported the
view that outsiders and aliens caused unrest6 - a claim which underlay
the use of the law to control and deport immigrants.7
Research has suggested that criminality statistics are a better reflec-
tion of social control than of real crime.8 One must question the source
for the categories used to develop criminality statistics. One must also
ask who is convicted, what are the circumstances, and which actions do,
and which do not, lead to convictions.9 Authorities have at times created
criminality categories to control certain elements of the population.10
Some social historians suggest that neither the crime statistics nor the
historical statistics and other data from which crime indicators are derived
can be reliably used for such a purpose.11 Other studies have identified
the use of the criminal justice system to control surplus population which
cannot be absorbed into the economy (or the polity).12
The Department's statistics can be manipulated to reveal as well
as conceal. Measuring deportation by cause against three- and five-year
moving averages of immigration produces an index with which to measure
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the use of the various causes to effect and explain deportation.
These index numbers do not add up to 100 per cent, across each
line. They are, however, strictly comparable to each other in a given year,
or over the entire period - a comparability which is lacking in the year-
to-year percentages in the "percentage by causes" table (Table IV). For
instance, compare public charge for the years ending 1912 and 1924.
The percentage for both years is 9 per cent, but the intensity has increased
sixfold from .11 to .67.
Several striking tendencies appear on this index. Public charge
remains the leading factor through most of the period, but its intensity
varies from three to almost ten times normal up to the 1920s. In this
decade it never falls below its pre-war peak, and in the 1930s it increases
eighteenfold, dwarfing all other causes. Nevertheless, during the First
World War, criminality rises to unprecedented heights, for a time far
exceeding the public charge category as the favoured device for deporta-
tion. In four years, from fiscal year 1906-07 to fiscal year 1910-11, depor-
tation changed from a one-cause system to a multiple-category system,
in which several lesser-used causes reinforced and occasionally supplanted
the favoured devices. The use of a multiple-cause system raised the
incidence of deportation as a whole to progressively higher levels,
whichever cause predominated.
This change in complexity reflected not only economic crises and
legislative actions, but also increasing bureaucratic sophistication and utili-
zation of the enforcement structures. The result of this was that an increas-
ing proportion of immigrants were expelled before they had completed
residency requirements, despite the fact that they had immigrated under
higher entrance standards. The intensity of deportation for all causes
increased from previous normal levels in the prosperous years, such as
1909-10 to 1913-14, to a still higher level between 1922-23 and
1928-29. Each prosperous, or, rather, "normal" period marks an
increased intensity in deportation.
The conclusion to be drawn is that while deportation was most
certainly a means of removing the unemployed and useless, it was some-
thing else as well. As the population rose, the flow of immigration (even
in the good years) could be filtered more carefully to ensure that the classes
Canada kept were the classes Canada wanted. The increasing intensity
of deportation suggests that this is not merely a myth: an immigrant of
the 1920s was three or four times as likely to be deported for any cause
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TABLE V
INDEX OF INTENSITY:
% OF DEPORTATION BY CAUSE AGAINST AVERAGED IMMIGRATION
FISCAL OTHER
YEAR MEDICAL PUBLIC CRIMINAL- CIVIL ACCOM-
ENDING CAUSES CHARGE ITY CAUSES PANYING
1903 0.06 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
1904 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
1905 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
1906 0.07 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
1907 0.08 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02
1908 0.20 0.16 0.03 0.01 0.01
1909 0.26 0.60 0.06 0.03 0.01
1910 0.10 0.16 0.06 0.02 0.00
1911 0.09 0.13 0.07 0.03 0.00
1912 0.07 0.11 0.08 0.04 0.00
1913 0.10 0.11 0.09 0.04 0.00
1914 0.14 0.18 0.09 0.04 0.00
1915' 0.12 0.25 0.13 0.04 0.01
1916 0.10 0.32 0.17 0.03 0.00
1917 0.10 0.17 0.30 0.06 0.01
1918 0.05 0.13 0.40 0.12 0.05
1919 0.09 0.14 0.33 0.04 0.01
1920 0.16 0.20 0.44 0.02 0.02
1921 0.13 0.24 0.61 0.05 0.03
1922 0.31 0.96 0.63 0.10 0.04
1923 0.28 0.69 0.55 0.07 0.05
1924 0.56 0.67 0.44 0.08 0.06
1925 0.36 0.47 0.45 0.05 0.12
1926 0.39 0.48 0.43 0.18 0.15
1927 0.41 0.30 0.39 0.13 0.14
1928 0.39 0.32 0.32 0.19 0.19
1929 0.48 0.33 0.32 0.14 0.17
1930 0.41 1.45 0.40 0.07 0.38
1931 0.55 1.57 0.60 0.13 0.19
1932 0.58 3.77 0.84 0.22 0.45
1933 0.51 5.28 0.89 0.29 0.67
1934 0.48 4.80 0.79 0.40 0.70
1935 0.45 1.45 0.83 0.53 0.25
than was his or her predecessor of the 1910s. This meaningful comparison
from period to period is only possible with this intensity index.
Two other anomalies emerge strongly from this index. First, crimi-
nality almost quadruples in intensity in the last three years of the First
World War, and becomes more intensely used than medical reasons, for
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most of the ensuing period. This reflects a change in deportation devices
which had important repercussions within the immigration bureaucracy
itself. Secondly, the increase in the use of all deportation causes in the
early 1930s epitomizes the more sophisticated shell game in which a
variety of ostensible causes concealed the real economic functions of
deportation. For instance, "other civil causes", that catch-all category,
increased two and a half times above any previous peak of intensity, in
the 1930s. By the 1920s, the process for "throwing the book" at potential
deports had been well established: any cause that would stick, would do.
The annual reports of the Department do not suggest the practices
revealed by internal documents. Some of the real reasons for deportation
were concealed behind the legal causes promulgated by the Department.
In order to understand why immigrants were deported, it is necessary
to go beyond what the Department told the public, and to examine what
the officials said to each other when they were not under scrutiny.
4
Developing the System, 1890S-1920
Deportation practices of Immigration
officials between the early 1890s and the early 1920s can be readily seen
to fall into three fairly distinct periods: 1890S-1906; 1906-1914;
1914-1920. During the first period, the Department was deporting so
informally and unofficially (and extra-legally) that little can be known
beyond the bare outlines of the practices of the time. Some trends are
nonetheless clear. Deportations were made on an ad hoc basis when
individual immigrants came to the notice of the Department, usually
because of a real or perceived incapacity to support themselves. Most
of these instances of inability to earn a living were due to some kind of
physical incapacity, because of illness or injury or some kind of defect
or condition. Often these people were casualties of industrial accidents.
Sometimes the inability was related to moral rather than physical
"disability"; this was a real and serious liability for women domestic
servants at this time, as they were judged fit to work in their employers'
homes not only on the basis of their physical but also their moral condition.
These early deports were judged and deemed unfit on an individual basis
and treated as individual cases.
Although the Department did not have the legal power to deport
immigrants before 1906, statistics show deportations did take place from
1902 onwards. As early as the 1890s the federal government had a firmly
established policy of sending back unwanted immigrants, that amounted
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to deportation. A system for shipping the deports had been developed
so that helpless, ill, feebleminded, or insane immigrants were taken care
of by immigration agents, railroad conductors, and other official and semi-
official persons during their journeys of deportation.1 After the 1902
Immigration Act gave government the power to set up a system (in effect
after 1903) to exclude or send back "undesirables", the same informal
methods; of deportation continued for the following few years.
Correspondence of the Department of the Interior (at that time
responsible for immigration matters) for 1895 shows that there was a
' 'long standing rule'' that immigrants who had become ' 'unable to earn
a living because of illness or bodily infirmity,'' accident, or other reason,
would be deported. The Department reported, "it is the practice to send
them back, as the simplest and cheapest mode of dealing with them."
Sometimes this procedure was referred to as the return of "failed"
immigrants. Often these people had been in Canada for less than a year,
but departmental files describe deportations of immigrants who had been
here four years or as many as ten years. The government often asked
transportation companies to reduce fares or issue passes; the govern-
ment sometimes paid all or part of the cost, depending on the financial
resources of the immigrant. The government accepted some measure of
responsibility for new arrivals in their first year, in accord with a policy
established in 1878,2 although this sense of responsibility seemed
most pronounced when the government was considering deporting the
immigrant.
The government did not automatically ship out people who had
fallen upon hard times. Immigration buildings were sometimes used to
shelter immigrants who were temporarily penniless, and Immigration
agents tried to help them find employment. On rare occasions they acted
contrary to policy by advancing funds to a particularly deserving family.3
Often immigrants fell on hard times through no fault of their own.
Immigrants who were disabled at work received no compensation from
their employers, and were sent home by the government at public expense.
For example, Johan Altmeir came out from Austro-Hungary in 1893 and
worked near Winnipeg for the Canadian Pacific Railway. He was wounded
through the heart by a piece of metal and although he recovered and
wanted to work, he was thereafter unable to do heavy work. The Depart-
ment decided that he should be sent home to Europe to his wife and child.
The CPR sent him free from Winnipeg to Quebec, the Intercolonial from
Quebec to Halifax. As he was unable to pay the reduced Atlantic passage
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so kindly granted by the Allan Line, the Department tried to arrange
for him to work his passage home.4 This could not be done and the
government paid.
In a somewhat similar instance, a young Dane could no longer work
after he lost a hand in an accident at a planing mill near Limbank, Ontario.
He had been working there for six months to learn English and save some
money to go out farming in the Northwest. Because his wages were low
he had not been able to save much in such a short period, and could not
pay the costs of his own deportation after his release from hospital. The
Department paid the costs of his maintenance and deportation, the
Intercolonial gave him a pass between Saint John and Halifax. The CPR
did not want to become involved in such cases and feared that "its acts
of charity'' in giving such passes would set a precedent. The CPR agent
explained:
Many towns in Canada have their poor that they want to send to many
places, and we have in the past been repeatedly asked to assist, but
we have declined, feeling that municipalities should take care of their
own poor. There is no reason that I can see why private corporations
should participate in a matter of this kind anymore than any other
tax payer.5
Some immigrants were deported on "mental" grounds because
they offended contemporary sensibilities and mores. A twenty-five-year
old British immigrant was deported from Winnipeg via Montreal because
he was "addicted to masturbation" which officials believed surely "will
end in insanity". The case of a twenty-four-year old Swedish woman
who had come to Canada as a domestic servant illuminates the thinking
of the Department (as well as contemporary standards) in this somewhat
delicate area. She had come with a party of domestics imported by
Mrs. Haglin of Montreal. Mrs. Haglin complained to Montreal Immigration
Agent Hoolahan that the young woman had a bad reputation and loose
morals. Hoolahan was told by three young fellow domestics that the
woman in question had "conducted herself like a prostitute" in her
hometown in Sweden. She set a bad example for the others, Mrs. Haglin
complained; she kept late hours, and got fired from her "situation".
Mrs. Haglin requested that the Department deport the woman; Hoolahan
agreed. No substantive evidence was brought forth. The woman was
deported on the basis of these interviews, with no further hearing, for
possessing a bad reputation and setting a bad example.6
56 WHENCE THEY CAME
Some immigrants were deported because they violated class norms.
Mrs. Austin and her two young children had been deserted in Canada
by her husband; soon after they had emigrated from England, he returned
home, leaving her penniless. She stayed at the St. George Society's
Montreal centre for British immigrants while the Department debated her
case. The medical inspector in Montreal had ordered her deported.
Immigration officials at Ottawa queried the order: it did not seem to be
based on medical grounds, and they did not understand why she should
be deported. The Montreal Charity Organization Society had requested
it, so that she would not become a charity case in the city. The Depart-
ment suggested that the children could be boarded and Mrs. Austin, who
seemed healthy and willing, could work. The Montreal Immigration office
countered that the inspector had ordered the deportation of this woman
because he did not think that she was the "type" to do domestic work.
Since other work for women was hard to find and would not pay enough
to support herself, let alone children, Mrs. Austin would probably become
a public charge. She and her children were deported.7
Two trends were established in this early period. The most signifi-
cant was the practice of shipping out those unable to work, because of
mental or physical illness or condition, or an injury received at work or
otherwise in Canada. In the case of a work injury, immigrants could expect
no compensation from the employer. Immigrants who were rendered
helpless were shipped back "home''.
The Department also shipped back those who did not fit in well
in other ways, such as the British masturbator and the immoral Swedish
domestic servant. Female immigrants were particularly vulnerable to the
consequences of sexual or social deviance. This was in part because of
economic factors such as the job market for female workers. Domestic
service was the largest single paid female occupation in Canada, and an
occupation for which the government and a variety of interest groups
consistently and vigorously sought immigrants. The moral character of
a domestic servant was a job qualification which she must demonstrate
by producing a certificate of character from a previous employer or
responsible person.8
The female immigrant, especially the domestic (and nearly all single
women coming to Canada were domestics) could lose her ability to earn
a living at her normal occupation because of an injury to her moral repu-
tation, as well as because of physical disabilities which a male immigrant
might also suffer. Moreover, if she had indeed engaged in sexual relations
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outside marriage, by choice or by force, and had become pregnant, she
would be subject to deportation on these grounds. The birth of an illegiti-
mate child was proof of immorality. As well, it often forced women to
become public charges, because they could not support themselves before
and after the birth, or because they could not pay the costs of confine-
ment and thus were listed by a hospital or other institution as "public"
patients. Domestics usually earned little, and their workplace was also
their home. They could not save enough to pay for another home between
the time they might be fired from one job for noticeable pregnancy, and
the time they might hope to find another - a hope that was usually
without foundation. Most jobs for women did not pay enough to support
an adult.9 Understanding the relationship between morality and work
for female domestics is necessary for putting into context many of the
deportations of single women from Canada in the early decades of the
twentieth century.
The early period of deportations between the 1890s and 1906
had been characterized by a particular type, techniques and targets.
Deportation was under-reported, informal and ad hoc. The role of govern-
ment was essentially passive. Deportation was aimed at individuals
who had come to the attention of the government as undesirables. The
nominal reasons for deportation concerned the unfitness of the injured,
incapable, and immoral.
The second period, from 1906 to the beginning of the First World
War, marked the introduction of modern deportation practices. The
Department's work became specified in law and regulation, became sys-
tematized, and rationalized. The Department adopted a more aggressive
approach. It energetically constructed and operated a whole series of
systems to search out, take into custody, and deport not only individuals
but also members of undesirable social groups: the insane, infected,
diseased, mentally defective, and the unemployed. Technically, the period
was characterized by statistically accurate reporting of those deported
for specific causes, cases actively sought out by the Department. Although
the reporting of the work was modernized, the information beyond bare
numbers was not available to the public.
Deportations became more numerous and more systematic after
the 1906 Act went into effect. In fact, records of the Department suggest
that the increased systematization of deportation was an important factor
in the absolute and proportional increase in the numbers deported.
Deportations continued to be attributed to more or less the same causes
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as before 1906. Now, however, the Department began to seek prospective
deports instead of waiting to have problem immigrants brought to its atten-
tion. In October 1906, Chief Medical Officer Peter Bryce took the first
step in this campaign of searching for deports, by notifying virtually all
insane asylums and like institutions in Canada to send names of alien
inmates, going back five years, so that they could be considered for depor-
tation. The original impetus for this request had come from a decision
by the United States to empty its asylums of Canadian inmates. By gather-
ing names of American citizens in Canadian asylums and other institu-
tions, Canadian officials hoped to show the American authorities that' 'they
will suffer more than we" in any exchange.10
Chief Medical Officer Bryce extended the search to prisons shortly
thereafter. At the same time, the Department hired Alfred Blanchet to
work in the Province of Quebec to implement the Department's wish to
"clear the country of undesirables who have come in ... or who may
. . . hereafter . . . succeed in gaining admission." Blanchet, formerly
of the Grand Trunk Railway, was recommended by a cabinet minister
and hired by Laurier, then acting as his own Minister of the Interior.
Wardens of prisons and directors of institutions were told to assist Blanchet
in his search for the unfit. In other provinces the "searching out" was
done by mail. In Ontario, directors of asylums were eager to expel
immigrant inmates. Deportation was under the direction of the medical
officers of the Department, and seen as a medical problem. The medical
officers were almost obsessively concerned with insanity and other forms
of mental or physical degeneracy. Eligible cases were not likely to escape
notice.11
This new thoroughness in the methods of the Department was
largely due to the Department's new ability to deport legally. Anything
done before the 1906 Act "really was not sanctioned by any special law,''
as Superintendent Scott explained to an Ontario provincial official. The
Department continued to prefer deportations (especially of insane persons)
to take place quietly, even though they were now quite legal, "since
experience in New York has shown that the speculative lawyer may by
habeas corpus proceedings give a good deal of trouble before the case
has been gotten out of the country.'' With prison and insane asylum depor-
tations, the emphasis was on increased searching out and secrecy. The
Department wanted to make the arrangements "without exciting . . .
suspicion," in order to avoid controversy or upset. Deportation of
immigrants who were inmates of penal institutions could be arranged
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automatically no matter how trivial or serious the crime. A third area
in which the work of the Department became more systematic was the
deportation of immigrants who had become public charges. Mayors or
clerks of municipalities could rid themselves of these immigrants by sending
a written report to Immigration authorities in Ottawa.12
The Department enlisted the co-operation of a variety of public offi-
cials to help in the campaign "to weed out undesirables" and "to assist
the Department as much as possible in keeping the stream of immigra-
tion coming in as pure as may be." It became increasingly important to
the Department that this assistance come from the public rather than the
private sector. By 1908 the Department was insisting that referrals of
public charge cases come from municipal officials, as provided in the
Immigration Act, rather than from charitable organizations or private
individuals. The Department explained this shift in policy by claiming that
private referrals might have been acceptable earlier because there had
been little doubt about the deportability of the immigrants in question.
But the Department had begun to receive requests for deportation of the
impoverished "from so many different sources, some of them at the
moment from some of the undesirables themselves, that it is felt to be
only reasonable deportation papers being at least signed by the proper
municipal authorities." It was because of these "innumerable" requests
from other sources that the Department decided to ' 'follow the law more
closely."13
But the timing of this decision to funnel deportation requests
through municipal officials was due to criticisms of the Department, by
the Home Authorities in Britain, for sending back immigrants who had
never "previously shown any such obnoxious characteristics as were
attributed to them" by those requesting their deportation in Canada. It
was to avoid such criticisms that the Department wanted a more official
sanction for deportations, and insisted that responsible municipal offi-
cials ' 'at least endorse" the various requests for deportation' 'originating
in their various municipalities."14 It was not solely in order to sidestep
criticism from Britain that Ottawa was anxious to have requests for depor-
tation originate from public and official sources. The Department wanted
to be sure that there could be no question about the legality of the depor-
tations. The aim of the process was to show that the deports were unfit,
and had been of bad quality originally.
In the 1908 depression a myth appeared that was to enjoy signifi-
cant publicity in the ensuing decades: the immigrant caused his/her own
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deportability by being lazy or unwilling to work. This convenient claim
reappeared in 1913-14, and persisted like a deeply rooted weed in the
1930s. The necessity for the myth can be seen in the cost argument;
that is, the Department had to argue that they were receiving flawed
immigrants from the transportation companies in order to force the
companies to pay deportation costs.
No encouragement should be given to strong able bodied immigrants,
well able to work, that they will be returned home free of expense
simply because they are too lazy to apply themselves or happen to
be suffering from temporary homesickness. It is intended that only
the criminally inclined, mentally or physically incapable, and moral
degenerates should be deported.15
Indiscriminate deportation of people who had become public charges
would encourage ' 'idle and indolent habits.'' Local municipal authorities
should make "every effort ... to induce strong and able bodied
immigrants to work for their living if such is obtainable."16 The Depart-
ment required municipal officials to send detailed information in their depor-
tation requests.' 'Reasons for inability to secure work'' had to be detailed
in the complaint, "as well as what if any efforts have been made either
on their behalf or by the immigrants themselves" to secure work. If the
reasons for unemployment were sickness or incapability, then a medical
certificate to that effect should be included in the request for deportation.
The Department did not want it thought that unemployment and depor-
tation were automatically linked.' 'You will easily understand the neces-
sity for discouraging the impression that deportation may be resorted to
solely'' because immigrants were destitute and unable to find work, Scott
wrote. Testimony from responsible authorities was needed about the
capacity or willingnesss of the immigrant to work, and about the avail-
ability of work. "Lack of work and liability to become a public charge
are not satisfactory reasons for deportation" under the Immigration Act.
An immigrant must actually have become a public charge to be deported
as such.17
By November 1908 Scott's tone had become exceedingly moralistic
and sometimes verged on the hysterical. "Lazy immigrants should not
be encouraged in this idea'' that they can give up and go home, or escape
without paying any penalty for their failures in Canada, Scott urged. "If
they will not work, and are physically fit for employment, they should
be properly punished before resorting to deportation." Scott reiterated
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this punitive policy to numerous municipal officials: ''All physically capable
immigrants who refuse to work when work is available should be made
to understand that they will be severely punished for their neglect before
being sent away."18
This attitude, often expressed by nineteenth and twentieth century
poor relief and welfare workers, would reappear in subsequent periods
of high unemployment when the Department was embarrassed by
increased public charge deportations. Deportation of the unemployed was
not supposed to be automatic. It was necessary to identify lazy failed
immigrants and to assure that they did not get away with anything.
Inmates of asylums or prisons were clearly deportable (and perhaps suffi-
ciently punished) by their very presence in these institutions. But the public
charge cases were more ambiguous, and had to be treated differently.
The deportation of misfits and indigents generally should be closely
supervised by the local authorities and care should be exercised in order
that none may be deported who are not thoroughly undesirable and
incapable of reform; lazy or homesick immigrants should be made to
understand distinctly that they are expected to accept whatever
employment may be available, failing which they will be dealt with
the same as any other citizen of Canada before any attempt is made
to secure their deportation.19
Victorian attitudes about poverty and unemployment certainly played a
part in this approach. More significant was the question of who was going
to pay the costs of deportation.
Under the provisions of the 1906 Act (and earlier legislation and
custom dating back to at least the 1880s) transportation companies who
brought in immigrants who were defective, or in some other way contra-
vened immigration laws, were responsible for taking these immigrants
back again. The companies had never been particularly eager to do this,
but usually could do little but comply. They did examine each individual
case for a loophole. When deportations increased because of the 1908
depression, the costs to the companies rose. So too did their scrutiny of
the deportation cases for which they were expected to pay. That this was
a problem for the Department can be seen in its internal documents and
correspondence. In March 1908, after the impact of the depression had
been felt strongly, Scott cautioned that because the transportation com-
panies were examining each case carefully, it was necessary to make sure
that all cases did "come clearly within the provisions of the Immigration
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Act." In order to make sure that the companies paid the costs, it was
important to distinguish between those immigrants who were "public
charges more the result of some temporary hardship readily overcome
in the course of time," for which the transportation companies would
probably refuse to pay, and "those of a hopeless or irreclaimable nature"
for which the companies must pay. The same caution appeared in numer-
ous warnings later that same year: the transportation companies could
not be expected to accept responsibility willingly for deportations caused
by the laziness, selfishness, and irresponsibility of wilfully unemployed
immigrants, therefore municipalities must not automatically send forward
such cases.20
This immediate dilemma was resolved by the Minister of the Interior
who ordered: "If the Mayor recommends deportation and it is within the
law, deport."21 The emphasis on the importance of demonstrating that
proper procedure had been followed in these cases lasted as long as the
serious economic problems that created large numbers of unemployed for
the Department to deport.
Proper documentation of the legal case for deportation was essen-
tial. As Scott explained to the head of a relief organization in Montreal,
' 'while pauperism may result in an immigrant becoming a public charge,''
pauperism alone ' 'is not considered a proper cause for deportation under
the Act." It was necessary to show that a person had actually become
legally liable to deportation. "It is very desirable that in every case the
evidence should be complete and in proper form before being finally sub-
mitted to the transportation companies concerned." Even after the Minister
ordered that deportation, if within the law, should be automatically carried
out at the request of the Mayors of municipalities, Scott continued to urge
caution in deportation solely due to unemployment, because the trans-
portation companies would refuse to pay the costs if they could argue
that the immigrants were not defective when they arrived.22
The suggestion that deportation might be an easy way out for the
irresponsible immigrant had been couched in moralistic terms, although
the Department claimed that it was a question of law and justice. Neither
of these was the real issue. The Department claimed repeatedly that it
did not deport solely on the basis of unemployment. Its files show that
this was not true; it routinely deported those who had become public
charges solely because of unemployment. The Department was caught
between the transportation companies and the municipalities. The Depart-
ment wanted to make sure that the transportation companies paid the
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costs of these deportations, but the companies could claim that, because
nothing was inherently wrong with such immigrants, there was no legal
obligation to ship them back whence they had come.
On the other hand, the Department was pressured by the munici-
palities (and sometimes by agencies like the Charity Organization Society
of Montreal which acted as a Protestant Relief Department for the City
of Montreal) to remove unemployed immigrants who had become a charge
on the municipalities. The Department tried to perform a precarious balanc-
ing act. It attempted to discourage the municipalities from using depor-
tation to ship out their immigrant poor, and insisted that the municipali-
ties' deportation complaints be in proper legal form. The former would
cut down the flood of public charge deportations for which the transpor-
tation companies were asked to pay, and the latter would make it more
difficult for the companies to evade payment. At the same time the
Department tried to reassure the transportation companies that the deports
with whom they were being presented were not the wicked, lazy, or
unlucky, but rather the unfit. The undeserving poor were supposedly
winnowed out. The Department attempted to dupe the transportation
companies into paying for what amounted to a national system of
immigrant poor relief through deportation.
There were limits to the timing and methods of deportation. Before
the 1906 Act, for a one-year period the government assumed a small
measure of responsibility for the immigrant, a responsibility sometimes
discharged by arranging his or her deportation as a last resort. After the
1906 Act, the Department legally could deport within two years of arrival.
This limit was relaxed by the Department of Justice: "there is no limit
to the time in which he may be deported." The Department advised its
agents to obtain written consent to their deportation from immigrants
who had arrived prior to 13 July 1906 (when the new Act was effec-
tive); both the immigrants' consent and a "reasonable prospect" of
reception in the home country were necessary to assure that deportation
would go smoothly. The deportation period was extended to three years
and further defined by the 1910 Amendment to the Immigration Act. Time
spent as an inmate of a mental hospital, charitable, penal, or other public
institution did not count as part of the three-year period. Anyone becoming
a public charge within three years of landing was deportable. Earlier, there
had been some question about the legality of a deportation when a long
time had elapsed since the commission of the deportable offence, but the
Department of Justice had ruled that the Department of Immigration
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was "empowered to act after the expiration of sentence or after the
immediate cause for deportation had ceased to exist." Technically, this
meant too that if an immigrant became a public charge at any time within
three years of landing, even for just a brief period (for instance due to
illness or unemployment), that immigrant was deportable. Insane
immigrants were deportable at any time, if they had been insane within
the five-year period previous to entering Canada.23
As a rule, the Department adhered to the statute of limitation rules
on deportation. It did not always follow the rules on what were deportable
offences, however. For instance, immoral immigrants, by which was
usually meant a woman who lived with a man to whom she was not
married, were an ambiguous group. "Immorality" was not clearly defined
in the law. Deputy Minister of the Interior William Cory ruled in 1913
that a woman who had come to Canada ''to live with a man in adultery''
was not to be confused with a woman who had come to practice prosti-
tution. The former was not supposed to be deported for that reason alone.
The correspondence of the Department, however, suggests that these
distinctions were not often made in practice. Nor did the Department
always adhere to the law concerning procedures to be followed in carrying
out deportations. For instance, in 1911 the Vancouver Agent J. H. MacGill
expressed his concern that deportations of persons convicted of crimes
were being carried out by a letter from Superintendent Scott, rather than
by an Order for Deportation issued by a Board of Inquiry, as provided
in the Act. Although the transportation companies might accept this proce-
dure, a letter was not a legal substitute for a Deportation Order. Scott
replied that no one had objected to this before, and that while MacGill
might follow the law if he chose and obtain Deportation Orders from Boards
of Inquiry, Scott thought that "the Department may safely continue the
present practice."24
In fact it could not. In March 1912, four Armenians prosecuted
for entering without proper inspection were convicted, fined, and sentenced
to jail in lieu of paying fines, and ordered deported by the presiding magis-
trate. The four were then ordered released on a writ of habeas corpus.
The writ argued that deportation could be ordered only by a Board of
Inquiry, and that inasmuch as there had been no Board of Inquiry, these
deportations were not legal. The new Vancouver Immigration agent
Malcolm Reid suggested that other such deportation cases might be stopped
by the courts on the same grounds. The Department had ordered the
Vancouver office to follow legal procedures by holding Boards of Inquiry
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only when it was felt necessary or judicious to do so. Scott still thought
that the Department could follow its informal (albeit extralegal) practice
as before, since no transportation company or deportee had protested.
Despite court cases unfavourable to the Department, it was to be left a
matter for local discretion.25
There is much evidence that the Department did not always follow
the law on deportation matters. When it began to follow certain parts
of the law more closely, it was due as much to economic or political as
to legal or moral factors. Although the period from 1906 to the First World
War showed increased systematization and formalization of deportation
procedures, the old ad hoc and sometimes illegal practices of the earlier
period were still in evidence from time to time. Of course, as the provi-
sions of the deportation laws became more comprehensive there would
be less need to act outside the law. Each new law or regulation increased
the powers allowed the Department.
The war period, from 1914 to the very early 1920s, was charac-
terized first of all by a sharp curtailment in the numbers of deportations,
and secondly by a sharp increase in the intensity of deportation work.
Between these years the head office in Ottawa devoted a good deal of
attention to instructing the local offices in how to build a tight case for
each deportation, a case that could stand up to challenges from the courts,
from the transportation companies, from foreign governments, and from
interest groups in Canada. The war period offered a unique opportunity
for the Department to learn how to conceal illegal or unfair practices behind
the legal categories through which it reported its deportation work. The
war also provided unique opportunities to ship out some residents who
were not otherwise deportable because they had been here long enough
to have domicile. As immigrants originating from enemy countries, they
could be shipped out along with the internees. In fact, since one sure
way to make someone deportable was to intern them, some politically
troublesome people were interned for the express purpose of deportation
after the war.26 Although the major target groups remained the unfit and
the unemployed, added to these were two new categories: enemy aliens,
and agitators. Late in the war and just after, the deportation of agitators
and radicals would become systematized, as the Department moved
deliberately into the field of political deportations, based on wartime
authority and experiences, but functioning to benefit interest groups such
as large employers.
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Shortly after the commencement of hostilities in 1914 the Minister
of Immigration decided to deport to the British Isles only those immigrants
who had friends there to receive and care for them. This was in part
to avoid "adverse criticisms or comment in the Old Country." The
Department told the municipalities that requests for deportation would
be acknowledged but not necessarily carried out until conditions changed.
This policy was developed in more detail in the fall of 1914. The Depart-
ment told its agents to notify those requesting deportations that the
Department' 'cannot consider the case while war conditions exist.'' The
Department would continue to send away individual cases who could be
cared for by friends. The local office had to send the Department a copy
of the evidence because, as Scott explained, "I expect that sooner or later
some objection will be raised against our sending forward some of these
individual cases and I would like to be in a position to defend our action
from correspondence on file before the deportation is ordered."27
Public charge deportations were delayed somewhat not only because
of the concern that the transportation companies might refuse to pay the
passage for those deported solely because of unemployment. The Depart-
ment had the idea that by forcing the municipalities to support the
unemployed, rather than shipping them back to the British Isles, it was
helping with the war effort. The Canadian municipalities were not suffering
as badly as Britain on account of the war, and keeping indigent immigrants
was ''one way by which we can help Great Britain and to my mind appears
to be a patriotic duty," explained Scott.28
The Department continued to claim that it did not consider the fact
of an immigrant becoming a public charge, solely on the basis of unem-
ployment, as grounds for deportation. Scott explained to one annoyed
city official that the steamship companies would say that the' 'Immigration
Act was not drawn up to get rid of persons out of employment, but persons
who are undesirable through sickness, feeblemindedness, inmates of gaols
etc." If there were any sickness that contributed to an unemployment
problem, or any contributing disease or perhaps feeblemindedness, Scott
would ensure deportation.29
There was often another alternative. An unemployed immigrant
could be arrested and convicted for vagrancy, and then easily deported.
Sometimes the length of a vagrancy sentence was directly influenced by
the wishes of the Department of Immigration. The sentence had to be
long enough to permit the Department to arrange for the deportation,
and short enough to save the municipality maintenance costs during
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the jail term. This sort of covert bargaining occurred with the blessing
of the Department of Justice.30 But the path from unemployment to
deportation via vagrancy charges was not always smooth, and local agents
turned to the Department for advice.
Scott might take the agent over the ground, step by step. Speaking
of a specific case, he said:' 'We must find some ground for her deportation
connected with 1) the manner of her entry, 2) her character before the
entry showing she was a prohibited immigrant 3) something she may
have done in Canada since her entry,'' explained Scott. It was not suffi-
cient to be in jail on remand, she must actually have been sentenced in
order to be deportable as a convicted criminal. The agent must examine
her to find out if she was a prohibited immigrant under the Act. If there
was something wrong with her entry, the applicable Sections were 33,
and 7; if she were convicted of a crime (Section 40), she could be ques-
tioned as provided in Section 42 (which set out procedures for deportation
examinations). Whether or not she could appeal depended on her being
free from disease (Section 18). "Our action can be taken altogether
separate and apart from that of the court, although if she is convicted
then her deportation would naturally follow by the application of
Sections 40 and 42." Fortunately, from the Department's point of view,
this immigrant was convicted of vagrancy and thus easily deportable.31
Once the Department had decided to deport someone, they worked method-
ically through each possibility until one was found. The decision to deport
did not always follow upon the commission of some specific offence. Often,
someone in the Department would decide that an immigrant should be
deported, and the action followed the decision. The flexibility of the law
provided much room for seeking the appropriate legal cause.
The deportation of "criminal immigrants (not enemies)" still
proceeded more or less as usual except that it took much longer to carry
out investigations for the first few months of the war. Despite the general
difficulties of carrying out deportations, other than those to the United
States, there was a bright spot. A ruling by the Americans permitted
Canada to deport to the United States aliens who had resided in Canada
less than three years, who had formerly long resided in the United States
but who were not U.S. citizens. If Canada could show that, prior to their
last entry into Canada, they had been rejected by a Canadian Immigration
officer, these aliens could simply be deported to the U.S. instead of to
their native countries. This would be much cheaper and much simpler.
Therefore, the Department asked heads of all penal institutions, various
68 WHENCE THEY CAME
city Relief and Department of Health Officers, and other public officials
in most provinces to include questions about previous rejections by
Canadian officials in their interrogations of these immigrants.32
Because the war affected available shipping, even the reduced
numbers of deports were more difficult to transport across the Atlantic.
By the winter of 1915, there were few sailings by Canadian lines, and
those that sailed were full of troops. Before, in deport cases paid for by
the government rather than by the transportation companies, the cost
at a " charity rate " had been $ 15. During the war when it was necessary
to ship via New York, the cost rose steeply to $50-$ 70. As conditions
in Britain grew more "acute", deportation became a last resort.33
The slowdown on overseas deportations endured until after the
end of the war. By 1918, the Department was frequently going through
the deportation procedure, ordering the deportation, then simply holding
the case (although not always holding the person) until deportation could
be carried out. In the summer of 1919, an interoffice memo noted that
"most of our deports at the present time go to the U.S.," the only type
of deportation remaining unaffected by wartime conditions.34
Despite the fact that the war prevented the Department from
eliminating numbers of the unemployed, it still gave the Department an
unprecedented opportunity to lock up agitators and activists of enemy
alien background, and to rid themselves of a raft of people whom they
could never otherwise have deported because such deportations were illegal
under the terms of the Immigration Act. Enemy aliens did not include
prisoners of war, strictly speaking, although the lines between the two
groups tended to blur. The government admitted to holding 8,579
internees in prison camps in Canada during the war, of which about 3,179
were real FOWs; the remainder were civilians snatched up under the War
Measures Act. Locking up civilians of enemy alien origin was part of a
massive campaign of surveillance of enemy aliens in general and, ulti-
mately, of harrassment of some aliens in particular: the radicals. Internees,
like deports, were prisoners in fact, although not according to peacetime
law. Under the Order-in-Council of 28 October 1914 internees were
declared prisoners of war, thus had "no remedy in law." The manage-
ment of internment camps during the war had its scandals and abuses,
as well as its bungling and stupidities, although the camps were probably
not much worse than some Department of Immigration detention facilities.
By the end of 1915 there were nineteen internment sites in Canada, five
of which were reception centres only. Originally the inmates were supposed
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to clear bush land for use by returned veterans after the war, but by the
spring of 1916 some were released to do farm labour and industrial work.
By the end of the war, there were still large numbers interned, and it
was not until 27 February 1920 that the last batch of ninety men, nineteen
women and children, left the camp at Kapuskasing to be "repatriated",
as these deportations under the auspices of the Ministry of Justice were
often called. In theory, the enemy aliens deported from the camps were
POWs being repatriated. In practice, it was the "policy of the Government
. . . to deport all interned enemy aliens who are considered undesirable"
whether or not they were otherwise legally deportable.35
During the war, the Department did not want to send healthy enemy
aliens ' 'home", even if there were sailings, for this would help the enemy
and "be a menace to our allies." There were other ways to deal with
enemy aliens, as in one case involving an Ontario family: ' 'If the party
in question or her son-in-law are manifesting a pro-German attitude, and
you will advise me, I will have the case looked into with a view to having
them interned,'' Scott wrote to one ' 'patriot''. The Department was not
interested in legitimate prisoners of war, except to know their names
should they ever try to return to Canada. Prisoner of war deportations
were sometimes handled more or less as rejections: some POWs were
examined as if they had applied to enter as immigrants and had been
turned down; then they could be sent back.36 But this was not necessary
in all cases. The Department wanted to send deportable enemy aliens back
to Europe along with POWs, The original request came in 1918, after
the armistice, but it took several months for shipments to be arranged.
POW shipments did not begin on a large scale until February 1919, handled
under the legal direction of the Minister of Justice, who had authority
under the War Measures Act to remove, expel or deport enemy alien
internees.37
The files of the Department show that whenever possible, ordinary
deports, legal or not, were sent along with these "repatriatees". For
instance, George Dowhy, Austrian, in Canada since 1909, was arrested
in Winnipeg 4 March 1915, held at the internment camp at Kapuskasing,
Ontario until November 1917, when he was released to do railroad work.
In 1919, he was in Kingston Prison serving a five-year sentence; the
Department considered him undesirable. Because he had been here since
1909 he was not legally deportable, but because he was of enemy alien
origin, the Department was able to ship him out with the interned enemy
aliens. An attempt to get rid of Clara Dubin, age 17 (an imbecile orphan
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of German origin, imprisoned in an asylum since March 1914), failed
- not because she could not legally be deported, although that was true,
but because there were no other insane female prisoners of war. Thus,
the Internment Office refused to include her in their shipment. Tom
Taschuk's deportation was also arranged using this method: originally
an Austrian reservist but in Canada long enough to acquire domicile, he
was arrested in 1919 at Vegreville and interned at Vernon, British
Columbia; he was "not subject to deportation under the provisions of
the Immigration Act.'' Taschuk was a member of the IWW, a "socialist,
with Bolshevik tendencies, who has been actively engaged in endeavouring
to create discontent and rebellion in the foreign element in Canada." The
Department was eager to get rid of him.38
The Department also used the POW repatriation shipments to carry
out legal deportations. In September 1919 the internment camps at Vernon
and Kapuskasing were designated as immigrant stations to legalize their
use as detention centres for deports. By that fall, there were dozens of
enemy aliens being sent along with repatriatees, some legally deportable,
others not. An attempt by the Province of Quebec to clean out its asylums
failed only because the Department could not find space for the inmates
on the military-controlled sailings.39
The Department considered itself responsible for the protection of
the public purse, the public health, and the public morals. In order to
safeguard the country, the Department stretched, ignored, and sometimes
violated its own rules. As the laws and regulations became increasingly
complicated, deportation procedures were more minutely defined. In
numerous cases, the Department did not follow legal niceties. Its gradual
and piecemeal reforms were often due to painful, if infrequent, experiences
in the courts: losing deports on habeas corpus writs, and the like. The
common response of the Department was to tighten up the procedures
when it had to, and to try to have the law amended to legalize what it
had already been doing.
The Department's heightened sophistication in case building would
serve it well in the ensuing years. Wartime experience with the possibility
of deportation as a method of social and political control would be the
basis for overt and systematic political deportations until the mid-1920s,
and again in the 1930s, when they would reach another peak with the
prosecution of communists by the Department of Immigration.
5
The Alien Bolshevik Menace, 1910-1920S
1 he Canadian Department of Immi-
gration moved into a new phase of deportation work in the latter stage
of the First World War, with the deliberate and systematic deportation
of agitators, activists and radicals. Some of these were people who had
not done anything illegal, but who were considered undesirable on the
basis of their political beliefs and activities. The threat they posed was
not to the people of Canada, but to the vested interests such as big busi-
ness, exploitative employers, and a government acting on behalf of interest
groups. The radicals represented a new target group for deportation.
Before, they had been removed on an individual basis, when possible.
Now, they were to be dealt with as a group. Looking at the practices
of the Department in this period gives insight into what the Department
did when there was no legal basis for declaring such a group undesir-
able. It is important to understand that these people (to whom the
Department tended to refer interchangeably as anarchists, agitators, IWW,
Bolshevists, and, during the war, enemy aliens) were designated as
undesirable not by legislation (as were, for example, immigrants with
tuberculosis or venereal disease) but by employer blacklists and complaints,
by the surveillance networks of the industrial and Dominion Police, the
Royal Northwest Mounted Police (later the Royal Canadian Mounted
Police), and U.S. intelligence, as well as by a certain anti-labour agitator
tradition in immigration policy.
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Much of the Department's activity tended to focus on the Industrial
Workers of the World (IWW), in the early part of this period, making
them a convenient illustration for this discussion. Before the Wobs, as
they were called, were proscribed by an Order-in-Council passed under
the War Measures Act, they were not an illegal organization in Canada.
From 1918 to 1922 they were illegal, along with twenty other radical
groups. After 1922, when the Justice Department ruled that there was
nothing in the IWW constitution that was contrary to the provisions of
the Immigration Act, they were declared legal again, insofar as immigra-
tion was concerned. In other words, before the period, 1918 to 1922,
it was not legal to exclude or deport Wobblies simply because they were
IWW members. It was not legal, but it was commonly done by the
Department. In some cases there were clear illegalities in the actions of
the Wobs, but in other cases, while the real reason for exclusion or depor-
tation was being an IWW member, the nominal legal cause was crimi-
nality, for example, or becoming a public charge, or illegal entry. Thus
in some cases the Department satisfied the letter, while violating the spirit
of the law. In these circumstances, very careful attention was necessary
in the preparation of cases. Thus, in order to justify what were shady
and unfair, if not illegal, practices, the Department's documentation of
its work became ever more complete and precise, and at the same time,
more misleading. Legal reasons were sought that approximated the facts
of the case, and the case was carefully made to fit the nominal legal causes
for deportation. This active deportation work was carried out at a level
of thoroughness that would not be exceeded until the police raids on
communists in the early 1930s.
Although the Department had earlier tried to deport prominent
radicals such as Emma Goldman in 1908, and it seems likely that some
of the deportations of East Indians from British Columbia in this period
were connected with alleged radical or seditious activity, the rise of Depart-
mental concern over agitators parallels nicely the rise of organizing drives
and strikes in Canada by IWW members and other labour radicals.
References in the files to the problems of eliminating "agitators" appeared
regularly by 1912. The Vancouver Immigration agent, for example,
complained that some of these immigrants arrested by the Department
(after local police had failed to convict them for vagrancy) were retaining
lawyers and fighting deportation. It was in 1912 that the IWW led a major
strike against British Columbia railway construction. The strike was
multi-ethnic, well organized, and successful enough to upset, more than
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usual, employers and politicians who demanded that Wobblies and their
ilk be deported on account of these activities.1
In theory this was not so difficult, as many of these Wobblies were
from the United States. Labour organizers and strikers were notoriously
liable to arrest on charges of vagrancy, rioting, or assault, because no
matter what the law said, striking was regarded by employers and local
interests, and often by local police as an activity that should be treated
as if it were illegal, reprehensible, and immoral. Yet the actual illegality
of the IWW, and of labour organizing, was not so much a fact as it was
wishful thinking. For example, the Department of Justice ruled in 1913
that there was not' 'anything in the Immigration Act which would justify
refusing them admission to the country on the grounds of their being labour
agitators."2
These legal niceties crumbled under the wave of anti-radical hostility
that became conveniently and inextricably mingled with anti-alien feel-
ing by 1918. There were in effect three currents of repression that came
together: attempts to suppress enemy aliens, who might threaten the war
effort; attempts to suppress labour agitators, who were blamed for growing
labour unrest and militancy as workers became angered by increased
exploitation under the guise of the war effort; and finally, attempts to
suppress foreign radicals, Bolsheviks, or whatever the current bogey was
called. This is not to say that there were no real threats posed by the
existence and activities of each group; there probably were. The point
is that it was very convenient for employers and the government to see
labour unrest, the growth of political and social radicalism, and the increase
in militancy in general as an expression of the influence of dangerous
aliens, rather than as a response of Canadians to Canadian conditions.
From this, "it was a simple step" for those who believed that labour
unrest was due to foreign agitation "to proclaim that all strikes were
treasonous." Harsh actions, however repressive, taken against the
treasonous in wartime can be justified by the exigencies of national
survival. Actions taken against the potentially treasonous were in the
same category, justifiable in the hope of nipping treason in the bud before
it flowered in a permissive atmosphere. As Laine has pointed out in
connection with the Finns, "the repressive measures and oppressive tactics
of the Government . . . were designed to keep the Finnish radicals and
their comrades in their place." Laine has commented that the govern-
ment used tactics against socialists and other dissidents that would not
have been tolerated if used against the general public. Yet the government
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had traditionally used similar tactics against one segment of that public:
immigrants. What the government did to certain groups of immigrants
during the war - to enemy aliens and dissenters, to paraphrase American
historian William Preston's study of similar repression in the United States
during this period - was different in degree rather than in kind, to what
it had done to certain individual immigrants before the war.3
The question of what the general public would tolerate is a diffi-
cult one in connection with deportation. Because public charge deporta-
tions, statistically the most frequently cited legal cause, originated in
complaints by municipal officials, it is clear that there was little resistance
from such officials to the deportation of public charges as long as the
procedures were properly carried out. Because deportation hearings were
closed administrative affairs, the general public knew little of them anyway.
Anyone asking would hear government propaganda from all save a few
leftwing groups. Even to suppose that the general public might react
negatively to deportation, especially deportation of dissenters, if it knew
the whole story, is not sensible. What made it possible for the government
to carry out its programme of repression was the "Red scare" climate
based on anti-Red hysteria, stirred up by employers, government and
the press, but shared by everyday people. If the "general public" refers
to everybody except trade union activists, leftists and reformers, and most
recent immigrants, then the general public seemed to care little about what
the government did to the excluded.
Perhaps another factor in this question was the nature of the anti-
Red repression in Canada. While in the United States there was a good
deal of individual, private anti-radical action (by organizations like the
Ku Klux Klan), in Canada
the campaign against radicalism and Bolshevism was initiated, orches-
trated, and executed by the federal government according to the laws
on the books, or created especially for that purpose.4
Despite the fact that ' 'very few of the groups kept under government
surveillance were actually illegal," the claim has been made that the
government' 'never exceeded its legal authority'' in repressing the radicals,
"because it did not have to." Even the Department of Immigration did
not exceed its legal limits, according to this view, although admittedly
certain parts of the Immigration Act were in ' 'violation of the spirit of
common justice."5
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This impression, based on claims made by the Department itself,
is false. The Department did indeed exceed its strict legal authority, despite
its sweeping powers to act against aliens and radicals during the war.
Wartime anti-radical programmes of the Department of Immigration
grew out of pre-war practices of dealing with labour agitators. Labour
militance was not only a challenge to the establishment but, with the
advent of the war and partly, but not entirely, because of its perceived
foreign origins, a threat to the state, in the view of many military offi-
cials. Lieutenant Colonel R. W. Leonard's perspective was representa-
tive. He saw the IWW (synonymous with labour activism) as a subver-
sive movement whose origins and purposes were alien to Canada. Its
dangerous influence was widespread. In Northern Ontario, under the guise
of the U.S.-proscribed Western Federation of Miners (now transmogri-
fied into Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers) the IWW had successfully been
recruiting not only the "foreign element'' but English-speaking workers.
There was no doubt that the IWW was foreign, full of "Finns, Polacks,
Austrians and Hungarians and some Irish, and I believe it to be a
thoroughly disloyal organization. This is borne out by some recent reports
of labour troubles in Canada which have been fomented by enemy
labourers."6
Anti-alien paranoia was further heightened by anticipation of anti-
conscription activities, by late 1917. Brigadier General Henry Ruttan wrote
from Winnipeg to Major General Willoughby G. Gwatkin, the Chief of
General Staff, that there were many enemy aliens in the vicinity,
"organized and fully under the control of Social Democratic Labor
Leaders," who could quickly turn out 3-4,000 for demonstrations. If this
group joined English- and French-speaking anti-conscriptionists under
Social Democratic leadership, real problems could result. Ruttan advised
increasing the supply of ammunition and maintaining troop levels until
conscription was operating smoothly. Dissent from conscription was
intolerable. Those who were "fond of talking and acting in a disloyal
manner and who offer or incite resistance to conscription should be
summarily dealt with.'' Similar conclusions were drawn by other military
men. The Chief of Staff of the U.S. War Department warned the U.S.
Military representative at the British Embassy in Washington that a
Canadian IWW member in North Dakota was recruiting his fellows to go
to Canada to start anti-conscription riots. His source of information was
the U.S. Department of Justice.7
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The Department of Immigration was important in the government's
war against radicals. The Department responded to pleas from various
sources to keep the IWW out of Canada, by patrolling usually isolated
and unguarded border areas, and increasing and toughening up inspec-
tions of incoming immigrants in order to try to detect IWW members.
The Department tried to reassure those requesting IWW alerts. Techni-
cally, it explained, the Immigration Act did not give it the legal authority
to deal with IWW entry attempts, because the "fact that a man belongs
to the IWW is not in itself sufficient" to exclude or deport him.
However, there are usually other features connected with the majority
of these cases which enable us to deal with them and you may rest
assured that the Department is alive to the importance of the situation.
The Department was firmly on the side of those who opposed the Wobblies:
"I have no sympathy with the IWW movement," explained Canadian
Superintendent of Immigration Scott to an American anti-radical group.8
Requests for action against the IWW came from the private sector,
and from within the government when officials acted in response to appeals
from employers and employers' groups. For instance, the Minister of
Labour forwarded letters from Canadian corporations requesting suppres-
sion of the IWW and asked Immigration to co-operate. Moreover, the
Minister forwarded such appeals to Prime Minister Borden and asked him
to instruct the RCMP to help out. The reply to this particular request reveals
something about the duration of the anti-radical work of the Department,
as well as something about its methods.
For some time past - in fact for years - our officers have been alive
to the danger of the IWW movement. . . . Although it may not always
be possible to reject one of these men solely on the ground that he
is a member of that organization, yet, there are usually other circum-
stances . . . and our inspectors are, as a rule, very careful to do
this.9
In another instance Scott reassured the Minister of Labour, "I do not think
any of our men would knowingly permit a member of the IWW to enter,
if there is any way by which he can be rejected."10
From the U.S. authorities warnings came also. In one instance
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) told the U.S. Immigration
Inspector at an Idaho port to warn his Canadian counterpart of the entry
into Canada of a German IWW leader, for the purpose of labour agitation,
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and perhaps for other reasons. The man was supposed to be German-
born and a naturalized American citizen. "Although either of these
statements may be wrong," said the FBI, "he is certainly of German
extraction and is a good man to watch." The Department replied,
I do not know whether it will be possible to reach Lintz under the
immigration Act but I would suggest a real effort in that direction.
His name is in itself sufficient cause to pick him up for examination
as a suspected enemy subject.11
Scott told the Canadian inspector to detain Lintz if he could not prove
U.S. citizenship. The United States at that time regarded any male aged
fourteen years or older who was not a naturalized citizen as an enemy
subject, regardless of his other citizenship. "A similar interpretation on
our part might be useful in a case like this," if it were possible, mused
Scott. "However, there may be something connected with the manner
of his entry, possibly under Subsection 10 of Section 33, which will enable
you to deal with him,'' advised the Superintendent. The warning against
Lintz set off a manhunt by the police, and Bruce Walker, the Commis-
sioner of Immigration in Winnipeg, echoed the determination of his
superiors in Ottawa in promising to deal with the man. "As soon as he
has been located I shall doubtless find some means of sending him back
whence he came." Unhappily for the forces of law and order, despite
an intensive investigation that included the use of an undercover agent
who tailed Lintz for several weeks and illegally opened Lintz's mail, noth-
ing could be found against him before he left legally several months later.
Lintz had been carefully shadowed, reported the Mounties, and although
he was a "noisy and extreme socialist," there was no evidence that he
was a member of the IWW, nor had he organized for the Wobblies in
Canada.12
This failure to "get" anything on a man considered undesirable
for political reasons was irksome to the Department. There were other
cases, often frustrating. The Immigration Commissioner at Winnipeg
appealed for more power in August 1914. He wanted to be allowed to
take some other course of action than the legal channels of deportation.
He had already carried out several arrests, prosecutions, and deporta-
tions of Wobblies, and felt that, while normally deportation would be an
adequate measure, it was not enough to deal with such "considerable
numbers" as there were present in his region. He feared that several of
these deports had written to invite all of their friends to come to Canada
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and make trouble. "When they are known, it is easy of course to reject
them," but the problem was that they could not always be spotted. The
official in Winnipeg wanted simply to hand over to the U.S. authorities
those Wobblies caught in Canada, without going through the legal proce-
dures of deportation.13
Superintendent Scott refused to countenance such an arrangement,
because there was no procedural machinery to "order these deportations
in a peremptory manner." Instead he suggested that the Winnipeg offi-
cial continue to use the "strongest endeavours" to keep out the Wobblies,
and failing that,
to arrange for their arrest by our own officers or by the police of any
admitted who in any way lay themselves open to arrest, even though
their breaches of the law be technical rather than serious.14
This was more or less what the man in Winnipeg had been doing.
Some cases were easier to arrange than others. For instance, the official
described to his superiors in Ottawa one case involving the arrest of John
Keeting, who had "created an agitation and a disturbance by openly
advocating the views of the IWW" while riding on a train. "I had this
man arrested'' and tried for deportation under Section 41 of the Immigra-
tion Act,' 'relying particularly on these words: 'shall by word or act create
or attempt to create riot or public disorder in Canada'.'' The tactic was
successful; Keeting was found guilty, fined and imprisoned, and then
deported. This action was at least based on some case in law, however
farfetched that law's interpretation. Others were even less substantial,
although equally successful. RCMP and Department of Immigration officers
arrested those members of the IWW who got into Canada, and the
Department brought charges against them.
While our legal action in these cases has not rested upon a very solid
foundation, yet we have prevented any serious numbers of the
members of this organization from entering . . . and so have been able
to control the action of those who have succeeded in getting
through.15
Other actions of the Department were at best questionable. In
one instance, the Vancouver agent found two men and a woman, all
Canadians, selling leftist literature and newspapers, including the IWW
newspaper. The agent explained that because at the present time, such
literature was "coming in through the mails . . . and being sold on the
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newsstands'' quite legally, and because he could do nothing under the
Immigration Act since all three were Canadians, he had let them go. But
he informed local officials that these three agitators were coming, so that
when they approached company towns by boat, they would not be
permitted to land.16
In some cases the Department found itself unable to do anything
to prevent agitation by particular individuals such as Ernest Lindberg.
He had been arrested for vagrancy in Vancouver; the agent wanted to
deport him, but Lindberg claimed to be legally landed and domiciled. This
was indeed the case; Lindberg had been in Canada for eight years and
could not be deported. The Vancouver Immigration office was deeply
regretful that they could take no action.' 'On account of this man's IWW
activities, his deportation if it could have been effected would be very
satisfactory to authorities here."17
By 1918 increased complaints from employers blaming labour
unrest on IWW agitation added to official alarm. The government identi-
fied the "IWW menace" with "enemy conspiracies . . . against the war
effort." The IWW were believed to be financed by enemy agents. The
Dominion Police established an IWW section (a forerunner of the 1930s'
Red Squads) and spy and police reports identified numbers of' 'foreigners''
who were Wobblies. Although Commissioner Zachary Wood of the
Dominion Police did not subscribe to the notion that the IWW posed a
real danger, he was in the minority. Borden listened to the hardliners.
When he asked Montreal conservative lawyer C. H. Cahan in May 1918
to study the problems of radical elements, Borden had already concluded
that labour militancy was part of a Bolshevik conspiracy more dangerous
to Canada than were the Germans. Since in Cahan's view Russians, Finns
and Ukrainians should be treated like enemy aliens because they were
"bolshies", he was not particularly troubled by questions of legality or
logic.18
Cahan was the architect of most of the wartime Orders-in-Council
squelching formerly legal activities long distasteful to the authorities. His
proposal incorporated police (municipal, provincial, and federal) and
private interest organizations into a vast central intelligence and enforce-
ment network aimed at detecting and putting down dissent. He was
commissioned by Minister Charles Doherty and Deputy Minister Edmund
Newcombe of the Department of Justice (admittedly as a result of his own
solicitations) to create just such an edifice.19 Cahan's repressive proposals
began to be passed as Orders-in-Council in mid-September 1918. By the
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end of the month he was installed as Director of Public Safety. (He
remained in office until early 1919 when he resigned because his Orwellian
measures were not enforced.)
Cahan's demand for draconian internal security measures was the
logical outcome of official paranoia about links between foreign agitators,
labour unrest, political dissent, and treason. Anti-agitator fears were
running rampant in officialdom by the fall of 1918. They were fueled by
domestic and foreign sources. The most important domestic sources may
have been Mountie spy reports, complaints by employers about labour
agitation, and rightwing pressure from men in high places. The foreign
sources included diplomatic, military and internal security and intelligence
officers of British, American, and other Allied governments. Their fears
were exacerbated by the failure of the Allied invasion of Russia to put
down the Russian Revolution. The view that labour agitators, IWW
members or sympathisers and Bolsheviks were synonymous was strongly
in evidence. For example the intelligence officer of the Allied Expeditionary
Force in Siberia wrote to Washington that certain Russians leaving
Vladivostok should be refused U.S. visas or Canadian entry because they
were "under strong suspicion of being IWW or Bolshevik agents." In
December 1918 and January 1919 the Canadian government was
approaching academics to give anti-Bolshevik lectures as part of a
systematic anti-radical campaign. Some members of the academy did not
find the government's proposal acceptable. University of Toronto President
Robert Falconer replied that working class discontent was caused by high
prices and unemployment, and antiradical propaganda would simply do
more harm. But the few liberal (or more sophisticated) holdouts appear
to have been the exception. The popular view in government offices was
that all of these tendencies were, in the context of the holy crusade of
the war, immoral and should be illegal. And illegal they became. As
Ian Angus puts it, "the government outlawed the left."20 Criminalizing
dissent made the Department of Immigration's political deportation work
easier, in part because it made it more legitimate.
By comparison with some other government officials and
bureaucrats, the Department of Immigration officials seem almost moder-
ate. Nonetheless, they were frustrated by their inability to deal effectively
with the increasing danger that they believed was posed by the IWW.
Since the early fall of 1918 Superintendent Scott had been exploring
various avenues to increase Immigration's power to act. Scott wanted
to have some kind of regulation put into effect that would "give us a
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ready means of dealing with these people." He had written to the
Department of Justice to ask for help. Scott had received reports from
the Department of Defence and other sources, outlining the extent of IWW
and other labour activities. He had seen evidence including "correspond-
ence (intercepted no doubt) between agents of the IWW in Chicago, and
persons in Vancouver" that indicated that the IWW was a nationwide
problem in Canada. ' 'Judging by the names on the list, most of the
members in British Columbia are of foreign birth or origin,'' he commented.
He also compared the' 'stringent measures being taken in the United States
for the suppression of the IWW,'' in contrast to his own relative help-
lessness. There was an "urgent need" now for some regulation to deal
with the IWW under the Immigration Act, Scott argued. At present he
had no legal power to exclude the IWW from Canada except by rejecting
them as persons liable to become public charges,' 'which in many instances
is rather far fetched.'' Scott pointed out that under Section 38 of the current
Immigration Act the Governor General had the power to prohibit the land-
ing of immigrants of any class. Scott asked the Department of Justice to
rule on whether the IWW could properly be "designated as a class."21
In fact, the Department of Justice was at this time considering
repressive legislation to take care of the IWW and "people of this sort."
Order-in-Council PC 2381 banning enemy alien languages was passed
in September 1918; it was aimed at the suppression of union and radical
literature. Another Order, PC 2384, passed 28 September 1918, out-
lawed fourteen radical groups (including a couple of Nationalist Chinese,
that is, pro-Kuomintang organizations!) including the IWW, various
"revolutionary" and social democratic groups most of whom were not
English- or French-speaking. Subsequent Orders-in-Council went further:
PC 2525, in effect from 11 October 1918 until 19 November 1919, banned
strikes and lockouts and established fines and imprisonment for a variety
of activities connected with industrial disputes. Copies of these Orders-
in-Council were sent by the Chief of Dominion Police Arthur Sherwood
to Scott, for distribution to all Immigration officials. These orders,
Sherwood explained, were for the purpose of "stamping out unlawful
associations . . . putting a stop to the seditious ravings of members of
these Organizations" and excluding their "vile seditious literature."
PC 2384 was rescinded by Order-in-Council 2 April 1919, and after that
date the RCMP could no longer prosecute anyone for possession of IWW
literature. Prosecution again became possible under amendments to the
Criminal Code passed 6 June 1919, permitting not only prosecution,
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imprisonment, and deportation for possession of literature, but repealing
the right of free speech and making membership in a "subversive" group
a crime. The penalty for this crime of mere membership could be depor-
tation or up to twenty years' imprisonment for "sedition".22
It is important to note that the perceived necessity for such measures
was justified by such dubious evidence as RCMP spy reports on legitimate
dissenting groups. The RCMP had long been using secret agents to spy
on labour unions and various other organizations whose existence and
activities were not illegal. Commanding officers instructed their subor-
dinates in the intricacies of selecting and operating such agents. Spies
were told to send photographs of their suspects if possible. It some-
times was not. Secret Agent 32 complained that his unionists were
"suspicious" and "too wise" to be photographed. Since the spring of
1917 the Mounties had had spies in nearly all the trade unions and left
groups. These agents sent in reports underlining the idea that socialists,
radicals, Bolsheviks, and foreigners were interchangeable terms.23
These generally held views of the police, RCMP, and government
officials (and probably a great number of Canadians) found expression
in the drastic amendments to the Criminal Code and the Immigration Act
passed by Parliament in June 1919. It is undeniable that these amend-
ments were aimed at the suppression of the Winnipeg General Strike. But
they were not an anomaly caused by wartime hysteria. The political depor-
tations of the Department of Immigration were well within the mainstream
of official persecution of dissent. And if the Department behaved illegally
from time to time, the private view of government officials, as well as
of employers representing business interests, would probably have been
that the laws were too lax.
In this increasing persecution of radicals and "subversive"
elements, Canada was following a path well tread by the United States.
This was not the result of coincidence, or even of the two countries choos-
ing comparable responses to similar problems; rather, it was a co-ordinated
effort. Canadian officials were in touch with their American counterparts
and each warned the other of radical incursions, real or imagined. The
legislation of each country had similar provisions: a Section of the U.S.
1917 Immigration Act plus a special Immigration Act of 16 October 1918,
were ' 'very much along the line of Section 41 of our own Act." The U.S.
and Canadian Acts had much the same "flaws", from the point of view
of deporting subversives, and so in the United States, "a considerable
number of alleged anarchists were arrested and deported during the year
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on grounds other than the charge of anarchy," just as radicals were
deported on grounds other than radicalism in Canada. Gradually more
formal lines of communication were developed, and by the end of 1919,
the United States officially notified Canada of impending agitator entry
attempts and vice versa: the initiator in this formal arrangement was
Canada.24
Some Canadian officials of particularly severe persuasion felt that
existing suppression was inadequate. As David Bercuson points out, many
military and law enforcement authorities "advocated internment to
deal with alien labour unrest." Any labour disruption came to be seen
as' 'treasonous''. Reactionaries found it easy to treat aliens as scapegoats;
surely no real Canadians would be receptive to Bolshevist ideas, and surely
no one unreceptive to such ideas would willingly go out on strike. Never
a patient man, Cahan had resigned, claiming that he had no support from
the government, which was not adequately enforcing the laws against
radical propaganda.25
On the whole, Canadian officials of the Department of Immigration
seem to have been satisfied with their own efforts in comparison to those
of the U.S. One commented:
I think we have been more successful than the United States in handling
the Bolshevik element so far: at least we have not yet had such an
exhibition as is now going on at Ellis Island where a considerable
number of the anarchist class are under arrest for examination and they
refuse to be examined or to give any information about themselves.26
The fiasco at Ellis Island was the result of the U.S. Immigration Service's
policy of mass raids and lockups of radicals. The radicals, after coaching
by competent lawyers, had refused to give any information or to respond
to questions. The authorities could not deport them for lack of evidence.
The American officials had become a laughingstock. They responded by
changing the regulations to remove the right to counsel before questioning.
The credibility and integrity of the U.S. Immigration Department had been
damaged.27
The occasional American farce did not prevent Canadian officials
from following with interest American tactics and attempting to winnow
useful techniques from U.S. successes. One such attempt concerned the
sailing of 248 deports from New York in December 1919. Secretary Blair
wrote to the American Commissioner of Immigration, referring to the press
reports of these deportation of "anarchists, communists, extremists . . .
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on account of their opposition to law and order,'' wanting to know how
the U.S. had carried it off, and particularly how they had gotten rid of
the Russians.
We have not so far been able to get rid of our undesirables of this
class, particularly those of Russian nationality, while we have not got
anything like the number ... we would like to get rid of those we
have.28
In fact, under the conditions of war, there were several alterna-
tive methods of procedure open to the Department. If the prospective
deport were of enemy alien origin, an easy solution was to have the person
interned, however briefly. In this case the deportation could be carried
out "as a matter of course and without any further examination or diffi-
culty." There was no appeal, no hearing; deportation was automatic.
Or, if an alien were caught with any type of arms, he or she could be
convicted of violation of the regulation governing the behaviour of aliens,
and thus deported automatically under Section 40 (criminality) if the person
did not have domicile. It was possible to arrest someone on the grounds
of some kind of political "crime" under Section 41, but it was a risky
method. If the person turned out to be a member not of a proscribed organi-
zation but rather of a borderline one, or if they attempted to defend them-
selves, the Department of Immigration might find itself in the embarrassing
position of' 'having to put a man on the witness stand without first being
able to establish that we have a case against him." Still, in the case of
someone of enemy alien origin, ' 'if it is desired to get rid of him'' no
matter what the reason, there was one guaranteed method: "the best
plan is to have him interned, and then his deportation is very simple."
Deportations which were illegal under the Immigration Act were carried
out by this simple expedient.29
After June 1919, the possibilities were widened by the infamous
amendment to Section 41 of the Immigration Act, which defined a
prohibited immigrant who could not be legally landed in Canada as anyone
interested in overthrowing organized government either in the Empire
(at the provincial level in Canada too) or in general, or in destroying
property, or promoting riot or public disorder, or belonging to a secret
organization trying to control people by threat or blackmail. If someone
fell under this Section at any time after 4 May 1919 or even retroactively,
"this constitutes evidence that he is still a member of the prohibited
classes," even if this person were not at that time doing anything
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prohibited.30 The sole exception was someone who was a Canadian
citizen by birth or naturalization. British immigrants could not be natural-
ized (their Canadian citizenship was automatic after the required period
here); thus they were subject to this amendment, which caused much
outrage.
The Department had a curious blind spot about British-born radicals.
Its officials made statements such as "so far as my experience goes,
British-born subjects do not generally side with the classes opposed to
continuing authority.'' Yet the June 1919 changes were aimed at removing
British agitators, particularly those leading the Winnipeg General Strike.
The amendments were not successfully used against the British-born in
the Winnipeg cases nor, if the Department were to be believed (and it
should not be on this point), in other instances. Moreover, provisions
added at about the same time to the Citizenship Act provided for
' 'denaturalization'' so that naturalized citizens could be stripped of citizen-
ship and then deported. Although denaturalization was possible, it was
easier to avoid giving citizenship to radicals in the first place. The
Department urged caution in this matter, "with the number of Reds
floating about this country, many of whom should be picked up and
deported . . . ."31
Into 1920, the Department continued to respond to the alarms of
the police, the RCMP, employers, and American officials about expected
incursions of "Reds" into Canada. It reinforced border patrols, intensi-
fied inspections, and sent investigators from the Department into reputed
trouble spots to search for deportables. In short, it was repression as usual.
Yet by this time there was a difference. The beginnings of protest against
continuing wartime measures to suppress dissent had appeared in the
press and elsewhere. The response of the Department to this challenge
was not sympathetic. The Winnipeg Free Press ran an editorial on
6 January 1920 opposing these measures as an arbitrary violation of the
right to read and think as one pleased, and so on. Western Commissioner
of Immigration Thomas Gelley sent the clipping on to Ottawa with the
comment that "It contains some very hot stuff." Secretary Blair com-
mented rather resignedly, "I am afraid there is a somewhat widespread
disposition on the part of the public to discount the need of any further
steps to control the element which has revolutionary tendencies." It was
not just the press who were becoming skeptical. A widespread campaign
by organized labour bore fruit at this time as well. The Department received
dozens of cards urging the repeal of the 1919 Amendments which were
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a "menace to the freedom of workers" in Canada. The cards gave the
numbers of union locals, and were usually signed by members of the
executive, most often the President and the Secretary.32
The liberal ideas of some members of the public had little influence
on the activities of the Department. The Red purge was at its height in
the United States, Canadian officials still believed there was a menace,
and the Department of Immigration continued to behave as if its duty
lay in ridding the country of foreign agitators. It is quite clear that the
U.S. situation continued to influence the Canadian scene. For example,
Canadian Travelling Immigration Inspectors were given copies of a list
of questions used by the U.S. Department of Justice to interrogate their
"Red raid" prisoners, and were told to use this list as a guide to inter-
rogate suspected "Reds" in Canada. The questions examined not only
place of birth, name, employment, citizenship, date and mode of arrival,
but also possible affiliation with the Communist Party, names of others
likewise affiliated, knowledge of the bylaws, affiliation with other allegedly
communist organizations, associates, and bylaws, and a series of ques-
tions to establish deportability on other political grounds. Did the prisoner
believe in the overthrow' 'of any [sic] government'' by force or violence?
in killing public officials? in revolution? anarchy? and so on.33
A casually selected sample of cases from the Department's
"agitator" file gives a sense of their actions at this time. There was, for
instance, Anna Kanasto, who entered by misrepresentation, did not report
for inspection when she became an immigrant, and spoke as an organizer
for the Finnish Social Democratic Party, thus coming under Section 41
of the Immigration Act and deportable as a radical. The bureaucratic case
report masks the real-life events, but some educated guesses are possible.
Kanasto may have said she was entering as a visitor, concealing her
intended political activities or deciding to become involved only after her
arrival. Her change in immigration status may have involved intent, activi-
ties, length of stay, or violation of the wartime regulations. She may not
have been aware of the legal niceties of her situation. The more arcane
points of Immigration regulations were surely not common knowledge
among the general public or even among immigrants. The important point
in the Kanasto file is the Section 41 liability; the other charges are either
preliminary or supportive. The second example is Elle Saborceki, a German
national who had arrived in Canada 1 June 1914, and during the war had
been associated with enemy subjects. She was allegedly a Communist
Party member, a "revolutionist of a pronounced type." Her deportation
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had been ordered but could not be carried out during the war, so she
had been interned and "repatriated1' as a ' 'prisoner of war' ',27 February
1920. Saborceki's "association" could have meant with family members,
friends, colleagues,- it could have been personal, private, public, political,
or all four. Given her nationality and alleged political leanings, it probably
was all four. Almost any combination would do to create "crimes'' with
which she could be charged. Note also that "repatriations'' did not appear
in the deportation statistics, nor were they governed by the Immigration
Act. Once an immigrant was ordered interned, whatever the ostensible
cause, she had virtually no recourse and certainly had no appeal rights
under the Immigration Act.
A third example, David Hirschfield, was a Russian, described as
a' 'tool of others"; after two months in jail for an unspecified but clearly
political offence, he had been "brought to his senses." He had been
ordered deported on unspecified grounds, but the deportation was delayed
because of problems obtaining his passport. He had been released on
$1,000 bond until the paperwork could be completed for his deporta-
tion. The fourth example, L. B. Thorp, was an American from Detroit,
and allegedly a member of the IWW and the Communist Party Secretary
in the Detroit area. His case was in progress at the time of the Depart-
ment record. Finally, there was Sava Elua, a Russian, arrested under
Section 41 and sentenced to two months in jail for possession of forbidden
literature. He had been examined for deportation by an Immigration officer
acting as a one-man Board of Inquiry, during the time he was in jail. This
case too was in progress.34
There is a wealth of evidence that the systematic persecution of
aliens for their political beliefs and activities was part of the work of the
Department during the period. Yet this was denied, as, for example, in
1920 in reponse to a question from the British Secretary of State for the
Colonies sent to the Governor General of Canada, concerning the alleged
"persecution of Russians, in . . . British Dominions, on account of their
political views." The Department denied that such persecution existed
in Canada.
So far as I am aware there has been no persecution of Russian citizens
in Canada. A number of Russians have been prosecuted for offences
under the Immigration Act. Deportation has been ordered in a number
of cases. We have 14 of these men detained at New Westminster,
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British Columbia, pending arrangements for their deportation to
Russia.35
Although the Department admitted to holding some Russians in
this instance, at other times it had denied such detentions. In September
1919, the Port Arthur, Ontario Trades and Labour Council had protested
the deportation of Russian radicals and had asked that these people be
allowed to choose the Russian city to which they would be sent. The
Director of Internment Operations responded to this request by writing
to the Department of Justice that since there were no more Russians
interned in Canada, no response was needed. Yet other correspondence
revealed that the Department of Immigration had a number of' 'undesir-
ables and agitators'', the majority of whom were described as Russians,
held under Section 41 for political "crimes", and awaiting deportation.
Because the paperwork for Russian deportations was difficult to complete,
some had been released on bail, others were being held in hospitals or
asylums, and still others were imprisoned at Immigration Department
Detention Hospitals (which despite their names were used as prisons)
at Vancouver, Winnipeg, and especially at Montreal where the central
Detention Hospital was located. The Department did not want these
"agitators'' to mix with other deports, and the segregated care of these
political prisoners was a strain on Departmental resources. The Department
had requested the use of an internment camp, and had been told by the
Internment Operations Office that a camp was available. The Department's
strategy was to designate such an internment camp as an "immigration
station'' within the meaning of the Immigration Act, thus making legal
the use of an internment camp as a deportation detention centre in which
"agitator" deports could be segregated from other prisoners. After the
Department of Immigration had the Department of Justice verify the legality
of this scheme, it was carried out. The internment camp was designated
an "immigration station", and the Russian and other "agitators" became,
legally and statistically, mere detainees for deportation for unspecified
offences under the Immigration Act, rather than internees or prisoners.36
The Department could then deny any political persecution of
Russians or other immigrants. Technically, their denial was true. Radicals
were prosecuted for violations of the Immigration Act. The fact that certain
political associations, beliefs or activities were in contravention of the
Act was not mentioned in the answer given to the British Secretary of
State in 1920 or on other occasions. Although the Department's answer
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was true, it was grossly misleading. As long as the Department proscribed
certain ideas, then political deportations could be carried out perfectly
openly, yet concealed by their very legality.
And so they were, during the war and into the early 1920s. Indeed
there were indications that there may have been a movement within the
Department to intensify the work of political deportation by increasing
its effectiveness. The Winnipeg agent suggested that the RCMP, who were
currently being used to help the Department trace and arrest violators,
actually be made Immigration agents so that they could prosecute as well
as arrest their victims. The legal position of the Department became more
difficult after the War Measures Act lapsed, because political deporta-
tions had been much easier under wartime emergency legislation.
Moreover, in December 1922 the Department of Justice ruled that the
IWW was not an illegal organization, because its constitution did not
contravene the relevant section of the Immigration Act. Yet undercover
surveillance continued. Despite the fact that the Wobblies were neither
legally excludable nor deportable as members of the IWW, the Department
continued to reject known Wobblies at the border. That this was deliberate
is clear from the files of the Department. As the agent at Winnipeg
explained to a subordinate,
Of course, if a man is known as an IWW agitator or organizer, our
officers at the boundary would hesitate to admit him, and if such a
man is found in Canada, and comes before your notice, he could be
treated under 33-7.37
And even though the Department could no longer legally deal with the
IWW as an organization,
with individual immigrants we can deal, however, under the Immigra-
tion Act, and in the present circumstances . . . persons . . . entering
should be held on reasonable suspicion of entering Canada by mis-
representation. No Boundary Inspector in my district would ever dream
of admitting any IWW agitators or IWW organizer.38
There was also a suggestion that the Department would have liked
to have gone even further. In one instance, a Travelling Investigating
Officer refrained from taking action against two Wobblies out of fear of
hostility from the men's local supporters, rather than out of any legal
fastidiousness. The two men were both Canadian, one by birth, the
other by long residence. The former did not come under Department of
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Immigration jurisdiction under any circumstances; the latter could have
been deportable under Section 41 if there had been grounds. The RCMP
were very eager to deport the two men but could not prosecute them
because they had not broken any laws. The Mounties relied on Immigration
to deal with the matter, but the Department could not in any case act
against them solely on account of their IWW membership since the Justice
ruling. The Travelling Investigating Officer concerned feared that if he
had taken any "high handed action", a situation "uncomfortable" for
the Department would have been created. He still hoped that the Depart-
ment could do something, but cautioned that these cases must be handled
in a ' 'very politic way'' and the Department must be sure to have ' 'very
secure grounds before proceeding." Eventually the situation proved to
be too difficult to pursue and the idea of prosecution was abandoned
because there was no legal ground for it and none could be created.39
Continued IWW activity in the West resulted in continued requests
from employers for the government to do something to remove the radicals.
The Department of Immigration was responsive to such requests. In
January 1924, for example, the Annual Meeting of the Mountain Lumber
Manufacturers' Association called on the government to "rid the country
of agitators.'' The Minister of Labour subsequently notified Immigration
to keep all agitators out of the country. Immigration asked the Association
for further information about aliens "advocating or participating in strike
agitation among the lumber camps." The Vancouver Board of Trade asked
the Prime Minister to declare the IWW an illegal organization, and wanted
all IWW organizers deported and excluded from the country in the
future.40
Eventually, protest emerged within the Department about the
illegality of the methods used by the Department to deal with the IWW.
Officer Reid, a stickler for detail, discussed the problem with the British
Columbia Immigration Commissioner Jolliffe:
As you are aware, we cannot exclude from Canada a member of the
IWW solely because he is a member of that organization, and unless
he is an idiot, insane person, criminal or diseased, we can only exclude
him if, in the opinion of our officer, he is liable to become a public
charge . . . . This has been done ... but it is putting somewhat of
a strain on the conscience of our officers.
One problem was that "in no case is there any danger of an IWW of any
standing admitted to Canada for propaganda purposes liable to become a
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public charge" because such a person would have money from the organi-
zation, and "he usually has brains enough to keep him from breaking
any laws" while in Canada. This left officers in an awkward situation.
"Judging from the telegrams" and letters from the Department asking
British Columbia inspectors to keep out agitators, Reid believed "the
situation is not clearly understood'' in Ottawa. If it was intended to prevent
members of the IWW from entering Canada, then the law should be
amended to exclude them on the basis of membership. Reid was not
refusing to exclude Wobblies. On the contrary, he explained, "we are
always willing to try to stop them from coming.'' Yet he feared that present
practices connected with deportations could not continue.' 'To pick them
up and arrest and examine them" after they had been legally admitted
would "only result in unfavourable criticism . . . and unless you instruct
to the contrary, we will not do so."41
This may have slowed down activity against the IWW but it did
not stop it. Immigration was conciliatory but did not back down. Reid's
superior justified the Department's position:
There has been ... a considerable amount of industrial unrest . . .
either started or kept alive by agitators allegedly operating as IWW
officers or delegates . . . . It is the desire of the Department that men
of this type be carefully examined and the Act be strictly applied.
Clearly what was meant here by ' 'strictly applied'' was using any tech-
nicality in the Act to keep the Wobblies out. This was shown by the detailed
instructions issued, including the admonition to use the "liable to become
a public charge" category even if it were not likely to be caused by
unemployment, but perhaps' 'as a result of agitating and fomenting trouble
in disturbed industrial areas." In other words, if these men were fired
or jailed because of their organizing activities, they might then become
a public charge (any resident of a jail was technically a public charge even
if they were later found innocent, and even if they had the money to pay
for their keep, because such bills were never tendered). Officers did not
need to trouble their conscience, because
it is not intended that our officers should be instructed to exclude
members of the IWW (as such) ... but it is of course intended that
our officers shall intelligently apply the Act.42
Officer Reid of British Columbia continued to seek legal ways to
deal with the IWW, writing weeks later that several IWWs had entered
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as tourists, and that if they took even a temporary job, he would ' 'have
some ground on which to take proceedings against them.'' He asked the
Department if their investigations had found cases such as this. Except
for catching the men in some violation of the Act, Reid said, ' 'under the
regulations as they exist at present, I have no means by which I can effect
the return of these men to the U.S."43
The high point - or perhaps low point is more a propos - of the
Department's persecution of the Wobblies was the badly fumbled attempt
to deport Sam Scarlett in 1924. The Department must share the credit
for this bumbling with the Department of Justice, for the case rested on
a tiny technical point of law, and Justice gave Immigration some bad legal
advice. The Vancouver office had been concerned about Scarlett but was
hesitant to act against him without good grounds. The Department of
Immigration wrote to the Department of Justice to ask if Scarlett were
deportable under various sections of the Immigration Act. Justice said
yes, and a warrant was sent to Vancouver for Scarlett's arrest and exami-
nation. Scarlett was a forty-three-year-old Scot who had first come to
Canada in 1903, and then had entered the United States in 1904. In 1911
he became a member of the IWW. He was convicted of seditious con-
spiracy in a trial of dubious legality, in Chicago in August 1918 as a result
of the Red raids and sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment.44 The
sentence was later commuted on the condition that he be deported, in
January 1923. Deportation was carried out from New York that April.
In August 1923 Sam Scarlett legally entered Canada. He had come
as a harvester, but took work as a machinist, claiming that he had arrived
in the Prairies between harvests and the other job had come along while
he was waiting for the next harvest. Later he worked as a labour organizer
in Vancouver where he was arrested. After a hearing in which the Depart-
ment tried unsuccessfully to show that Scarlett advocated violence and
the destruction of property and did not believe in organized government
(which would have brought him under Section 41), he was ordered
deported under Section 3, subsections (o), (r), and (s) of the Immigration
Act. The case rested on the Department of Justice ruling that the latter
two subsections applied to Scarlett because he had been found guilty of
conspiring against an allied government during the war, and had been
deported from an allied country for this conspiracy. Therefore he was
a prohibited immigrant who could not have been landed legally when he
entered in 1923. It is unclear why subsection (o) was included in the
order, since Justice had ruled nearly two years earlier that the IWW
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did not come under this subsection. The key points in his conviction,
however, were the other two subsections; otherwise he was not deport-
able. Scarlett appealed his conviction, and his attorneys filed a brief arguing
that neither the IWW nor Scarlett advocated anything illegal under the
Act. The brief did not touch upon what was to be revealed as the real
flaw in the case. The problem, as the Department discovered when it asked
Justice for advice about the appeal, was that the United States had not
been an ally of Canada during the war, but rather an "associated power''.
The case of the Department collapsed, and Secretary Blair noted,'' In view
of this we must sustain the appeal."45
Blair may have been relieved. He had expressed qualms about the
case: "I think it would have been better if we had not started this at all,''
he had said, "because these upheavals usually do more to spread fire
than to quench it." The upheavals to which he referred were a series
of protests and demonstrations, well observed by the RCMP. They reported
that the IWW did not expect to halt the deportation, but was determined
to use it to promote the movement. The Department had received tele-
grams from a wide variety of British Columbia unions and other labour
organizations, as well as from an MLA from that province. As well, in
September it received dozens of letters from concerned individuals and
organizations.46 The long (and sometimes successful) campaign by the
Department to suppress agitators in response to the demands of employers
had received a serious blow. The campaign did not stop, but it fizzled.
The Department did not lose its interest in eliminating agitators, but it
became very cautious.
Sam Scarlett remained active. A letter from the Immigration
Commissioner at Winnipeg in the summer of 1925 indicated that he
remained a thorn in the side of the Department. It was a thorn with which
the Department was prepared to live, however. The Winnipeg officer's
superior wrote:
While the Department fully appreciates the undesirable activities of
Sam Scarlett, yet it is quite evident that no action at the present time
can be taken under the provisions of the Immigration Act, the Justice
Department having ruled that the case does not come within the
provisions of subsections (o), (r), (s) of Section 3 of the Act . . . . If
the activities of Sam Scarlett are not such that he can be arrested and
convicted on any charge ... it is hardly probable that the Department
could successfully take any action against him in the matter of depor-
tation, particularly when there are no grounds other than those upon
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which he has already been examined. Therefore the Department is
not prepared to sanction any action to arrest and examine Sam Scarlett
unless he has been convicted of some offence and sentenced to a term
of imprisonment in Canada.47
The return to the pre-war status quo took some time. There were
numerous attempts to take Section 41 back to its original form as it had
been before the June 1919 amendment. In each case, the Senate rejected
the attempt, leading Blair to speculate to the Deputy Minister that this
would probably not happen until the government had a majority in the
Senate. In fact, Section 41 was not returned to its original wording until
1928. Section 98 of the Criminal Code was not repealed until 1937.48
The Department liked to claim that "no person . . . so far as I am
aware has ever been deported from Canada under the extended authority"
of Section 41,49 If this were true - and it is not - it would not have been
from lack of trying. Scott had written to the Department of Justice about
legal technicalities of a series of Section 41 deportations that he wished
to undertake, just before the Section was amended in June 1919. Scott
had reported large numbers of cases coming within Section 41, including
those who have been convicted for being in possession of revolutionary
or other prohibited literature of an undesirable nature, and of simi-
larly illegal and disloyal acts, and who are shown to or are known
to profess disloyal or revolutionary tendencies.
Scott asked if these could be deported, even though they had acquired
domicile, and even though under the Act at that time they were not clas-
sified as prohibited immigrants (which would have annulled their domicile).
Scott also wanted Justice to confirm that such persons could indeed be
deported under Section 41. On 21 July 1919 Scott wrote again to Justice,
saying that no reply to his first letter was now necessary, as "the amend-
ments to the Immigration Act have provided the answer to our letter."50
The answer was "yes".
The files of the Department abound with examples of the use of
Section 41. Successful deportations under this Section include those of
Charles David Rose, Bernard Reed Thompson, and David G. Miller, David
Porter Moon, and Fred Schultz, all of whom had entered from the United
States in the fall of 1917. They were all card-carrying IWW members,
and had ' 'stirred up trouble'' by encouraging their fellow workers to strike
for higher wages. They were prosecuted under Section 41 for "attempting
by word or act to create riot or public disorder."51 There were also
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charged under Section 33: entry without proper inspection. A somewhat
later example of deportations under Section 41 (as amended in June 1919)
was that of two women, one a Finnish Social Democratic Party member
and organizer, the other a German Communist Party member.52
A particularly blatant example of attempted Section 41 deporta-
tions was the case of the "Winnipeg Five", who had been rounded up
in the Winnipeg General Strike raids. It was in order to legalize such
proposed raids that Section 41 had been amended in June 1919.
Three of the five "foreigners" rounded up were Jews. The men
were charged with seditious conspiracy, told that they would be deported,
and taken to Stoney Mountain Prison. Several weeks later they were moved
to the Immigration Hall in Winnipeg. Moses Almazov (ne Samuel Pearl),
Sam Blumenberg and Michael Charitonoff had all been classified as
dangerous enemy aliens and for weeks before the raid had been under
surveillance by the RCMP. Almazov, a University of Manitoba student
in economics and philosophy, had come from Russia in 1913. He was
editor of Die Volke Stimme, and a member of the Social Democratic Party
and a communist. The RCMP said he was an "active revolutionary
plotter." He was eventually acquitted by a Board of Inquiry and released
after a scolding by Magistrate Noble (illegally appointed to the Board by
Immigration authorities).53
Michael Charitonoff had been charged with attempting to create
riot and disorder. The evidence against him was based on his presence
at a public meeting in Winnipeg. He had sat on the platform but had not
spoken. He had voted in favour of several resolutions which the Mounties
said were not in themselves seditious, but had been supported by rather
"hot" speeches. His deportation case was based on this flimsy evidence.
Charitonoff was ordered deported by the Board of Inquiry. He success-
fully appealed the decision. The Department of Justice had ruled that
although Charitonoff was "well within the meaning of undesirable,"
simply voting for these resolutions was not sufficient evidence for
Section 41 charges. He would have been acquitted in a court of law.54
Although the Charitonoff case ultimately had turned on legal points
of evidence, another factor was the public outcry following the Winnipeg
General Strike raids. The government had been too alarmed at the fuss
to make the use it had intended of the amended Section 41. The govern-
ment was forced to resort to other tactics, including the use of other
sections of the Immigration Act, to rid themselves of' 'troublemakers".
The other four of the Winnipeg Five fared well under Section 41. Only one,
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Schoppelrei, was deported, and that was for illegal entry. Their Board
of Inquiry hearings were important in determining the failure of Section 41
as an instrument for automatically deporting political dissidents, as Donald
Avery has pointed out. A group arrested in a second raid four days later
did not have hearings before a Board of Inquiry, as provided by the
Immigration Act. Instead, they were sent to an internment camp on the
order of Judge MacDonald, and "secretly deported" at a later date.55 This
was, of course, exceeding the letter as well as the spirit of the law. It
was not an uncommon excess.
What the government was trying to do in the war period was ' 'to
arrest a movement: it was trying to deport a philosophy."56 Extra-legal
methods were appropriate to problems that did not admit of legal solu-
tions. These methods, like so much that had taken place under the auspices
of the Department before this time, were indeed, as David Bercuson has
pointed out, in "violation of the spirit of common justice."57
The political deportations of the war period displayed the sophisti-
cated and systematic bureaucratic techniques of the Department. During
this period, the Department managed to remove a whole category of people
by applying to them purely administrative proceedings. Deportation's
function as an extension of exclusion was made clear, and so were some
lessons on how to manoeuvre around legal limits. For example, they could
find other nominal reasons to exclude or deport; use the double bind tactic
of excluding those who admitted their affiliations, and deporting for entry
by misrepresentation those who concealed them. There was also the post
facto technique: once the political undesirable had been identified, it was
a matter of finding the legal grounds to fit the case. Before the war, this
had been done on an individual, intermittent, and ad hoc basis. Now it
was systematic and deliberate.
Four conclusions may be drawn from the political deportations of
the war period. First, that systematic political deportation existed, overtly
within the Department, but to a certain extent concealed from liberals
and critics and the public in general. The main technique for concealment
was the absence of a category called' 'political deportation'' in the statistics
on the causes of deportation that appeared in the annual reports of the
Department. Second, from the evidence it is clear that the published statis-
tics concealed the real reasons for deportation behind a screen of
bureaucratic categories. Nominal categories could be used to remove a
person deemed undesirable on other grounds. For instance, a person
deported for having tuberculosis most certainly had the disease; but
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was that the real or only reason for deportation? The question for the
Department was not so much' 'why is this person undesirable,'' but rather
"for what legal cause can we deport this undesirable person." The
evidence indicates that this method was commonly used for political depor-
tations. Third, the Department deliberately and systematically extended
its policy and role of actively searching out deports, by fitting political
deportations into existing categories. Sometimes the fit was crude and
obvious, other times easy and unquestioned because of wartime hysteria
and the new ' 'undesirability'' criteria. But once the deportation of political
misfits had begun on a large scale, it continued after the wartime reasons
and the legal supports for it had disappeared, and indeed until the target
group had itself faded away. Bureaucratic categories, practices and excuses
had become self-sustaining. Finally, the question of whether the Depart-
ment threw out a group depended not on the legal status of the group,
but on its political status. If legal deportability confirmed the political
deportability, as it did for interned enemy aliens, so much the better, but
the a priori reason for deporting enemy aliens was political. In the case
of the IWW, the Department continued to act against them whether or
not the IWW was at a given moment a legal or an illegal organization:
the techniques, not the activities, of the Department changed. The law
was not a problem for the Department for much of this period, as the
law was changed to suit the political needs of the government; not
coincidentally, it also suited the administrative needs of the Department
in its own war against radicals and agitators.
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The Bureaucracy Matures, 1920S-1935
1 hroughout the 1920s deportation
case-building and record-keeping increased in importance. Before the
1920s, the Department's emphasis on constructing solid cases was usually
based on its desire to make the transportation companies pay the cost
of deportation, and to avoid grave criticism or public uproar for shipping
out paupers or the helpless. By the 1920s, it had begun to build legal
cases that would demonstrate the fairness and completeness of its work.
To perfect deportation as an administrative proceeding, the
Department had to show that deportations were legally carried out, for
consistent reasons, by proper methods, in accord with the provisions of
the Immigration Act. The evidence that was assembled and the cases that
were created protected the Department rather than the immigrant. This
is not to suggest that the Department intended to cover up gross violations
of the rights of deports, or gross illegalities in its actions. The Department
did not as a rule commit such offences, nor did it need to. Its violations
of the Act were often technical and could be seen as petty and unimportant,
were it not for the consequences for the people involved.
The 1920s were a period of intensified activity for the Department,
not searching out deports - that system had been effectively set in
motion in the preceding decades - but in creating an unassailable legal
rationale for its practices, policies, and actions. The rationale was
unassailable because it was based on prevailing social and sexual mores
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and discrimination, and because it was concealed from the public and,
for that matter, from Parliament. If awkward questions were to be raised,
the records created by the Department would show the occasional instance
of regrettable necessity of a mixed and shifting type. It remained almost
impossible for outsiders to discover how the actions of individual
immigrants were related to the statistics on the causes of deportation
published in the annual reports.
During the decade the Department had to develop techniques to
cope with legal and procedural issues such as the extralegal detainment
of immigrants who had not been convicted of crimes. The Department
had been placing them in jails in lieu of designated immigration deten-
tion facilities. Its authority to detain immigrants for examination or depor-
tation was limited by the Act to holding them in an "immigrant station''.
A jail was not an "immigrant station" within the meaning of the Act.
Sometimes the Department could arrange to have a jail so designated,
such as the penitentiary in New Westminster where fourteen Russian
"agitators" were being held. The Minister simply sent a letter "recog-
nizing" the Warden and his staff as "officers" under the Immigration
Act, and the jail as an "immigrant station" in order to "clear up the
question of legality of detention in a penitentiary." After the Department
of Justice criticized several related practices as being illegal, the Department
decided to follow more closely the procedures laid down in the Act, to
use the proper paperwork, and to produce documentary evidence that
its actions were legal.1
Certain illegal practices continued, however. For instance, under
some sections of the Act, an immigrant could be arrested without a
warrant, but not detained in jail. Nonetheless, the Department decided
to continue to do this "at present until we can get the Act amended in
such a way to make entirely legal such detention.'' The Department hoped
that if problems arose it could prosecute the detained immigrant for being
in Canada in contravention of the Act or entry by stealth or misrepresen-
tation. It might gain a fine or even a conviction. "The moment a convic-
tion is secured, the question of legality of detention awaiting the outcome
of deportation proceedings, is no longer a question for us."2
The Department also used extralegal procedures with deports who
were quite legally held in jail following criminal convictions. Contrary to
the provisions of the Act, it was their "custom to deal with inmates of
prisons, penitentiaries, and asylums without the formality of an exami-
nation by a Board of Inquiry." After 1920, the Department tended to
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hold Boards of Inquiry, although its methods remained questionable. One
short cut was to keep a supply of blank orders signed by the Minister,
so that they could be sent off at very short notice in response to a telegram
from an agent.3
The situation in British Columbia illustrates the way the Department
complied almost meticulously with certain legalities while at the same
time violated the Act. By 1921, applications for writs of habeas corpus
by defendents in Departmental deportation cases were "almost weekly
occurences.'' British Columbia judges had repeatedly ruled that the courts
could investigate to be sure that the Department had followed proper proce-
dures laid out by the Act. As a consequence, Vancouver agents paid much
greater attention to detail to be sure that their cases would stand up in
court. It was to provide British Columbia agents with evidence that they
acted legally that the practice of having the Minister sign blank orders
for examination became standardized. By 1922, the Minister was signing
blanks in batches of fifty.4
As the Department increased its attention to case-building, it gave
outside officials detailed instructions about preparing deportation cases.
To the head of the Canadian Pacific Railway Colonization Department,
Secretary Blair explained how to deport some Yugoslavs who had refused
to do farm work. It was first necessary to prove that they had entered
as agricultural workers but had subsequently refused farm jobs. They could
then be arrested without a warrant and deported under Section 33 for
entering by misrepresentation. The CPR man was told to submit several
cases to the Department, when he had prepared them along these lines,
in order to have the deportation proceedings started.5
The Department increased its attention to record-keeping, as well.
Agents were told to be sure to obtain a signed statement from immigrants
who withdrew their appeals against deportation. Perhaps the most
significant decision (at least from the point of view of later analysis of
the practices of the Department) was to "save the deportation cases."
This practice was initiated after the Department found that it could not
proceed with a deportation ordered on the grounds that the immigrant
had been previously deported, because the person's file had been
destroyed. "It seems to me that in deportation cases it might be advisable
to retain our files almost indefinitely, because such cases are liable to
crop up over and over again and once a record is destroyed it is difficult
to effect the second deportation without a good deal of trouble."6 The
general principle of saving the deportation records was consistent with
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the increased attention by the Department to creating and maintaining
records, and building good legal cases for its deportation activities.
Developing precise definitions of deportable conditions or offences
was an important factor in assembling solid deportation cases. The Depart-
ment tried to define more precisely what constituted becoming a public
charge. The answers to that question were sometimes inconsistent. For
instance, the Deputy Attorney General of British Columbia said that a
woman who received Mother's Pension (that is, welfare for the support
of dependent children, usually paid to poor widows and other women
in desperate circumstances) was not "a charge on the public authorities."
Yet these "pensions" were paid from public funds. Women who lived
in Salvation Army or YWCA or WCTU hostels were not public charges
either, according to the Department of Justice.7 First World War veterans
receiving treatment for war-related problems at veterans' hospitals,
however, were considered to be public charges, and could be deported
as such.
The deportation of veterans had political implications, and raised
complex questions. The issue centred on the question of whether or not
a hospital maintained by the Red Cross, or a public institution to help
veterans set up and run by the government, were ' 'public charitable insti-
tutions" within the meaning of the Immigration Act. Members of Boards
of Inquiry had not always agreed, and this had led to difficulties in reaching
consistent decisions on deportation cases. In the opinion of the Immigration
officials in Ottawa, Red Cross hospitals were public institutions, since funds
had been subscribed in Canada by municipal, provincial and federal govern-
ments as well as by the general public. If the Red Cross gave help to people,
particularly those not citizens or not members of the Canadian Expedi-
tionary Force (CEF), they became public charges within the meaning of
the Act. Further, government veterans' hospitals were maintained by
public funds. Whether or not veterans using these hospitals became
public charges depended on individual circumstances, particularly upon
allowances deriving from former military service. According to the
Department of Soldiers' Civil Reestablishment (DSCR), even when veterans'
allowances entitled them to treatments paid for by the government, the
payments did not cover the actual costs. Thus, "no matter to what
treatment they are entitled,'' patients who had not been in the CEF, who
became inmates of veterans' hospitals run by the DSCR, "become to a
certain extent a charge upon the public funds and a public charge in
Canada."8
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Thus, veterans were deportable if they sought hospital treatment
as veterans:
If an ex-Imperial soldier is not receiving a pension and he receives
treatment under the jurisdiction of the Department of Soldiers' Civil
Reestablishment in Canada, he is regarded by that Department as
becoming a public charge, unless they are reimbursed by the Imperial
authorities for the cost of such treatment.
Such reimbursement was reported to be rare. Moreover, even if the
veterans were getting a pension and the Imperial authorities paid all the
costs of treatment, the DSCR stated that such payment "does not cover
the costs to their Department of the maintenance of such persons in
Canada." Therefore, even a veteran with veterans' medical treatment
benefits became a public charge if he sought treatment at a veterans'
hospital in Canada.9
The Department of Soldiers' Civil Reestablishment did not stand
by the veterans on this issue, but rather co-operated with the Department
in deporting vets. The collaboration of the DSCR helped the Department
to establish standardized procedures for veterans' deportations. The local
offices of the DSCR sent lists of prospective deports to their central office
in Ottawa, which in turn forwarded the information to the Department.
At the same time, local DSCR offices sent carbon copies of the deport
lists to the local Immigration Agents, to help start the investigations. By
the end of 1922, the DSCR was requesting deportations in much the same
way as the municipalities. The choice of who was deported was largely
a question of class, however: as Immigration Secretary Blair remarked,
lists of deportable vets seldom included officers.10
Even when deportation seemed inevitable under the Act, it was
necessary to create detailed evidence in accord with legal procedures. This
became increasingly evident in medical deportation cases where the deport
had been in Canada long enough to acquire domicile. It was necessary
to show that the immigrant could not acquire domicile because he or she
belonged to the prohibited classes. In medical cases it was politic for the
Department of Immigration to consult with the medical officers at the
Department of Health (where the immigration doctors had been trans-
ferred in 1919), in much the same way as the Department consulted
with lawyers at the Department of Justice about interpretations of the
Immigration Act. In 1921, Secretary Blair wrote to the Deputy Minister
of Health about a woman certified as mentally defective by Dr. Eric Clarke
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of the Canadian Committee for Mental Hygiene at Toronto. Clarke attested
that the woman, now aged twenty-one, had been feebleminded when she
had entered Canada as a Salvation Army immigrant at the age of fourteen.
She had borne an illegitimate child, and was currently receiving treat-
ment for venereal disease. Secretary Blair wanted confirmation from the
Department of Health that this young woman was indeed a prohibited
immigrant under the Act. "Feeblemindedness is an arrest of development
of intelligence and is like an indelible scar on the brain cells," replied
the Deputy Minister of Health. By definition, she had been so afflicted
at entry, and thus was a prohibited immigrant, could never have legally
entered, and thus could not have fulfilled the requirements for domicile.11
Sending records of all medical-related cases to the Department of
Health did not necessarily mean that these deportations were actually
carried out on medical grounds:
Unless evidence is available that a person was prohibited at the time
of entry, no action can be taken in the deportation cases of persons
who are insane or mentally defective in any way or are suffering from
venereal disease or tuberculosis or are physically defective to such an
extent that they cannot work or earn a living, unless such persons
have become inmates of asylums or hospitals for the insane, or the
mentally deficient, or public charitable institutions or have become
public charges.
Lacking the evidence that the condition or problem had existed at the
time of entry, deportation was usually effected on the grounds that the
immigrant had become a public charge.12
The Department of Immigration did not refer all deportations on
medical grounds to the Department of Health, nor did it refer all public
charge deportations:
The term "for medical reasons'' is rather elastic, and we must decide
generally the limit within which we will report to the Health Depart-
ment. If the real grounds for deportation are physical or mental, I think
we should advise Health. But if otherwise, I would not report unless
the record shows that a person had become a public charge etc.,
because of physical or mental conditions possibly present when
entering Canada.13
For the most part the relationship between the two departments
was smooth and they collaborated effectively on deportation problems.
Yet sometimes there were hints of disagreement. In 1927, the Department
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of Health expressed concern that "too many cases were being deported
on the ground of medical reasons." Immigration countered that although
the Department of Health was given copies of all medical cases, this did
not mean that such deportations were "effected on medical grounds."
They explained, "the condition of health of the person under investigation
... is frequently a determining factor in the decision finally arrived at,
but this does not, of course, mean that the deportation is effected on the
grounds of medical causes."
In the case of one man who was also a prohibited immigrant because
he had tuberculosis, the deportation had been
ordered solely on the grounds that the alien had become a public charge
in Canada and was not in possession of Canadian domicile. The
Examining Officer came to the conclusion that the alien was not
disposed to work and that he appeared to be strong and healthy.14
Thus, the fact that the person had tuberculosis and was therefore a member
of the prohibited classes was used only to disqualify him from domicile.
The actual ground for deportation was that he was a public charge.
High numbers of deportations on medical grounds reflected badly
on the Department of Health; since the transfer of the immigration doctors
in 1919, incoming immigrants were inspected by medical officers under
the auspices of the Department of Health. Although by the 1920s the
medical officers no longer had the power to exclude or deport immigrants,
they were still required to certify in writing the existence of any medical
problems which might make each immigrant a member of the prohibited
classes specified in the Act. Subsequent admission, rejection or, ultimately,
deportation, was out of their hands. Yet outcry for stricter inspection
focused on the inadequacy of medical inspections. High rates of medical
deportation fueled such outcries.
Even though the medical inspectors had little real authority by the
1920s, it was essential that they note any defects that might have bearing
on later deportation cases. Without such evidence, the Department of
Immigration might find it impossible to deport someone. For example,
in 1928, Jane Smith, aged seventy-four, suffering from senile dementia
and varicose veins, was ordered deported. She had entered Canada in
August 1919, destined for Fort William, Ontario, where her married
daughter lived. She had been admitted to the Ontario Hospital for the
Insane in April 1928, nearly nine years later. The Department of Health
agreed that she had been certifiable at the time of entry under the medical
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prohibitions of the Act, because of ulcerating varicose veins. Her depor-
tation order was based on Section 3,' 'prohibited immigrant'', Section 40,
1 'having become an inmate of a hospital for the insane,'' and "having
become a public charge."15
The case rested upon her inclusion in the prohibited classes because
of her varicose veins at the time of entry. She had admitted that she had
suffered from varicose veins before entering Canada. Upon arrival at the
hospital, she had been medically certified as physically unable to work
because of old age and varicose veins. Moreover, there was also a letter
from the Medical Superintendent of the hospital attesting that she was
lame because of her veins, and thus had never been able to earn her living
in Canada. Therefore, she had been certifiable under Section 3 at the time
of entry. Nonetheless, the Department finally had to reverse her depor-
tation order, because she had not been so certified when she entered
Canada. Thus, there was no adequate evidence to show that she did not
have domicile, and so she was not deportable under Section 40.le
The issue in deportation cases was not so much the real situation
but rather what could legally be shown to be the situation. While medical
factors gave the opportunity to build good cases for the deportation of
some immigrants even after long residence, these medical factors were
useful only if carefully constructed into evidence to support the case.
The Department acquired a new technique to use against domiciled
aliens, with the amendment of the Opium and Narcotic Drug Act
(O.N.D.A.) on 28 June 1922. Before, only undomiciled aliens could
legally be deported after criminal convictions for drug-related offences
such as possession of, addiction to, or trafficking in, illegal drugs. After
the 1922 amendment, according to a Department of Justice ruling, "an
alien coming under the provisions of the O.N.D.A. is deportable, not-
withstanding the fact that he may have acquired Canadian domicile under
the provisions of the Immigration Act."17
Such deportations did not go unchallenged: in fiscal 1922-23,
fourteen cases from the Pacific Division (British Columbia) went to the
courts. Five of these court cases were won by the Department and the
persons were deported after their jail sentences. The other nine persons
won and the Department had to release twenty-three O.N.D.A. deports
who had served their jail sentences, and whose deportations would not
have been sustained by the courts if challenged by writs of habeas corpus.
Another important British Columbia Court of Appeals decision made
O.N.D.A. deportations more difficult. The Court decided that deportation
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under certain Sections of the O.N.D.A. was a criminal proceeding. This
increased the already high number of deportation cases being appealed
in the British Columbia courts.18 The Department fared better in closed
administrative proceedings. Nonetheless, the use of the amended O.N.D.A.
was subject to fewer constraints in other provinces, and its provisions
did bring hundreds more each year into the ranks of the deportable.
The tactics used by the Department were flexible and varied accord-
ing to the target. The O.N.D.A. deportation provisions applied only to
' 'aliens''. British subjects could not be examined for deportation for drug
offences under the O.N.D.A., but if undomiciled they could be examined
under Sections 40 and 42 of the Immigration Act for deportation as
convicted criminals. Sometimes the Department's choice of legal tactics
was affected by economic considerations. Some O.N.D.A. offences could
lead to deportations of undomiciled immigrants under the Immigration
Act. In these cases, the transportation companies were usually liable for
costs. Drug cases "beyond" the Immigration Act, when aliens had
Canadian domicile, had to be carried out under the O.N.D.A. In these
instances, the Department paid the costs of deportation.19
The Pacific Division office in Vancouver, where most of the
O.N.D.A. deportations were carried out, and where the Department had
faced the most severe court challenges, helped other offices prepare
O.N.D.A. cases that would survive appeals or habeas corpus writs. Agent
Malcolm Reid, Assistant Chief Controller of Chinese Immigration at
Vancouver, explained to Agent Regimbal, Montreal Controller of Chinese
Immigration, that in British Columbia they had "successfully defended
some Habeas Corpus cases ... but have lost one or two as well." The
most important points for the Board of Inquiry to bring out in such cases
were that the accused was an alien, and that he or she had been sentenced
under the relevant sections of the O.N.D.A. "The courts have told us
that in all cases, the Warrant of the Minister of Justice . . . must be
issued," as well as the warrant from Immigration. Further, the person
would have to have been formally ordered deported by a Board of Inquiry.
If these steps were properly taken, Reid advised, the Department "will
not have much trouble with these cases."20
The statistics of the Pacific Division showed the usefulness of the
new Act. In fiscal 1923-24, 38 per cent (116 : 307) of its deportations
were under these provisions; in 1924-25, 22 per cent (77 : 374); and
in 1926-27, 16 per cent (52 : 328). Moreover, within the statistics of
"criminal" deportations, there were other instances of those not yet
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domiciled, and thus liable to be deported for criminal convictions (violations
of the O.N.D.A.), under the provisions of the general Immigration Act.21
The O.N.D.A. was aimed at the drug trade in Canada, particularly
at the Chinese, who were thought to be disproportionately involved in
it. Indeed, most of the deportations under the O.N.D.A. were of persons
of Chinese descent. Chinese immigration had been restricted since 1885
by the imposition of a $50 head tax, increased to $100 in 1901, and
$500 in 1904. In 1923, the Canadian government's Chinese Immigration
Act cut off Chinese immigration by restricting entry to Canada to: diplo-
matic personnel and their families; returning Canadian-born Chinese who
had been away for educational or other purposes and who could prove
they were Canadian-born; returning long-time Canadian residents who
could prove their status; students; certain classes of merchants; visitors;
and persons in transit to other countries. Persons of Chinese descent
presently in Canada had already been required to register with the immigra-
tion authorities. Their subsequent exit and re-entry was controlled by a
system of certificates valid only for a certain length of time.22
This anti-Chinese prejudice expressed in policy in the 1923 Act
was also expressed in Departmental practice. The Winnipeg Commissioner
wrote to the Ottawa office in 1923 to complain that he had not been
consistently notified of the impending arrival of Chinese deports coming
from the East to be deported from a Pacific port. Winnipeg officers met
the train, and took over escorting the Chinese deports to Vancouver.
Winnipeg officers needed adequate notice to arrange a transfer of custody
at the station, "so that these Chinese will not be kept over in the
Immigration Hall here."23
It was not just the Department who objected to close contact with
Chinese deports. In 1929, Charlotte Whitton of the Canadian Council on
Child Welfare complained to the Department about a series of child depor-
tations. A fifteen-year-old girl and a fourteen-year-old boy, escorted by
a Department Matron on the Vancouver eastbound train, had found no
sleeping accommodations. Their car had been filled with Chinese men.
At first the Department presumed that it was the colonist car accommo-
dations rather than the Chinese passengers to which Whitton objected,
and responded that the colonist car was no worse than that in which the
children had immigrated to Vancouver. Moreover it would be exceedingly
rare for [white] child deports to travel in a colonist car, or to be sent in
a car full of Chinese. As a result of this case (and others before), the
Vancouver Children's Aid Society asked that all child deports be given
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better accommodation. As the Society argued, when the children had
travelled to Vancouver with their parents, it is unlikely that they had been
the only non-Chinese occupants of a car. The Society wanted assurances
that child deports travelling without their parents would be placed in a
car "where the other passengers are not Orientals and the girl deportees
should not be made to travel in a car entirely rilled with men." Someone
from the Department noted in the margin beside these two requests, "quite
right," and suggested using tourist rather than colonist cars.24
The O.N.D.A. amendments added another weapon to the arsenal
of the Department, but the instructions had to be carefully followed to
avoid backfiring. The provisions of the Immigration Act did not so much
limit the power of the Department to carry out deportations, as did they
specify the methods and procedures through which the Department was
to exercise that power. As long as the Department was meticulous in
paperwork, used the correct forms, and adduced evidence in its Board
of Inquiry hearings to prove the immigrant's membership in a particular
group specified in the Section of the Act under which the deportation was
to take place, its authority would be virtually unchallenged.
Immigrants in Canada more than five years could be deported in
the 1920s only under certain conditions: discovery of political offences,
bringing them under Section 41; discovery that they had not entered legally
and could not have fulfilled the requirement for five years' residence after
legal entry; or discovery that some medical problem or condition brought
them under the prohibited classes, which meant that they could never
acquire domicile. Otherwise, domiciled immigrants were usually safe from
deportation. The amended O.N.D.A. added another category to the list
of exceptions, and it focused on groups who were widely seen as undesir-
able: drug addicts or traffickers, criminals and, often, the Chinese. Depor-
tation of these groups was politically safe, morally attractive, and in accord
with the popular prejudices of the general public and of the "progres-
sive" elements such as doctors and moral reformers of the period.25
Morality was a particularly important consideration in the depor-
tations of women. The attitude of the Department was ambiguous. On
one hand, the Department routinely deported women because of little more
than sexual transgressions at which they had been caught (for instance
by pregnancy or venereal disease). On the other hand, the Department
cautioned its various agents to be sure that women reported for deporta-
tion for sexual immorality were not merely victims of someone's desire
to get them out of the way. During the war, Superintendent Scott had
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issued a notice to all agents and officers in the West concerning such cases.
The Department was sometimes criticized, Scott said, for deporting young
women, especially single women. It was claimed that "interested persons"
were bringing about such deportations to "avoid local trouble" and the
women were "unable to defend themselves and more to be pitied than
blamed." The Department had no desire to find itself blamed, however.
Scott instructed, "With the object of further safeguarding our interests . . .
where the deportation of a young woman is under consideration, the
greatest care should be taken to see her side of the story is considered
and, if necessary, investigated."26
Bruce Walker, then in charge of the Winnipeg office of the Depart-
ment, responded that he had ' 'for several years . . . made it my personal
business not to pass a woman for deportation, old or young, married or
unmarried, without a thorough investigation. , . . Interested parties do
not hesitate to bring unsupported charges to compel political or other
influence towards the removal of a woman whose presence is considered
dangerous or inconvenient to them. I have a case in Ft. Frances this
morning, where local influence is being used against a young woman . . .
by local interests, in which one of the parties concerned is guilty of a
serious crime against the girl and seeks to protect himself from further
exposure. . . ,"27
The Department was paternalistic towards female immigrants, espe-
cially the respectable and the "fallen". This can be explained in part by
connections between the Department and the women's reform movement
in Canada, especially that part of the movement involved in female
immigration promotion and management. Bruce Walker was sympathetic
to maternalist feminist circles such as the Young Women's Christian
Association. Walker addressed meetings sponsored by the YWCA, wrote
on female immigration in their magazine, and approved of YWCA efforts
to control and protect female immigrants in the West. The YWCA had
been a leader in the efforts by women's organizations in Canada to protect
young women immigrants. In 1909, a Canadian representative to an inter-
national conference of women reformers had suggested that young women
coming to Canada be made wards of the state, to keep them on the straight
and narrow; unsupervised young women would be "ruined".28
By 1914 the YWCA had helped to set up an elaborate system of
reception and supervision of female immigrants arriving in Canada. The
YWCA's part in this network was mostly Travellers' Aid work. "TA"
workers wearing badges met incoming women at stations all over the
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country, and through local committees of women's church missionary
societies, associations of girls' school graduates, home economics societies,
women's institutes, other women's organizations, and through local
clergymen, tried to supervise and assist newcomers. The YWCA had
received permission from the railroads to put up placards in stations, and
had obtained promises of further co-operation. The Canadian delegates
at an international YWCA conference in Stockholm had suggested that
a system of compulsory reception and registration centres be set up in
each Canadian city station, where female immigrants would check in so
that they might each "be located and guarded."29
Bruce Walker echoed many of these same concerns in his 1914
article in the YWCA periodical The Young Women of Canada. He described
the moral dangers of unescorted and unprotected travel, and advocated
the investigation of prospective employers to protect women against moral
dangers. He explained the importance of supervising female immigrant
newcomers so that they would become the kind of wives and mothers
upon whom the building of Canada and the moulding of "the destinies
of future Canadians'' could safely depend. He urged that there be a female
immigrant receiving home managed by women (especially YWCA women)
in every province, and that the presence of female supervisory escorts
be made compulsory on all ships and trains carrying female immigrants.
He urged his readers to pressure the government to bring about these
reforms.30 (They took his advice.)
This was the context within which Department agents approached
concerns related to female immigrants. The YWCA and other women's
groups working with these immigrants continued during the 1920s to
press for more systematic and thorough contact with immigrants after
they had been settled in new jobs and homes. With the creation of a
Women's Division in the Department of Immigration after the war, the
ties between the women reformers and the Department were formalized
and legitimized. Jean Burnham, head of the Division, instituted many of
the procedures which women's groups had developed and lobbied the
government to support since the 1880s. Burnham advocated "follow-
up work'', as this supervision and contact was called. She told the YWCA
Immigration Committee in 1925 that she believed it should be ' 'not just
protective," but also embodied in "club opportunities for making friends
and keeping straight." The social activities of women immigrants should
be a part of this follow-up system. Burnham was sometimes more thorough
than the YWCA on this question, for she had suggested, as well, a letter
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and "follow-up visit" to every employer ("mistress") of immigrant
domestic servants to assure that effective supervision and protection could
be maintained.31
On other occasions, Burnham used the YWCA and other follow-
up workers ' 'to locate missing girls,'' that is, women who had dropped
out of the records of the Department. Women reformers had focused mainly
on British female immigrants; Burnham extended the system to non-British
women. Agreeing that female escorts were needed for women travelling
to their new homes, Burnham expressed concern that "conductresses"
were "rarely sent out on an immigrant train that is wholly foreign,'' so
that "foreign" women did not receive the same "protection" as British
women. She was able to report a few months later that the situation
had improved, and that fewer "foreign" trains were sent out without
a "conductress". Some aspects of this close relationship between the
women reformers of the YWCA and the government, however, had
deteriorated by the last half of the 1920s.
In 1926, Burnham notified the YWCA that she would no longer
send them corrected and updated addresses for all single female immigrants
in Canada.' 'The government safeguarded the interests of the new arrivals
and . . . our general follow-up work was therefore not needed, "reported
an upset YWCA worker to her headquarters. In 1927, Burnham discon-
tinued the practice of notifying the YWCA of the arrival of married women;
only single immigrants were to be named henceforth in the Department
lists given to the YWCA.32
Three factors were significant in these decisions. First, the Depart-
ment had become more deeply involved in the work of female immigration
management; women immigration officers and other workers were
employed by the government, and systems for the "care" of female
immigrants were well established, particularly with the advent of the
Empire Settlement Act and the Aftercare Agreement for the supervised
immigration of British domestic servants. The Aftercare Agreement
promised that the women would be personally conducted to their ships,
supervised on the voyage, met at the Canadian port by women officers
of the Department of Immigration, and kept under government supervi-
sion until they were placed in suitable positions. After placement, the
government would maintain contact with the immigrants for several years.
The government no longer needed to supply information to the YWCA in
order to have follow-up done. Secondly, the pressure of work increased as
paperwork became more voluminous, more specific, and more important.
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The special responsibilities of the Women's Division meant that Burnham
and her staff were under constant pressure to generate a staggering array
of statistics and reports on women immigrants. Moreover, it was their
duty to keep track of every single female immigrant who entered the
country. The Division could no longer afford extra time and money to
send this information to the YWCA. Finally, by the 1920s, Jean Burnham
may well have been exasperated by the difficulty of bringing together
women reformers to work with her under new and more professional terms
and conditions.
In 1919, when the Women's Division had been formed, a publicly
funded advisory and coordinating committee of representatives from
provincial and federal governments and women's reform groups work-
ing in female immigration had also been established. The Canadian Council
of Immigration of Women functioned for several years and then gradually
faded from the scene, perhaps because its role was token. Ever more of
the responsibilities of the Council were taken over by government represen-
tatives and professional social workers, while the volunteer reformers
became ever less necessary and available. Dr. Helen Reid, a Montreal
feminist and physician who was very active in immigration and public
health matters, in 1927 suggested calling up the Council again, to
strengthen the Women's Division, to lessen the overlapping of organiza-
tions doing immigration work, and to develop information on the actual
work done by organizations. Reid stressed the importance of co-operation
between governments and women's groups in this work. Burnham had
been working without much success since 1926 to organize a confer-
ence to revive the Council, and had written to Minister of Immigration
Robert Forke to gain support for the idea. She hoped that women's
organizations could use the Council to ' 'help mould government policy.''
The meeting was eventually held in 1928 but the role of voluntary organi-
zations in female immigration work was never to regain the importance
of previous decades. Although the work of the Women's Division con-
tinued to show maternal feminist features of the earlier period, its outlook
had become professionalized. The women's immigration reform movement
that had helped to shape the Division had also changed, with some of
its activists becoming professionals themselves, and some turning to other
tasks.33
The establishment of a Women's Division can be seen as one
response of the Department to decades of working more or less in
co-operation with women (and to a lesser extent, men) reformers in the
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area of female immigration. There is little evidence of conflict between
Jean Burnham and other Department officials. Since most of the work
relating to women took place under the ostensible supervision of the
Women's Division, there may well have been relatively few occasions
for clashes. It was the practice in the 1920s to use female officers to carry
out escort and other deportation-connected duties. Despite the Depart-
ment's sometimes harsh deportation practices, it did display a paternalistic
(or maternalistic) "protective" attitude towards women immigrants.
The Department routinely deported women who strayed from well
regulated and respectable behaviour. The Department in some instances
deported women solely because they had illegitimate children. In one
case in 1922 the child had died, so "the care and maintenance of the
child was not a matter to be taken into consideration"; still, the mother
was deported. "Fallen girls" were deported, often at the behest of
municipal officials. In one such case, the Department's Assistant Account-
ant explained to the Secretary of Immigration that Calgary authorities
were doing their best to "get rid of" one woman, whether she was
"legally deportable or not. I think experience has shown the Department
that this is pretty much the attitude of at least all the Western
Municipalities . . . ,"34
When a woman in such a situation wanted to go back to the British
Isles (most single women immigrants in the 1920s were British) the
Department "might have helped her home without bothering about
whether or not she was deportable." But if she were not willing to go,
and not legally deportable, she could not be shipped out so easily. In the
case of Nellie Fry, for instance, the Department was stymied. She had
entered before the 1919 Act had come into effect, so could not be found
in the prohibited classes, said Blair. She had been examined to see if her
"mental state" would bring her under the prohibited classes under the
provisions of the 1914 law. It did not. Noted the Department, "when
the girl herself stated that she did not want to go back, that her misfor-
tune and her offence had taken place in Canada and that she had paid
here for her error, it became necessary to deal with her case in an
absolutely legal manner."35
Whether or not women were deported for causes related to sexual
"immorality" seems to have been determined also by such factors as
with whom they were' 'immoral''. Grace Evelyn Baker had come to Canada
as a domestic in November 1926, left her job after a month, and then
was apparently courted at the same time by Padgen, a naturalized
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Canadian of Austrian origin, and Hoy, a Chinese cafe cashier. The Depart-
ment had implied that she had been sexually intimate with both before
she had married the former. In July 1927, she obtained a legal separa-
tion. In September of that year she gave birth to a child who was regis-
tered as Hoy's son. Hoy had been "looking after" her since that time.
Moreover, upon examination she had "admitted to having been intimate
with a young man in England prior to emigration to Canada, and from
the evidence it is quite conclusive that she is an undesirable."
She was charged as a prostitute under Section 40 of the Act and
ordered deported, because she had admitted having a room at the same
hotel as Hoy, and also admitted that she had "frequented the room of
this Chinese and had intimate relationships with him, who gave her money
as well as presents." Her appeal against deportation was sustained only
because she was legally the wife of a Canadian citizen. It is also clear
from the records of the Department that it was on account of her sexual
relationships outside of marriage (albeit one of the three had been long
before) that she was deportable. While the Department professed sympathy
for respectable women who had "fallen" victims to sexual predators,
and sometimes did help them, it reacted to those who willingly and know-
ingly transgressed, with little but the desire to remove such a menace
to public morals.36
The Department was concerned to show that deportations were
not arbitrary, but just and legal. The Act offered a variety of statutory
causes for deportation. The Department had to build evidence to show
that particular cases came under the general categories of the Act. The
evidence was the link between the actions of the immigrant and the ability
of the Department to deport him or her as a consequence of those actions.
There may well have been a direct cause-and-effect link between action
and deportation, but the records created and displayed by the Depart-
ment in its annual reports did not necessarily reveal this causal connec-
tion. Rather, nominal or legal causes given to explain deportation tended
to obscure the "real" reasons.
The extent to which nominal causes for deportation concealed the
real or a priori reasons can be seen in the deportations of British women
who had come to Canada as domestic servants during the 1920s. Between
1923-31, a total of 23,804 women had come out as household workers
under the Empire Settlement Act. Of these, 18,790 came after January
1926 under the Aftercare Agreement. This agreement brought over women
in five different categories under various schemes set up between the
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Imperial authorities, the federal government, and such bodies as the
Province of Ontario or the Salvation Army. The Aftercare Agreement
offered household workers guaranteed work at standard wages. Between
1923 and 1925, women could obtain passage loans. In 1926 a cheap
fare of three pounds (reduced to two pounds in 1927) was made avail-
able for the ocean passage, and rail fares in Canada were also greatly
reduced. The post-1926 immigrants had to pay their own ocean passage,
but could get loans for their rail fares. (By 1937, eighty-nine per cent
of the loans had been repaid.)37
The Aftercare Agreement did not entirely succeed in eliminating
the problems traditionally associated with female immigration. The Depart-
ment classified difficulties experienced by these immigrants as "minor"
and "major" problems. Minor problems listed for fiscal 1931-32 included
ill health, job changing by unskilled houseworkers, immigrants being
"unsettled owing to poor character", houseworkers taking other kinds
of work, address unknown, and unemployment. Minor problems in them-
selves seldom led to deportation. Yet minor problems might become
' 'major'', and major problems often led to deportation. Despite the super-
vision ("protection") promised by the Agreement, numbers of domestics
became pregnant and bore children out of marriage.38
The Department of Immigration claimed that it did not deport these
women simply because they had illegitimate children. This claim was
regarded with some skepticism. The Overseas Settlement Office in England,
a British government agency, had complained as early as June 1926 that
Canada was too eager to deport Empire Settlement women. In 1928,
Terence Macnaghten, Vice Chairman of the Overseas Settlement
Committee, wrote on behalf of the Overseas Settlement Office protesting
the deportation of unwed mothers. "We take the view that when an
unmarried woman from this country becomes a mother after she has
resided in Canada for a year or more, i.e., when the presumption is that
she was led astray after she had arrived in Canada ... the mother and
child should remain in Canada and be dealt with like any other unmarried
mother and child in Canada."39 He urged the Department to seek
permission from the Overseas Settlement Office to deport such cases.
The Department was indignant at the suggestion that it should
consult British authorities in deportation cases. In an internal memo the
Commissioner of Immigration hotly denied that the Department had a
programme of wholesale deportations of unwed mothers. "We are
continually in hot water owing to our refusal to deport" many such
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cases, he claimed. As for Macnaghten's idea that these women had been
"led astray" in Canada, "no doubt some of them are, b u t . . . from a
perusal of most of these cases, I would judge that there has not been
much leading astray ... the examination frequently indicates the girls
were immoral before ever they came to Canada."40
Deputy Minister of Immigration William Egan replied to
Macnaghten, "we never deport an unmarried mother nor do we deport
any British subject if it is at all possible to establish them in this country
but we subsequently discover migrants who belonged to the prohibited
classes at the time of their entry, and we have ... no authority under
the law to permit such persons to remain in this country.'' The Canadian
law was "designed to protect a municipality'' from immigrants who had
become public charges, and unwed mothers fell under this law. Shortly
thereafter Blair forwarded Macnaghten a copy of a report from an urban
charitable organization which complained strenuously about a very low
rate of deportation for illegitimacy, arguing that these mothers had become
public charges, and that "socially unadjusted cases of this type'' should
be deported. The organization had decided to refuse to grant relief to such
cases, and warned that it would not accept responsibility for the "serious
and permanent social problems due to the Department not taking action."
Blair cited this report as an example of the problems faced by the Depart-
ment in dealing with these cases, and as evidence that the Department
did not automatically deport unwed mothers.41
Macnaghten was persuaded that such cases were dealt with "sym-
pathetically and justly.'' He accepted the claim that these immigrants were
not deported "unless there is evidence of constant immorality and
disease," Further, he believed that only a small percentage of deporta-
tions ordered had actually been carried out.42
Departmental files challenge these claims. The rate of deportation
for British female domestics brought to Canada, under the Aftercare
Agreement (with its supposedly stringent procedures of selection, super-
vision and assistance), between 1 January 1926 and 31 March 1931,
was 4.6 per cent. This is considerably more than the average of one per
cent cited by the Department in its published annual reports. A report
by the Department on 670 "unwed mother" cases between 1926 and
1933 revealed that 27.5 per cent of these unmarried mothers were
deported, and a further 5.4 per cent were ordered deported, but the depor-
tations stayed. Ten per cent' 'returned to the Old Country''; it is unclear
how many of these returns were in fact informal deportations. These
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figures do not reveal the extent of illegitimacy deportations, because of
the high percentage of cases not yet settled at the time of the study: 36 per
cent. Department memos and internally circulated reports indicate that
there was not necessarily a direct connection between the "problem",
and the stated cause given by the Department for deportation. An analysis
of the causes for the deportations of 689 Empire Settlement Aftercare
domestics between 1 January 1926 and 31 March 193143 showed that
the same "problem1' - immorality - was listed as a "contributing factor
which necessitated deportation" in four of the five statutory causes for
these deportations.
The Department gave seven reasons for these 689 deportations:
"illegitimacy" (169), "immorality" (64), "criminalconvictions" (68),
"bad conduct" (64), "medical" (233), "marriage" (deported with
husband, 83), and' 'becoming a public charge" (8). These reasons were
not necessarily legal causes for deportation, nor did they correlate directly
to the legal causes. The statutory (legal) causes for these 689 deporta-
tions were: "public charge" (528), "insane" (24), "prohibited
immigrant" (66), "inmate of gaol" (56), "misrepresentation" (15). The
same reasons appeared under more than one statutory heading. "Immoral-
ity' ' was in four; "mentally deficient'' and ' 'medical'' appeared in three
("public charge", "prohibitedimmigrant", and "misrepresentation").
' 'Venereal disease'' appeared as a subcategory of' 'medical reasons'' under
the statutory cause of "public charge", and again as a category itself
under the statutory cause of "prohibited immigrant." "Inmates of gaol''
deportees (56) had been jailed for "immorality" (80), "vagrancy" (21),
"theft" (16), "forgery" (1), "breach of the liquor act" (1), "child deser-
tion" (1), "bigamy" (1), and "contributing to delinquency" (7). Those
deported as prohibited immigrants under the Immigration Act (66) were
"mentally deficient" (37), "immoral" (8), "previously deported" (2),
"convicted prior to arrival" (2), or had "venereal disease" (6), "medical
problems or conditions'' (11). Of the fifteen women ordered deported for
entry by misrepresentation, four were deported for ' 'immorality'', "mental
deficiency'', ' 'medical reasons'' or having been ' 'previously deported'',
while eleven were ordered deported for having "misrepresented" their
marital status, that is, for claiming to be single. Even so apparently
straightforward and frequently used a statutory cause as ' 'being a public
charge" (528) included a variety of stated reasons: "illegitimacy" (142),
"immorality" (33), "bad conduct" (69), "medical reasons" (159),
"mental deficiency" (32), "vagrancy" (5), and "unemployment" (88) .44
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illegitimacy figured prominently in the "Reports of Aftercare
Agreement problem cases." The Department claimed that it did not deport
an immigrant solely for having an illegitimate child; however, it did deport
women for other, often related, reasons. Another Departmental study
outlined the causes for deportation of a group of 574 Empire Settlement
Aftercare Agreement immigrants who had borne illegitimate children by
the end of March 1934. Of this group, 137 were deported for illegitimacy
combined with other charges:' 'becoming a public charge'',' 'immorality''
(living with men to whom they were not married), "having a second
illegitimate child", "theft", "feeblemindedness", "venereal disease",
"being thoroughly undesirable". Of the deportations not tied to
illegitimacy, fifty-four were deported for ' 'immorality'' (living with a man)
in combination with "prostitution" or other offences. A total of sixty-
one more were deported for "conviction of a criminal offence'', such as
"keeping a disorderly house", "theft", "forgery", "immorality", or
"contributing to delinquency". Another fifty-three were deported for "bad
conduct": "attempted suicide", "petty theft", "incorrigibility", "refusing
to accept employment''. Medical reasons accounted for 208 deportations:
"feeblemindedness", "asthma", "epilepsy", "rheumatism", "tuber-
culosis", "arthritis", "venereal disease", "kleptomania", and "foot
trouble''.' 'Becoming a public charge'' was the reason given for the depor-
tation of sixty-one, of whom fifty-nine were sent along with their deported
husbands, and two more with their husbands and children.45
The Department had not expected these problems with the
supposedly carefully screened and supervised Aftercare Agreement
immigrants. It attempted to compare them with other single British women
immigrants who had arrived in Canada between 1926 and the end of March
1934 46 xhis group produced 472 "problems" for the Department. Of
these, 194 concerned "illegitimacy", 38 "immorality", 18 "criminal
convictions", 32 "bad conduct", 124 "medical conditions or problems",
18 had unemployed husbands (and thus were deported with them), and
48 were themselves unemployed. Of the total, 202 were deported and
another 50 ' 'returned'' home by the Department.' 'Returned'' home often
was de facto if not de jure deportation, in cases where statutory causes
might not exist, or where the person had been resident too long to be
deportable, and he or she would consent to be sent back. Some returns
were indeed voluntary, but it is clear that many, if not the majority, were
voluntary only in the sense that consent had been given, sometimes under
duress.
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In the Empire Settlement comparison group, by December 1932,
of a total of 18,528 Empire Settlement arrivals between 31 March 1926
and 31 March 1931, 377 had become problems. There were 120 cases
of "illegitimacy" (19 deported, 7 "returned"). Two women had been
pregnant on arrival in Canada. There were 52 cases of "immorality"
(7 deported, 2 "returned"), and ten "criminal convictions" (5 deported).
Sixty-one women had been noted guilty of' 'bad conduct' ' (11 deported,
2 "returned"). "Medical problems" numbered eighty (27 deported,
2 "returned"). A total of 45 were deported with their unemployed
husbands. Seven themselves had become public charges, and two of these
were deported. Of the total, 114 were deported and 22 "returned".47
A study of a slightly larger group of Empire Settlement arrivals
produced 1,885 problem cases by the end of March 1933. There were
670 cases of "illegitimacy" (179 deported), 184 of "immorality"
(67 deported), 95 "convictions" (69 deported), 313 cases of "bad
conduct" (67 deported), 451 "medical problems" (248 deported),
108 deported with their unemployed husbands, and 64 ' 'public charges''
(10 deported). A total of 748 were deported, and a further 202 were
"returned" home. Somewhat more than half of the immigrants identi-
fied by the Department as "problem cases" were deported in one way
or another.48 There was a considerable increase in the rate at which the
Department labelled these immigrants as "problem cases" by 1933: over
1,400 new "problems" arose in one year. One must speculate about the
reasons for this increase: did the economic and social pressures of the
Depression produce more real difficulties for these women, or were their
experiences typical of domestic servant immigrants? Were the new
"problem case" immigrants on the verge of gaining domicile, after which
they would be harder to deport? Whatever the case, the Department used
deportation as a solution for problems experienced by female as well as
male immigrants in Canada.
In 1936 the Department undertook a study to determine the success
of the Aftercare Agreement programme. This report is useful as a summary
of what did happen to those women who came over as domestics under
Empire Settlement in the 1920s. By the end of March 1936, of the total
of 18,970 arrivals, 2,189 had married, 402 had gone to the United States,
85 had died, 305 had become "re-established" and 1,356, or a total
of twelve per cent of the 18,790 "girls" went back to the Old Country, by
deportation and' 'voluntary '' returns. Of the total Aftercare immigrants,
2,169 had constituted "major problems" for the Department. A total
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of 877 (forty per cent) had been legally deported. Another eighty
deportations had been ordered but never executed.49
This breakdown of major problem cases reveals interesting data
not only about the difficulties experienced by this group but also about
the response of the Department to these difficulties. Of the 2,169 cases,
773 were deported for "illegitimacy", 201 for "immorality", 107 for
"convictions", 339 for "badconduct", 519 as "medical", 135 "deported
with husband", and 95 as "public charges".50 These cases show how
the Department translated immigrants'' 'problems'' into legal deportations.
TOTAL '' Major Problems ": 2,169
Numbers % of 2,169 % of 18,790
Deported 877 40.4 4.6
Deportation stayed 80 3.6 .4
Returned to Old Country 257 11.8 1.4
Went to United States 27 1.2 .1
Died 38 1.7 .2
Married 388 17.9 2.1
Re-established 305 14.0 1.6
Cases under supervision 195 9.0 1.0
These legal deportations were carried out under five statutory
causes: "public charge" (690), "prohibited immigrant" (82), "insane"
(29), "inmate of gaol" (61), "misrepresentation" (15). The reasons listed
under these causes are illuminating.
Although ' 'public charge" was the most frequently used statutory
cause for these deportations, identical offences were used to build up a
case under several different statutory headings. Only 2.9 per cent of public
charge deportations were because of the woman's own unemployment,
15.3 per cent were because of her husband's unemployment. Those
defined as "immoral", bearing illegitimate children, deemed "mentally
deficient", arrested for "vagrancy" (even if they did not all serve
sentences), with ' 'venereal disease'' or' 'tuberculosis", or who lied about
marital status, or were guilty of bad conduct (attempted suicide, petty
theft, refusing to accept a job, being incorrigible), might be deported under
any of the five legal headings.51 For these particular immigrants, at least,
and probably for female immigrants in general, moral considerations played
a significant role in determining whether or not the Department would
allow them to remain in the country.
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TOTAL DEPORTATIONS: 877
79.9% PUBLIC CHARGE 690 9.4 PROHIBITED IMMIGRANT 82
21.0 illegitimacy 182 5.0 mentally deficient 22
8.7 bad conduct 76 2.5 medical
22.1 medical 194 ( .8 VD 7)
(2.4 VD 21) ( .1 TB 1)
(3.1 TB 27) ( .3 Epilepsy 3)
(16.6 Other 126) (1.3 Other 11)
3.1 mentally deficient 27 .3 previously deported 3
1.0 vagrancy 9 .6 immorality 8
15.3 deported with husband 134 .9 conviction prior to arrival 5
4.1 immorality 41 — ^^ ~
.1 theft 1
2.9 unemployed 26 1-7 MISREPRESENTATION 15
(married 19) -1 medical 1
(single 7) • 1 previously deported 1
-^NMATEOF^AOL M \ ^^L \
2.4 vagrancy 21 A immorality 1
2-2 thett , 19 .2 illegitimacy 2
1.2 immorality 11
. 1 forgery 1
. 1 breach of liquor act 1
. 1 contributing to delinquency 7
. 1 bigamy 1
Whatever the "real" reasons for these deportations, it is clear that
this was a period of brilliant legalisms interspersed with petty illegalities.
Factors secondary to the real reason for deportation were used to a hitherto
unsurpassed extent to build a legal case for deportation for a statutory
cause that might be quite peripheral to the real reason. The records of
the deportation of the disabled, the ill or handicapped, the criminal, the
immoral, and the unemployed or impoverished reveal indisputably that
the Department manipulated the factors in a case to build up evidence
to support deportations for legal causes that often had little to do with
the reason the Department wanted to deport an immigrant. This was
perfectly legal, and no more than good administrative sense, from the
Department's perspective. Attempts by the courts to assure that the
Department followed legal procedures helped to strengthen this tendency,
but they did not create it. For the most part deportation took place out
of public view, and almost entirely beyond the control of anyone but
officials of the Department. The maturity of the Department as a
bureaucracy had become increasingly visible in the 1920s. All of the skill
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that it had developed became necessary in the 1930s, when the activities
of the Department became almost entirely centred around the deportation
of the immigrants that it had brought into the country in previous years.




Importation of radicals in the 1930s
was made to order by political fiat. It was a logical extension of earlier
deportations of similar troublemakers. The techniques used for the political
deportations of the 1930s were similar to those developed during the period
of the First World War. In both instances, political deportation was made
easier by special legal powers to deport radicals overtly for political
"crimes" as enemies of the state. Although the Department of Immigration
openly deported radicals for political reasons, it also continued to throw
up a documentary smokescreen to disguise this target group and its specific
undesirability by deporting radicals under various nominal legal causes.
There was no category in the Department's Annual Report for ' 'political
deportation''. By using other legal categories, the Department could avoid
unfavourable publicity, make legal appeals against their deportation more
difficult and less effective, and make the administrative management of
deportation smoother, more efficient, and easier.
The longstanding policy of the Department to deport radicals and
troublemakers whenever possible found its logical extension in the
communist cleanups of the 1930s. A good many of the deportations of
radicals had previously taken place under normal headings: medical causes,
entry without proper inspection, public charge, or criminal conviction.
These tried and true measures lost none of their effectiveness during the
first half of the 1930s. A new legal weapon against the Communist
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Party of Canada gave the Department the powers it needed to deport
communists simply and openly for being communists. The Communist
Party was declared an illegal organization in Canada on 11 August 1931,
under Section 98 of the Criminal Code.1
Since the 1920s, communists and other radicals had been involved
in activities which deeply alarmed the government and the business
community of Canada: organizing industrial unions, building leftwing
groups within existing unions, organizing the unemployed, leading militant
strikes, and conducting successful publicity campaigns, such as the one
that collected 100,000 signatures on a petition for unemployment
insurance, a five-day work week, and a $35 weekly minimum wage for
both women and men workers.2
Anti-radical drives were flourishing in several Canadian cities by
the end of the 1920s. Police and civic officials, as well as provincial
politicians, were prominent in such campaigns. At conferences, in groups
and individually, officially and privately, they warned that the "communist
menace" was growing, and urged clampdowns and wholesale deporta-
tions. In Toronto, regulations were passed in 1929 against non-English
language public meetings and disorderly or seditious utterances. Anyone
renting a public facility to a group for such a meeting could lose their
licence. Police Chief Denis Draper and Mayor Sam McBride promoted police
harrassment and assault against radicals, for which the radicals frequently
found themselves arrested. The "free speech" issue became a cause
celebre; Toronto remained a hotbed of radical action and repression by
the authorities until the mid-1930s.3
It was not only Toronto; anti-radical sentiment was high in smaller
centres. In Sudbury, the City Council passed a resolution that the govern-
ment should deport "all undesirables and communists'', and sent it round
to all the members of the Union of Canadian Municipalities in April 1931;
over seventy sent in the resolution to Ottawa. As well, provincial premiers
and other officials wrote urging action.4
Winnipeg Mayor Ralph Webb, a staunch supporter of law and order,
carried out a one-man campaign, writing regularly to R. B. Bennett
demanding action against communists and agitators. In May 1931, Webb
sent Bennett the names of fifteen Winnipeggers who had gone to Moscow
to study revolutionary organizing, asking that Immigration be told to bar
their re-entry. In July, Webb wired Gideon Robertson urging him to press
for "deportation of all undesirables" including behind-the-scenes radical
activists and administrators. A number of local veterans' and employers'
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and fraternal associations supported Webb's position; the Bennett papers
contain many resolutions and demands for stiffer laws and intensified
or automatic deportation of radicals. The local Immigration official, Western
Commissioner of Immigration Thomas Gelley, shared the prevailing views:
he wrote to Commissioner Jolliffe in June 1931, suggesting a revival of
the draconian provisions of the June 1919 version of Section 41 of the
Immigration Act, repealed only three years before. His explanation of
the problem was at least original (although perhaps not his own): Gelley
argued that to allow the "communistic element" to come into contact
with young people was like a farmer allowing potato bugs to multiply
until the whole potato patch was endangered. In his opinion the
Department must take some "radical action ... to stamp out this element
from Canadian life."5
Such sentiments were not surprising from the influential classes
of a city that had survived Canada's only attempted Bolshevik revolu-
tion (or so they thought) a scant dozen years before. As well, there was
a fear in some quarters that such an event might again be in the making.
RCMP and Provincial Police headquarters, especially, were prone to such
alarms. Among their contributions to the suppression of the Red menace
were warnings to the Premier that the local Communist Party was setting
up a "fighting group ... to obtain funds" by "rob[bing] banks and
stores,'' and a report that the Communist Party had insinuated many of
its important members into municipal and other government positions,
which was supposed to offer them protection against the authorities.6
The federal authorities in Ottawa were receptive, indeed enthu-
siastic. Prime Minister Bennett revived Section 98 of the Criminal Code
and the government used it to go after the Communist Party.
Police signalled this campaign by raiding the offices of the Party
and the homes of three of its leaders, and the offices of the Workers Unity
League and the official paper The Worker, on 11 and 12 August 1931.
The raids had been planned by Ontario Attorney General William Price,
and co-ordinated by Ontario Provincial Police (OPP) Commissioner Victor
Willimas, who had arranged for a squad of federal, provincial, and city
police to carry out simultaneous raids in Toronto. There was a slight hitch;
Willimas had failed to keep the leaders under surveillance, so six of the
eight leaders sought were not there when the police appeared. A second
series of raids had to be carried out to finish the operation.7
Although the OPP initiated the crackdown, it was strongly
supported by the federal authorities. The federal Justice Minister had been
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sending spy reports obtained from the RCMP and other material to the
Ontario authorities and offering "the fullest co-operation" from Justice
and the RCMP, in any actions taken. The actions resulted in the arrest
of eight Party members and officials; all were charged with being members
of an unlawful organization, and seditious conspiracy.8
The eight were: Tim Buck (aged forty, married, three children,
British-born, here since 1912), chief official of the Communist Party in
Canada; Sam Carr (aged thirty-one, of Ukrainian origin, immigrated in
1924), in charge of the Party's organizational work; Malcolm Bruce (aged
fifty, born in Prince Edward Island), editor of The Worker and on the
Party executive; Matthew Popovich (aged forty-one, Ukrainian-born, in
Canada since 1911), was former editor of Robochny Narod and a leader
in several organizations such as the Ukrainian Labor Farmer Temple
Association; John Boychuck (aged thirty-nine, married with one child,
Ukrainian origin, immigrated in 1913), was a long-time organizer and
official Ukrainian representative on the Central Executive Committee; Tom
Ewan (aged forty, widower with four children, in Canada since leaving
Scotland in 1911), was National Secretary of the Workers Unity League;
Amos Hill (aged thirty-three, married, one child, Finnish-born immigrant
to Canada in 1912), was active in various Finnish organizations, and
Tomo Cacic (aged thirty-five, Croation, in Canada since 1924), was active
in various ethnic branches.9
The eight were tried in front of a Toronto jury. The Crown's chosen
method of presenting evidence was to be a precedent for the numerous
prosecutions that followed. Rather than arguing that these individuals
advocated force or violence, it argued that as communists, they were under
the direction of the Communist International which advocated revolutionary
violence. The views or actions of the individual were not germane; all
that was necessary was to show that a person was a member of the
Communist Party, which was bound to follow Comintern policy. The
Crown's case rested primarily on Comintern policy documents, publica-
tions, etc., and on the testimony of a Mountie spy who had been an under-
cover member of the Party for ten years. Sergeant Leopold's statements
were used to establish the subordination of the Canadian Communist Party
to discipline from abroad, and the seditious nature of the organization.10
All eight men were convicted. All save Tomo Cacic were sentenced
to five years' imprisonment; he got two (because of his relative youth,
according to Anthony Rasporich's account, but Sam Carr and Amos Hill
were younger than Cacic). All were supposed to be deported, but in the
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end, only Cacic was. On appeal, the seditious conspiracy charges were
dropped, but the Section 98 charges stood. Thus, after February 1932,
the Communist Party's status as an illegal organization was confirmed;
all of its members were chargeable under Section 98. Such an outcome
had been the hope of the authorities.11 It was particularly pleasing to
Immigration officials. Now political deportation could proceed smoothly,
either overtly under Section 41 of the Immigration Act, or under the crimi-
nality category; an immigrant convicted of a crime was automatically
deportable upon completion of sentence.
Not that they had not been busy. By 1931, Immigration officials
were routinely exploring various avenues to expedite the deportation of
radicals. They received names from the RCMP and other sources, inves-
tigated the immigration status of the prospective deports, and set in motion
the appropriate machinery. By the fall of 1931, intensified political depor-
tation had become federal policy. In October, the Minister of Justice hosted
a special meeting to discuss the need to increase deportation. It was
attended by the Minister of National Defence, the Commissioner of
Immigration, the Military Chief of General Staff, and the RCMP Commis-
sioner. They decided to use the RCMP barracks in Halifax to house the
expected deports.12
Naturalized citizenship was no sure defence against deportation.
In June 1919 the citizenship laws had been amended to permit revoca-
tion of naturalization certificates, as a preliminary to deportation. In the
1930s, the Department of Immigration used this route to move radicals
from an inviolable to a deportable category. Stripped of citizenship, an
immigrant could revert to being a member of the prohibited classes, unable
to gain domicile no matter how long in Canada, because persons of that
class could never legally enter. In November 1931, for example, Jolliffe
of the Department of Immigration sent Thomas Mulvey of Citizenship
Branch of the Department of the Secretary of State a list of thirty-five
names to be checked for citizenship, as part of deportation proceedings.
Thirteen were naturalized; eighteen had no record of citizenship, two had
been rejected, and one case was being held in abeyance. Mulvey's staff
obligingly identified four likely candidates for deportation: one was Michael
Novakowsky, an Alberta farmer in Canada since 1912, and a citizen since
1920. Some of the names were those of men sentenced in Montreal to
one year for sedition by Mr. Justice Wilson in the Court of Queen's Bench,
the past June.13
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An Immigration memo on one case illustrates the process. The
Immigration official had been reading the RCMP file on a political case,
and was lamenting the poor quality of evidence. The case against the
man was shaky. "None of his speeches, nor the article in the Montreal
Star and the one in the Worker . . . are of a seditious nature." The only
evidence given at the trial had been that of "two secret agents'' working
for the RCMP, and it had been of "very little value." But it had been
good enough to have the man sent up for sedition. For Immigration to
deal with him, however, a preliminary step was needed. Their strategy
would be to have his naturalization "revoked and then attack the case
on the basis of the fact that the conviction on a charge of sedition brings
him within the meaning of Section 41." The order went out: "request
Mulvey to cancel naturalization certificate - and Board him after - tell
Mulvey he must act at once."14
Although it is impossible to be sure of how many political depor-
tations were carried out during the Depression, it is possible to verify
that these were numerous. Usually they were carried out under public
charge, criminality, or other legal categories, and they were not explicitly
acknowledged as such in the public documents of the Department, such
as the Annual Report. Internal documents are somewhat more revealing,
but it is frustrating to try to pin down specific cases, not least because
the problem is ultimately not quantifiable.
The sources of information are fragmentary. In one memo, a total
of eighty-two names were listed by the Department as having been
deported as communist agitators. Many of the names are not those of
well-known communists, and few appear in the historical literature on
the Party. Many, but not all, of the individuals listed had been convicted
of a crime prior to their deportation, usually under Section 98. Charges
cited in the file include: unlawful assembly, distributing communist liter-
ature, inciting riot, assault of police, concealing weapons, communist
demonstration, unlawful association, and simply communist. By far the
most common was membership in an unlawful association or member
of an unlawful assembly - in other words simply being a communist or
participating in a communist meeting or demonstration. Three of the
eighty-two were also noted for other violations of the Immigration Act:
Section 33, subsection 7 (prohibited classes) and communist; unlawful
association and previously rejected; unlawful association and epilepsy.
This notation suggests that in these three cases, the Department may
have used other legal grounds for deportation than those in Section 41,
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or may have used provisions of Section 33 specifying membership in the
prohibited classes on other than political grounds. Epilepsy was a medical
condition interdicted in the regulations; epileptics could never legally
immigrate to Canada. Medical prohibitions were not subject to appeal.15
A second source of information in the records of the Department
is a list of thirty-five names compiled to have citizenship status checked
and naturalization certificates revoked, in order to effect deportation.
Among the thirty-five names are those that do not appear on the list of
eighty-two communists deported as such. A third list of twenty-six names
of alleged communists also contains several names not elsewhere listed.16
A fourth file concerned with political deportation also contains lists
of names, for example of thirteen immigrants arrested in Rouyn in 1932
for participating in a May Day demonstration. A note by a Department
official explained that all legally deportable immigrants were to be ordered
deported by Boards of Inquiry, and in the case of those with domicile,
the Boards were to be adjourned until the Department could decide how
to proceed. Eight of the names on the list of eighty-two radicals deported
also are on the Rouyn list. Five other immigrants appearing only on the
Rouyn list include just one who might have been in Canada barely long
enough to acquire domicile, and who consequently might have been some-
what more difficult to deport. Cross-checking reveals that domicile was
no bar; for example, one of the men on both the Rouyn list and the list
of eighty-two names, Wasyl Semergo, had been in Canada since July 1913.
He was deported almost twenty years later in March 1933.17
Another reference to those arrested in the 1932 Rouyn May Day
demonstration contains information about Polish nationals involved in
deportation proceedings on account of their alleged communist activities.
The names of two women and one man, not elsewhere mentioned, are
given.18
Other Department files, memos, and correspondence contain names,
or discussions of cases, of other radicals not appearing on the list of eighty-
two names. Internal and external evidence indicates that these people
were deported under the legal grounds of public charge and other
categories, or that the Department tried but failed to obtain such depor-
tations. Whatever the details of individual cases, it is clear that such
practices were routine and widespread. For example, in the fall of 1931,
a group of Polish nationals who had been detained at Winnipeg for
deportation, refused to co-operate in the documentation process necessary
to arrange their departure. The Winnipeg Immigration official sought
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and received advice from his superiors in Ottawa about how to proceed.
Further substantiation is given by accounts in the local press about the
detention and deportation of those twenty immigrants as public charges,
over the protests of the Polish consul.19
Another source of information on individual cases is the Canadian
Labor Defender, the organ of the Canadian Labor Defense League (CLDL),
which cites numerous instances of deportations for political activities. Some
of the names given here can be cross-checked against Department of
Immigration and other sources, although many names cannot be veri-
fied. Although the CLDL had an axe to grind and would have found it
advantageous to portray the situation in the blackest possible terms, it
was also to the advantage of the League to trumpet its successes in averting
deportation in individual cases. On balance, it seems reasonable to accept
as valid their descriptions of deportations completed. As well, their sporadic
forays into statistics may also be useful for cross-checking other sources.
For example, the CLDL claimed that between January and June 1932,
thirty-three workers had been deported for political offences. The files
of the Department list only fifteen persons deported as communist agitators
during that period, suggesting that eighteen were probably deported under
other legal categories.20
Also informative are oral history interviews with people who
participated in the events of the time. Satu Repo's interview of Einar
Nordstrom, a Lakehead radical, provides details not only about Department
practices, but about community responses. In Thunder Bay, an October
1932 protest drew 1,000 demonstrators demanding services from city
officials. According to Nordstrom, at the time the city had no soup
kitchens, and unemployed single men had been denied relief by the City
Relief Officer. They marched, and were turned back, some beaten, by
the RCMP, OPP, and city police. Many were arrested. Most were later
released, but a few leaders were held and eventually deported.
One of these was Emil Sandberg, a twenty-one-year old Swede,
in Canada three years, who was very outspoken and active in the local
Scandinavian Workers and Farmers Club. He was charged with vagrancy
and being instrumental in causing a public disturbance. Deportation had
by that time become so common, according to Nordstrom, that ethnic
associations had developed the custom of holding dances and other
fundraisers to pay a tailor to make a suit of clothes for the person to wear
on the trip home. The tailor who measured Sandberg was the only visitor
he was allowed. Even when he developed appendicitis and had surgery,
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he was guarded so closely at the hospital that a Swedish hospital worker
could not slip in for a word.
Somehow Sandberg smuggled out a piece of toilet paper giving the
time of his departure on the train East to be deported. A large crowd went
to the station to see him off. Sandberg was handcuffed to two OPPs and
not allowed to speak to anyone.21
Emil Sandberg's case does not appear in any of the Department
lists of radicals deported. No information is available on the legal category
under which his deportation was carried out. The circumstances of the
case suggest that criminality would have been likely (his prison sentence),
or public charge (if he had succeeded in obtaining relief) - either of which
could have been smoothly executed procedures.
Causes for deportation were reported under five headings. "Public
charge" covered those who were non-paying inmates of any publicly
funded institution (medical or charitable), or who received some form of
welfare payment from the public purse. "Criminality" covered those who
had served sentences in penal institutions.' 'Accompanying'' referred to
members of families who were themselves not necessarily deported or
deportable (Canadian citizens by birth, for example), accompanying a
deported family head or member. "Medical causes'' included those who
were ill, injured, or incapacitated in ways that contravened the Immigration
Act. They were usually not self-supporting at the time when ordered
deported, and might have been non-paying inmates of hospitals and so
on. Some may have been self-supporting but had a contagious disease,
or were afflicted in some way that might in the future affect their ability
to be self-supporting. Causes ranged from industrial accidents, tubercu-
losis, epilepsy, heart disease, varicose veins, venereal disease, retarda-
tion, and psychological problems (from raving insanity to masturbation).
"Other causes" referred to various violations of the Act, usually related
to improper entry, or belonging to some prohibited category.22
"Other causes" covered a multitude of sins. A Board of Inquiry
could use Section 33 for an immigrant whose entry had been improper
(sneaking in, lying, failing to comply with regulations), or Section 3 for
an immigrant belonging to the prohibited classes on account of medical
conditions, political beliefs or activities or intentions, criminal records,
or morals at the time of entry. Many cases falling under sections 3 or
33 could be deported regardless of the number of years of residence
subsequent to entry.
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The charge of' 'entry by misrepresentation'' was a handy catch-
all used by the Department to deport those who undertook activities at
variance with those they stated as intended at the time of entry. For
example, Mikolaj Dranuta was brought over under the auspices of the
Ukrainian Colonization Board in 1926 to do farm work. Instead, according
to an RCMP spy report, he took a job in an Edmonton meat packing plant,
joined the Ukrainian Labor Temple and taught in a Ukrainian school,
helped to organize cultural activities such as the visit of a dance troupe,
and so on. The Mounties described him as a communist, and noted that
while he had not made any public speeches ("yet"), he was open about
his views. After reviewing the spy report, an Immigration official perused
Dranuta's photograph (from his Canadian Pacific Railway Occupational
Certificate) and decided on that basis that Dranuta was not the fanning
or peasant type. "Under the circumstances" wrote the official, the
Department would take "action . . . with a view to deportation on the
ground of entering Canada by misrepresentation."23
''Vagrancy'' was a common criminal charge against radicals. John
Ferris recalls that in Sault Ste. Marie, activists in unemployed workers'
movements were picked up and charged with vagrancy because they were
"without substantial means of support." Margaret Patterson was
reportedly charged with vagrancy in Toronto when she was arrested after
singing "The International" at a 1930 May Day rally.24
Although any activist could find him or herself in trouble with the
law, immigrants - especially the non-British - were particularly at risk.
Mauri Jalava's interviews with Sudbury Finns revealed that deportations
were a strongly feared feature of Finnish life in Canada during the
Depression. By the early 1930s, many Finns still did not have citizen-
ship, and others were refused when they applied, so any contact with
the authorities could prove dangerous. Political persecution could take
place even if no laws were broken: translators for companies hiring Finns
were often anti-radical informers.25 Protesting poor working conditions
or the lack of work could have grave consequences. The political climate
in Finland was not friendly to radicals; there might be a danger to liberty
or perhaps to life for those deported.
A further problem for immigrant radicals was that existing laws
were unevenly enforced. As Leslie Morris of the CLDL pointed out, many
thousands of unemployed transients rode the rails and were usually ignored
by police (partly because there was no space in the jails for a fraction
of them). But anyone identified as a radical was far more likely to be
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arrested. For an immigrant, that might mean a one way ticket out of the
country, marked only by a number in the criminality deportations listed
in the Annual Report of the Department of Immigration.26
Deportation for any cause except violating Section 41, that is, under
any category not overtly political, was considered so problem-free, so
automatic, by the Department, that it did not normally hire lawyers for
the Boards of Inquiry. So long as the Department followed properly all
the procedures outlined in the Immigration Act, there was little likelihood
of any successful challenge, even by the courts. The Department processed
many thousands of deportations without any interference whatsoever
during the 1930s. Most were carried out under the heading of "public
charge". Many were in fact political deportations. For example, the City
of Winnipeg had requested the deportation of a group of Polish immigrants
reputedly "members of organizations connected with the communist
movement," some of whom hired lawyers to represent them at their
Boards of Inquiry. But the Department made no attempt to hire its own
lawyers, and any tactics of resistance on the part of the Poles were futile
because, although their political affiliations were their real crimes, their
deportations were "based on public charge grounds." It is clear from
the records that the Department was nervous about public protests in
these cases (civic elections were coming up in Winnipeg and the
communists were active in politics), but the facts were irrefutable. The
immigrants were public charges, and were legally deportable as such after
hearings in conformity with the Immigration regulations. And as such,
they were deported.27
The real causes for which radicals were deported were varied. Arvi
Johannes Tielinen, Thomas Gidson Pollari, Viljo Adolf Piispa, and Jaako
Emil Makynen were convicted (along with several others) for taking part
in an unlawful assembly after they had marched in a parade at Timmins,
and deported in 1932. Of thirty-four people convicted of unlawful assembly
for a similar parade in May 1932, eight were deported. Those deported
for organizing or participating in relief strikes or demonstrations included
Matti Hautamaki of Port Arthur, Leontie Karpenkower of The Pas, and
W. Jacobson of Vancouver. Askeli Panjata was arrested for marching in
a Port Arthur parade of unemployed workers in November 1930. He was
sentenced to three months, then hastily removed from the local jail to
Halifax, ' 'before any of his friends were aware of it." He was deported
to Finland in March 1931, in spite of his protests that his life would be
in danger.28
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Hymie Sparaga was arrested in Toronto in January 1931, on the
picket line of a garment worker strike, sentenced to two months in jail,
then deported (and according to Annie Buller, he was later killed by the
Nazis). Louis Revay and John Gryciuk were convicted, respectively, of
unlawful assembly and rioting during the 1931 Estevan strike, and
deported.29
Often little information has survived about events such as these.
In other cases, more can be learned. The details are different but the
patterns are predictable. Sophie Sheinen's experiences were in some ways
typical.
Sophie Sheinen was a Russian Jew who had immigrated to Canada
in May 1927. Little is known about her subsequent activities save that
she was involved in protests. She was arrested in Calgary and convicted
in July 1931 of unlawful assembly. The case went to appeal; she lost,
and served a six-month sentence in the Fort Saskatchewan Gaol, at the
end of which she was ordered deported to the U.S.S.R. Her sentence was
completed 11 May 1932, but she was held until 31 May, partly to induce
her to sign some of her deportation documents. Worried about her ill
health, eventually the CLDL stepped in and signed on her behalf.
Apparently she was ill-treated in jail. It is unclear if such treatment
was typical of prisons of the time, or if she was singled out. Her cell was
allegedly overheated and unventilated, the water periodically turning black
and undrinkable. She complained of being harassed by a night matron
who refused to turn off the noisily running water in the toilet and who
rattled the door. Sheinen said that she was kept in solitary confinement
as punishment, and was refused medical treatment until she threatened
to complain to the warden. The CLDL passed on to Immigration a letter
in which she detailed her complaints, claiming that by the end of her
sentence she was spitting blood and had lost nearly thirty-five pounds.30
By September 1932 protests against her deportation were gaining
Bennett's attention. He sought advice from Immigration officials, who
told him that Sheinen had been "mutinous'' in jail and vociferous about
ill-treatment. In the opinion of the Department, her claims of ill-health
were simply a device to avoid deportation; they had her medically
examined and pronounced "fit to travel".
The Department's advice to Bennett was typical and revealed a
consistent policy in political deportation cases. They admitted receiving
many protests, but the sources were suspect. All seemed to be from
communist sources. The Department had thus "decided to ignore such
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communications unless they were from responsible parties." Unless there
were protests of a "special nature" or from a "source which obviously
should be recognized," they would continue to follow this policy. They
advised Bennett to do likewise. (Bennett needed little encouragement; he
was rabidly anti-communist.) Sophie Sheinen was picked up at her home
and deported in November 1932.31
Not even that much is known about the experiences of some of
her colleagues. Edward Reinkanen was arrested (and beaten) at a Toronto
anti-deportation demonstration in June 1931; he served one month at
the Jail Farm, then was held at the Don Jail until deported to Finland in
November 1931. Sam Langley, an activist in Northern Ontario, was
deported to England on the Ascania, 23 December 1931. He had been
previously ordered deported after a 1929 jail sentence for a free speech
demonstration, on charges of vagrancy (the disorderly conduct subsec-
tion) - part of a whole series of arrests by Toronto police beginning in
February 1929 and continuing into the summer. An uproar organized by
the CLDL was effective in stopping Langley's 1929 deportation, probably
because of his nationality as much as the dubiousness of the vagrancy
conviction as the ground for a criminality deportation. By 1931 the political
climate had changed; he was picked up in Port Arthur at 5:00 p.m., and
on the train to Halifax by 9:00 p.m. that same evening, to be deported
under the reactivated 1929 order. Essentially the same thing happened
to Joseph Farley who had been arrested and jailed with Langley and four
others in 1929. The old order was activated and used to deport him after
he completed a ten-month sentence in Lethbridge. He was sent back to
England in December 1931. Peter Zepkar, a Croat long active in Yugoslav
organizations in the Party, and in Canada since 1924, was sentenced
to one year in jail for his part in a Fort Frances lumber strike (unlawful
assembly), and deported in December 1934.32
John Ferris of Sault Ste. Marie, a young man during the Depression,
recalled pressures against radicals. Women canvassing for the Canadian
Labor Defence League were arrested, then released without charges being
laid. These cases were merely adjourned and left hanging so that they
could be picked up long after. He remembers numerous cases where
radicals were picked up and deported - sometimes so fast that friends
did not even know that they were gone. Most of these cases involved
non-British immigrants. The Sault Ste. Marie City Council, like others,
passed a resolution to "deport all known Reds." "Reds" was synonymous
with activists.
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Although Ferris himself was subject to arrest, he could not be
deported, as he was born in Canada. Partly for this reason, he was
responsible for conveying the hidden mimeograph machine to meetings.
Accompanied by a left-leaning Free Methodist preacher (later forced by
his congregation to resign), Ferris concealed the press in the family baby
buggy and took it for innocuous strolls. The police never caught on, and
never managed to confiscate the press. But there were other repercussions.
The superintendent of the local steel plant told Ferris that he would have
to change his politics if he ever wanted a job. "Practically blacklisted",
Ferris gave up and left for Cochrane, Ontario, to look for work in 1935.
If he had been a recent immigrant, and unable to find work, he would
have had to apply for relief eventually; deportation would have resulted,
although the real issue would have been his politics.33
Departmental files on individual deportation cases reveal disquieting
evidence about the grounds on which the officials were prepared to act.
Cases were built on the personal impressions of officials about the attitudes
of the accused; the immigrants were not privy to this material and even
if they had been, such stuff is impossible to refute, slippery as it is. Worse,
Red smearing based on such impressions could remain in someone's official
records for years, decades, and later be used against them - all without
any foundation in fact, or at least without substantiation. Innuendo was
good enough. For example, Sam Kluchnik of Winnipeg was reported for
deportation by J. D. Fraser, Superintendent of the City of Winnipeg Relief
Department in June 1932. His experiences in Canada were typical of many
relief cases. He had entered as a farmworker, in 1928, but quit in disgust
at the wages (seventy-five cents a day). In the ensuing years he worked
seasonally in railway construction. More often than not unemployed, he
lived "on the charity of friends" through most of 1930 and 1931. By
October 1931 he was sufficiently desperate to apply for relief, and when
the deportation complaint was recorded he had received a total of $ 101.50
in beds, meals, and clothing, in exchange for which he had worked a
number of weeks on the Grassmere Ditch.
At his deportation hearing he said quite clearly that he was prepared
to accept any kind of work, including farm work; he hoped to be hired
for the harvest. He was ordered deported as a public charge, an order
which he appealed. The regional Immigration official prepared a memo
concerning the appeal, to be used by Ottawa in the ruling. In the memo,
another reason for the ruling appears. Kluchnik's appeal should be
dismissed:
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There is a memorandum in my file from the Chairman of the Board
of Inquiry in this case, stating that at the time of the Board, the
appellant was surly and gave the impression of one who belonged to
one of the "Red" organizations of this country, although he denied
this. The Chairman of the Board is of the opinion that Canada would
be well rid of the appellant.
The next step in the proceeding was to have the steamship company
pay the costs of the deportation. If an immigrant were proven defective,
the transportation company which had brought the immigrant to Canada
would also be responsible for removing him. In the case of Kluchnik, the
Department letter to the company displayed careful use of the opinion
of the Chairman of the Board of Inquiry, and was an excellent example
of distorted and fabricated evidence. It was based on an internal memo
to the Commissioner of Immigration and the Deputy Minister, claiming
that Kluchnik had admitted that he
had not fulfilled the conditions of entry to Canada and apparently has
no intentions of doing so. While he claims to be anxious to remain
in this country he does not desire to take farm work and in the opinion
of the examining officer he is a surly individual and gave the impression
of being a Red although he denies this.
To the steamship company, Commissioner Jolliffe wrote that Kluchnik
"refuses to accept farm work". The transcript of the Board of Inquiry
reveals that Kluchnik made no such statements nor could anything he
said be so interpreted.
Sam Kluchnik's deportation was not effected; by the time that the
order got back to Winnipeg, he had found farm work. He was lucky; there
had been such an outcry against deporting the unemployed that the
Department had begun suspending deportation orders against those who
had been on the dole but had found work by the time that their orders
were ready. Had they again gone on relief, the orders would have been
activated and carried out; otherwise they remained suspended.34
Kluchnik was under suspended sentence of deportation for more
than twenty years. In December 1949 he hired a Winnipeg law firm to
try to obtain his passport. The Department of Immigration investigated
the request. Their records show that since 1932 Kluchnik had worked
in farming, construction, and finally had gone into mining. By 1949 he
had a family, owned a home and other property, and had savings. The
local Immigration official declared himself ready to quash the outstanding
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deportation order, but the RCMP demurred. In a confidential memo, Special
Branch replied,' 'We have no alternative but to say that he is 'NOT CLEAR
FOR SECURITY' on the grounds of 'A'." On this basis, the Department
of Immigration decided to retain the deportation order, although Kluchnik
had never done anything to warrant its use.35
The federal authorities had a heyday in 1932. The previous autumn
they had undertaken preparations for another showcase raid of communist
functionaries. Internal documents show names of prospective targets
whose arrival dates were to be verified; lists of naturalized citizens, some
of whom might have their certificates revoked; and a sampling of warrants
issued for arrests. Immigration records are scattered and incomplete, but
there is sufficient evidence from a number of sources to piece together
an account of the events.36
In February 1932 the appeal court decision in the Buck et al. cases
gave the green light. Now it was legally established that the only evidence
needed for deportation on political grounds was to prove that the immigrant
was a member of some communist organization. A conviction under
Section 98 or any other section of the Criminal Code was handy but no
longer necessary. Deportation had never depended solely on conviction
in a court of law; now it was even simpler.
On May Day 1932 the authorities swooped down on eleven radicals
in Montreal, Oshawa, Sudbury, Winnipeg, Edmonton, and Vancouver.
Offices, homes, and persons were searched for evidence of communist
affiliation.37 All arrested were kept incommunicado and quickly sent to
Halifax for deportation hearings. The swift removal to Halifax was intended
to avoid public outcry, prevent any effective defence, and effect swift
deportations. The tactic had been a clever choice.
As details of the proceedings became known, there were widespread
protests. There was good reason. Questioning of the Immigration Minister
in the House by Woodsworth and others revealed an arbitrariness and
disregard for due process all too typical of deportation methods. Gordon
evaded questions concerning the nature of the charges and the where-
abouts, date, and nature of the hearings. Cornered, he excused the hurried
removal of the men by saying that when Immigration officials were sure
that an immigrant was illegally in the country, they frequently chose the
"nearest most convenient port" for deportation as the site of the
hearing.38
Feeble on the face of it, subsequent revelations suggested that
Gordon was trying to cover up star chamber tactics. Three men had
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been arrested in Winnipeg: one, Orton Wade, had been taken to jail after
speaking at a May Day rally. He was visited the next day by a CLDL
lawyer who then demanded (and was promised) a look at the order for
arrest. Instead, RCMP Inspector Mellow stood up the lawyer and put the
handcuffed men on the train for Halifax. What made all this more than
just awkward was that Wade was a Canadian citizen by birth, under no
circumstances deportable, and not accountable to the Department of
Immigration for any reason. The Department had not done its homework.
Wade was not released until after his hearing with the Board of
Inquiry in Halifax. He sued the Deputy Minister and others for false arrest
and imprisonment. His case was dismissed by Winnipeg's Court of Queen's
Bench, but heard by the Manitoba Court of Appeal. Wade lost the case
by a narrow three to two decision, one judge ruling against him solely
on a technicality.
The hearing produced a number of scandalous revelations for which
the Department was roundly criticized by the Bench and the public. For
example, Deputy Minister Egan had signed the warrant for Wade's arrest
five months before it was used, but had made no effort to verify that Wade
was subject to Immigration's authority. Nor did he think it reasonable
to do so. If the Department verified particulars before issuing warrants, it
would never get its work done, he said. The court was willing to agree that
although the Department had acted improperly in failing to verify Wade's
status, it may have had some justification in arresting him because Wade
had previously told a police official that he had been born in the United
States. But Wade's treatment after arrest "amounted to a denial of justice
. . . actuated by motives which are not permitted by the law,'' said Justice
Dennistoun. Further, even if Wade had been deportable, there was no
excuse for his removal from Winnipeg (close to the U.S. border, thus the
nearest port for his deportation) to Halifax. Justice Trueman compared
the Department's conduct to "parallel high handed proceedings'' of 1667
when Clarendon shipped off various of his opponents to islands and other
remote outposts so that they could not have the protection of the law.
Egan's response was as revealing as his apparent imperturbability.
He defended the Department's actions on the grounds that these were
perfectly routine and normal procedures used in a "great number" of
instances. Thus, if there were anything wrong in the Wade case, by impli-
cation, it was wrong in most deportation cases. And indeed it was.
A victory for Wade would have put a serious crimp in the Department's
activities.
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Orton Wade succeeded only because he was Canadian-born. The
remaining ten prisoners taken in May 1932 had little chance to escape
deportation. There were as yet few constraints on the Department. The
ten were a diverse lot, fairly representative of men in the Party. Typical,
too, was the handling of their cases by the Department. At their Boards
of Inquiry, held within a few days of their arrival, all ten denied that they
were currently Communist Party members (the Party no longer existed,
they said) or that they advocated the use of force or violence to over-
throw the government. The Department depended on Sergeant Leopold's
testimony to dispute both claims. All were members of communist affiliated
organizations; all were subject to Party discipline. If Party policy advo-
cated force or overthrow by violence, their individual beliefs were
unimportant.39
Whatever else might be said of these men, the outlines of their
activities contained in Departmental records show them to have been
phenomenally energetic. Each was involved in numerous organizations.
The Department's distaste for them and their ilk was hardly concealed;
the more active the man, the more the Department urged his deportation.
Conrad Cessinger was German, single, aged thirty-one, and in
Canada since August 1927. He did farming and bush work, and was active
in a plethora of ethnic and other Party organizations, and on the executive
of several. He was deported 18 December 1932. Dan Chomicki, a Pole
who used the name Holmes, was thirty-four, married, and the father of
one child; he had come to Canada with his parents from Austria in June
1913. He was a printer, and had worked for eleven years for the publisher
of Ukrainian Labor News, Working Women, Farmers Life, and Militant
Youth Magazine. Although it was awkward to deport him when he had
been here since childhood, and all his relations were in Canada (his wife
and child were Canadian-born), nonetheless the Department saw him as
a leader "of a particularly dangerous type . . . entitled to no consideration
whatsoever." He received none and was deported 17 December 1932.40
From Edmonton, Iwan Sembaj (John Semboy) had been arrested.
He was then forty, born in Poland and claimed U.S.S.R. citizenship, and
had been in Canada since 1923. He was married with Canadian-born
children. He had done farm work for a short time, joined the Ukrainian
Labor Farmer Temple, and had become a member of the executive. He was
also active in the CLDL and other organizations. A Mountie spy in the
Ukrainian Labor Farmer Temple Association (ULFTA) had reported that
Sembaj had made "radical utterances" at meetings, and had advocated
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the establishment by force and violence of a Soviet-type government in
Canada. He was regarded as a "more cultured type than average" and
more dangerous for it. He was deported 16 July 1933.41
John Farkas was thirty when he was arrested in Oshawa. Single,
he had come from Hungary in 1926 as a farmworker. He tried farming
for less than six months and then headed for the city. He went from
Toronto to Oshawa, where he remained after February 1928. He was
involved with the CLDL, the Unemployed Workers Association, and
various ethnic groups. When raided he had in his possession literature
of an "extremely radical nature, revolutionary in its teachings and
distinctly Communistic in its expression." He had "caused considerable
trouble in Oshawa due to his radical tendencies and his active participation
in various demonstrations there," and the OPP were eager to remove
him. So was the Immigration Department; they deported him in December
1932.42
Martin Parker (Pohjansalo) was only twenty-two, but a threat to
the security of the state, nonetheless. He had come to Toronto with his
parents in 1913. Since 1928 he had been involved with Vapaus in
Sudbury, and when arrested, he was associate editor. He was also active
in the Finnish Organization of Canada. At his Board of Inquiry, while
he denied advocating violence, he admitted that he thought a revolution
was inevitable, and that the masses might retaliate if the bourgeoisie used
violence against them. Immigration was impressed with his intelligence
(of a "higher standard than average") and was keenly committed to his
deportation. He left with his colleagues on the 17th of December 1932.43
Hans Kist was also young. At twenty-seven, he was married
(common-law) and had lived in Vancouver since deserting his ship in May
1930. He was charged with entry without inspection (Section 33,
subsection 7) as well as under Section 41. He had been active in a strike
at Fraser Mills and in several unemployed organizations. Immigration had
a good deal to say about him: obviously he had stepped on some toes.
He was "saturated with Communist beliefs and revolutionary ideas of
a particularly virulent nature . . . a thoroughgoing troublemaker" with
"no respect for the law": a "dangerous type." He was deported in
December 1932 and died a few years later after being tortured in a Nazi
concentration camp.44
Arvo Vaara was an old hand at this sort of thing. Aged forty-one,
single, he had immigrated in 1909 and settled in Sudbury. He had previous
brushes with the authorities: he had been rejected at the border in 1928,
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and admitted only after J. S. Woodsworth and others intervened. In
December 1928 he was convicted of seditious libel for publishing an
editorial which expressed indifference about the possibility that the King
might die from an illness he was currently suffering. His appeal failed
and he was in prison until August 1929. He was in trouble soon after
his return to Sudbury, where he was editor of Vapaus and a stalwart of
the Finnish Organization of Canada. In 1931 he was arrested for a May
Day demonstration and various free speech activities; the authorities kept
tabs on Vapaus and accumulated other articles that they thought might
be seditious. Vaara was adjudged to be a "particularly clever individual
. . . particularly dangerous. He is a menace to Canada and to the existing
economic and governmental structure of this country." He was deported
17 December 1932.45
John (Toivo) Stahlberg (aged forty, married to a Finnish citizen),
was born in Finland and had come to Canada in 1910, but had gone on
to the United States where he had worked for ten years and acquired
citizenship in 1917. He was a trained blacksmith, but after his return
to Canada he worked as a steamship agent and as business manager for
Vapaus. He was also involved in the Finnish Organization. He was
deported to the United States in December 1932.46
Gottfried Zurcher, a Swiss citizen (thirty-two years of age), had
been in Canada since September 1927. After working on a friend's farm
for nearly a year, he became a welder in Winnipeg. He eventually settled
in Vancouver. Active in the Communist Party from his early months in
the country, at the time of his arrest he was Secretary of the CLDL. In
addition to Sergeant Leopold's testimony, the Department used the
testimony of two Mountie spies who had witnessed Zurcher's speeches
and activities at various meetings and demonstrations. In particular,
Constable Upton had been a fellow member of the Vancouver branch of
the National Unemployed Workers Association. Immigration and the
Mounties regarded Zurcher as an "active and dangerous" communist.
He and his wife (who had come from Switzerland to marry him in 1928)
were ordered deported, and departed 1 January 1933.47
By comparison, Stefan Worozcyt of Montreal was small potatoes.
Single, aged thirty, he had come in 1926 as a farm worker through the
CPR, to a job in the West. Instead, he went to Hamilton and next to
Montreal where, at the time of his arrest, he worked as a window cleaner.
He was involved in the ULFTA, CLDL and Ukrainian patriotic associa-
tions (Society for Assisting the Liberation Movement in Western Ukraine).
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Although he was not high up in the Party, and "possibly of a lower
grade of intelligence'' than the leaders (in the view of the Department),
he was still a prime candidate for deportation. The Department saw two
reasons to deport him: he had "failed to comply with the conditions of
entry when he came to Canada'' by skipping out on farm work, and he
had "obviously associated himself with a class who are a menace to the
accepted government structure and institutions here." He was deported
23 January 1933.48
Although the Department preferred that the Halifax Ten (as they
came to be known) never saw the inside of a courtroom, the CLDL did
its best to get the case into the courts. Their first attempt failed: the Nova
Scotia court under Justice Carroll refused to consider an application for
habeas corpus under the provisions of the Liberty of Subjects Act of Nova
Scotia. The CLDL appealed this refusal and got a hearing before Acting
Chief Justice Renfret and his colleagues in the Supreme Court in October
1932. Technically, the issue was the lower court's refusal to hear the
habeas corpus application, but the Ten's attorneys challenged the validity
of the entire deportation proceedings.
The discussion centred on the issue of the Supreme Court's authority
to review the evidence considered by the Boards of Inquiry. The men's
lawyers argued that due process had not been followed, that "full
particulars" of the charges (as required by the Immigration Act) had not
been given, and thus the arrests and hearings were unfounded. Moreover,
the charges were so vague that the men did not know of what unlawful
actions they had been convicted. Besides which, the applicants had been
charged with advocating the overthrow by force or violence, and their
advocacy had not been proven.
The Justices accepted the argument that "full particulars'' had not
been given. They were not swayed by most of the points put forward
by the Department of Immigration's lawyer who claimed that: it was too
late to challenge the validity of the composition or activities of the Boards
of Inquiry; a provincial tribunal could not judge the activities of a federal
tribunal or question the extent and nature of the powers of the Minister
of Immigration in relation to the cases under consideration. But in the
end, in November 1932, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. The
Minister of Immigration did the same in December.49 Despite much
agitation and a veritable flood of letters, petitions, telegrams and other
documents attempting to avert the deportations or alter the destinations,
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as soon as arrangements for documents and transportation were
completed, the men were shipped out.
The most important source of protests against the deportation of
radicals in the 1930s was the Canadian Labor Defense League.50 It was
a Communist Party front, established to raise funds in aid of striking miners
and their families in the mid-1920s. It was modelled on International Red
Aid which carried out diverse support activities, including supplying fake
passports and safe passage to the U.S.S.R. for radicals who were being
deported to unsafe countries. With the intensification of political repres-
sion in the late 1920s, the League refocused its activities from fund raising
to organizing protests and providing legal defense for arrested radicals.
It defended eighty-eight Toronto cases alone between January 1929 and
February 1930. In 1930 the CLDL began a major membership and fund-
raising drive to increase its skimpy resources. It was heavily dependent
on its 130-odd branches, most of whose members were non-British in
origin. The Finnish and Ukrainian organizations were particularly
important. By 1930, deportation of the unemployed and of radicals were
the major issues with which the League was dealing. After 1931, as the
authorities increased their crackdowns on the communists, the CLDL began
to campaign for the repeal of Section 98 and the reform or abolition of
deportation procedures.
The campaign for repeal was played out against a background of
intense anti-radical paranoia. Anyone speaking out against persecution
of radicals risked being labelled a communist. In some cities, more than
a label was at stake. In Toronto, for example, businesses stood to lose
their licenses if they allowed communists to use their premises. The men
and women going bail for Buck et al. in 1931 risked losing everything
they had put up if Buck et al. were convicted, as Section 98 provided
for the seizure of property of communists, and large fines. Anyone willing
to put up bail was a de facto communist.51
Not everyone was intimidated by such a climate. Although most
of the protest generated by the League was from communist affiliated
organizations, a good part of it was not, especially on two issues. The
first was the free speech issue in Toronto. When the city police moved
from communist-bashing to an attack on the Fellowship of Reconciliation,
a religiously based liberal group of pacifistic leanings, the respectable
middle classes were affected and a certain measure of indignation was
aroused. When sixty-eight professors from the University of Toronto took
on the redbaiters, the ensuing furor at least had the effect of showing
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the importance of the free speech issue as a civil liberties question of much
broader importance than the quashing of radical dissent and disorder.52
The second and more significant instance of broad support for a
CLDL campaign was that for repeal of Section 98. Mainstream farm,
labour, church and social groups worked for repeal. J. S. Woodsworth,
who had opposed Section 98 from its passage (as Sections 97A and 97B)
in 1919, made numerous attempts in the Commons to have it repealed
or revised. Eventually Mackenzie King agreed to support repeal and when
he was elected in 1935, he repealed Section 98 the following year.53
Among its many activities the League published a pamphlet entitled
Deported! which contained a succinct and accurate analysis of the activities
of the government in deporting radicals, activists and the unemployed.54
The adjectives may have been extreme, but the League's understanding
of the mechanisms and purposes of deportation was quite sound:
The Immigration Act as a whole is essentially a legal carte-blanche
for the brazen skin-game of importing labor, using this labor as a lever
against both the native Canadian and the imported labor itself, forcing
every possible dollar of profit out of it and throwing it on the scrapheap,
ready for deportation.
Oscar Ryan, the author of Deported!, compared Section 98 of the Criminal
Code with Section 41 of the Immigration Act, pointing out the essential
sameness of the offences described in each. Except for the critical flavour
of his description, that section of the pamphlet could have been taken
from a Departmental memo describing the legislation. Ryan concluded
that it was easier for authorities to rely on Section 41 for political depor-
tations, because such a procedure "dispenses with the bother of a formal
Section 98 charge and the routine of court procedure."55 This was in
fact a view shared by authorities.
The CLDL claimed that large-scale protest could stop deportation
of activists - at least in some cases. Ryan described the case of Dan Malone
as an inspiring example of what could be done. According to an account
in the Canadian Labor Defender, Malone, his wife, and several others
were driving to a meeting in Ottawa when they were stopped by the RCMP
brandishing guns. After allegedly attempting to plant a gun on Malone
(the planter admitted at the scene that it was his own gun, said the CLDL;
the account was confused), the RCMP searched and eventually released
all the travellers. Five days later, two officers from the notorious Toronto
Red Squad arrested Malone, charged him with vagrancy and accused
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him of being an IRA terrorist. The CLDL organized mass protests. In the
next few days the police case did not advance, and on 8 August Malone
went to court on vagrancy charges alone. Although the papers of 5 August
had reported that the RCMP had ordered Malone's arrest in relation to
a plot to assassinate J. H. Thomas, a British delegate to the Imperial
Conference, the Toronto police did not lay any such charges. Before Malone
went to trial, it was announced by the Department of immigration that
Malone would be deported as a public charge: he was unemployed and
had received some relief money.
Meanwhile the CLDL was publicizing the cases as widely as possible
and organizing protests. On 12 August the League claimed that it had
found a stool pigeon called Kusack, who had been responsible for initiating
the accusations of terrorism (no motive was suggested). Malone went
to trial 13 August, and the vagrancy charges were dropped. He was free,
insofar as the criminal justice system was concerned, but still under threat
of deportation. The next day a large meeting was held at the Labor Temple
to protest his deportation, and on 18 August the Department announced
that his deportation "would not be effected".56
On the face of it, the protests had influenced the course of events.
By the summer of 1932, the CLDL had become an old hand at protests.
But just how effective were they? Did the CLDL succeed in more than
a few scattered cases? Certainly it was active. It got thousands, tens,
and in some cases hundreds of thousands of signatures on petitions; it
got hundreds and thousands of letters and resolutions against deportation
sent to the government over the years. It provided legal defence for many
hundreds of court cases, and sometimes - when the cases were shaky,
the actions of the authorities particularly unconscionable, the defendants
clearly victimised, and the judge fair - the defence was successful. Noisy
publicity about unsavoury practices by the authorities was awkward;
protests probably helped in some circumstances. Petryshyn, who certainly
knows more about the CLDL than anyone who was not a participant in
the organization, believes the CLDL was an effective force in at least
slowing down the deportations.57
The files of the Department of Immigration tell a different story.
The Department was eager to avoid informed criticism by the public, press,
politicians or the courts - partly because its practices were often illegal
or at least unpalatable and would not stand scrutiny. Fortunately for the
Department, few people ever understood that deportation procedures
violated cherished traditions of British justice and fair play. Those who
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realized this were rarely powerful enough to bring about more than
cosmetic changes. Fear of publicity aside, when Departmental officials
were assured that they had the support of the government, the public
could go whistle, and especially the radical public. This is quite evident
in the Department's response to substantial protest against the deporta-
tion of communists. Tomo Cacic's case is a good example.
Cade was not a big fish. He was only picked up in the 1931 raids
by chance. He had spent many years in North America, had worked
seasonally in the United States and in British Columbia for several years
before and during the First World War, and then had returned home to
Yugoslavia. After a spell in jail for his political activities, he came to Canada
as an immigrant in 1924. He had not applied for Canadian citizenship
(and probably would not have been granted it, in any case). At the time
of his arrest he had just returned to Toronto from an organizing trip
through Sudbury, Timmins, and Kirkland Lake. He worked primarily in
unions and ethnic organizations for the Party. On 12 August, he was
at the Workers Unity League office arranging to have some pamphlets
shipped, when the police burst in.58
His deportation hearing was held early in 1933 at the Kingston
Penitentiary by a one-man Board of Inquiry. Officer Reynolds acted under
strict instruction by his superiors, who foresaw weaknesses in the case
and wanted to avoid problems. Cacic had been in Canada long enough
to acquire domicile; Reynolds was to be sure to establish that Section 41
nevertheless applied because as a member of the "prohibited or undesirable
classes within the meaning of Section 41 [Cacic was not] capable of
acquiring Canadian domicile."59
As Cacic's deportation date grew closer, his case was made a focus
of protest. Radical groups from all over the country sent in resolutions,
petitions, letters, and telegrams, urging the government to cancel the order,
or failing that, to change Cacic's destination. By the fall of 1933, there
was a furor over the conditions of Cacic's imprisonment (which were
unusually punitive, if the records can be believed), as well as his imminent
deportation.60
Protests were futile. Not only the bureaucrats but also the politicians
- including the Prime Minister - were determined that Cacic's deportation
would be carried out. Just as the protests were heating up, the Yugoslav
Consul wrote to the Department of Immigration: ' 'As one of the leaders
of the Communist Party in Canada and ... of very dangerous influence
upon our nationals in this country, this Royal Consul would appreciate
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very much if you would proceed with his deportation." Such requests
were treated seriously by the Department (while protests against the
deportation of public charges by other consuls often were not). A Depart-
mental official wrote and twice underlined ' 'VERY IMPORTANT'', in red
ink, upon the consul's letter. The Department's reply was reassuring:
a number of protests had been received but "it is not our intention to
favourably entertain these requests. The Department fully appreciates your
desire to have Cacic removed on account of his very dangerous influence
upon his fellow-countrymen in Canada."61
Although the Department was determined not to accede to demands
to cancel Cacic's deportation, there were a number of practical problems
to be solved. The Department frequently could not arrange to collect
prisoners on the day of their release and to take them to a port for
deportation. The usual solution was to detain them (illegally) in the prison
until shipping arrangements could be made. This avoided the bother of
timing a re-arrest by Immigration officials, and lessened the pressures
on the Department's already-overcrowded detention facilities. Of course
there were protests against such practices, but the Department had decided
that it could usually afford to ignore them.
When the stream of protests became a flood and Cacic's case
threatened to become a cause celebre, the Department could no longer
carry out business as usual. The publicity would do its reputation no good,
and by late 1933 it was already under fire for its deportation activities.
When the Hungarian Workers' Club wired that it was determined to ' 'free
Cacic and stop his deportation,'' the implied threat was the last straw.62
The Department was caught between two unpleasant alternatives. Holding
Cacic past his release time might invite court intervention and rescue by
legal means. Releasing him might make it possible for some sort of home-
grown Red Aid attempt to smuggle Cacic to safety, to secrete him
who-knew-where.
There was pressure from the Prime Minister. Bennett had been at
Minister of Justice Guthrie after Guthrie received the threatening telegram.
Guthrie in turn sent an alarm to Gordon at Immigration who passed on
the substance of Guthrie's memo to Commissioner of Immigration Jolliffe.
Identifying Cacic only as "one of the Tim Buck crowd,'' Guthrie had said,
"I do not know this chap's name but the Prime Minister made it clear
that he desired great care taken in connection with the holding of the
Board on this man to see that it is conducted strictly in accordance with
the law." Gordon told Jolliffe to have the Department of Justice go over
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each step of the case to be sure it was legal, so that there would be no
repetition of a "previous unfortunate case" where the government had
bungled a deportation and the prisoner had been released.63
Jolliffe wrote reassuringly to Guthrie. Radical elements might indeed
"seek to obstruct the process of law by legal action or other methods
which may tend to cause embarrassment.'' Immigration would take' 'every
precaution . . . tending to ensure of his safe delivery." The Assistant
Commissioner of Immigration would personally oversee sailing
arrangements.64
Not too surprisingly, Justice found that the case was shaky. The
only evidence given at the Board of Inquiry that Cacic had advocated the
overthrow of government by force was his conviction under Section 98
of the Criminal Code of being a member and officer of an unlawful associ-
ation. If a habeas corpus application were made, likely the court would
hold that this was "not evidence of the conduct described in Section 41
of the Immigration Act, which renders the immigrant undesirable." Justice
suggested holding a second Board of Inquiry with a fresh complaint and
a new Ministerial Order, and adding to the evidence a certified copy of
the transcript of Cacic's court trial. The trial evidence would probably
satisfy the requirements of Section 41 and safeguard the Department from
the courts.65
A new Board of Inquiry was held, following procedures carefully
specified by high-level Justice and Immigration officials. Nothing was left
to chance. Sergeant Leopold was brought in as a witness to repeat his
testimony that, regardless of Cacic's personal views, as a Party member
he was committed to carry out Party policy supporting the overthrow
of government by violence. As the hearing continued, Leopold's testimony
broke through Cacic's resignation. Defending the ethnic organizations as
teachers of' 'geography and the everyday life of Canada to ... illiterate
immigrants," Cacic burst out at Leopold, "You are a paid agent who
appeared in court against myself and comrades, swore their life, through
nothing else but reading pamphlets and trying to establish a Red scare.
I really do not expect anything else from you."66
As far as the authorities were concerned, everything was now
ready. They geared up for final arrangements. Guthrie wrote privately
to the Commissioner of Immigration to make sure that everything was
properly arranged. None of the casual illegalities so much a part of
deportation must be permitted for Cacic. Guthrie told Jolliffe to ' 'take such
steps as may be necessary to take charge of him upon his release.
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In my judgement it will not be possible to hold this man in the peniten-
tiary after the [end of his sentence] . . . . This letter is for personal
information and not for your fyles."67
Cacic appealed. The Department reluctantly decided to release
relevant documents to Cacic's CLDL lawyer on an eyes-only basis. Justice
had carefully double-checked the second Board of Inquiry, so that
Immigration had little to fear about the outcome of the appeal.68
Cacic's lawyer was afraid that his client would be hastily removed
from prison and deported. He need not have worried. Justice had cards
up its sleeve. Cacic was to serve every single day of his sentence - none
of the usual time off for good behaviour. Further, it might be possible
to hold him beyond the late December expiry date until the first of
March 1934, under Section 72 of the Penitentiaries Act which provided
that a convict could request to stay in jail from December to the end of
February.6? How Cacic would be induced to make such a request was
not discussed.
While Justice plotted and Cacic's fellows protested his imminent
deportation (to prison or death, they feared), the Department methodically
arranged for Cacic's shipment. The day after the appeal was refused, all
procedures were in place. Deportation Officers Howell and Souillard would
pick up Cacic, take him on the train from Brockville, Ontario ("take great
care to avoid publicity,'' the Officers were told) to a remote stop in Quebec,
where they would be met by car and driven to a police station to wait
for the Halifax train. At Halifax they would take him directly to the
Immigration Inspector-in-Charge who would oversee boarding the ship.
Ordering the officers to take the ' 'greatest care . . . overlook no details,''
their superiors made it clear that this case must go off perfectly. "It is
absolutely essential that the law should take its course in this particular
instance."70
Far from masterminding a rescue plan, the CLDL almost missed
its chance to make a last-ditch legal plea; they only indirectly learned
that Cacic was about to be taken East. By now the CLDL was resigned
to Cacic's deportation. Now their tactic was to try for a change of desti-
nation. If they could get him to the U.S.S.R., he would be safe. The CLDL
and Department lawyers fought it out in the Halifax courts. Justice Doull
refused habeas corpus; so did the Full Court on appeal. The Montcalm
sailed at 4:30 a.m. New Year's Day, 1934 with Tomo Cacic aboard.71
Did the Department believe that it was sending him to his death?
Probably not, but it seems unlikely that Immigration officials truly had
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no idea that radicals deported to their native countries might be in danger.
Even if Immigration officials rejected as excessive the alarms raised by
the left (and there were thousands of these warnings), they had infor-
mation from more palatable sources. For instance, in 1930, Commissioner
Cortlandt Starnes of the RCMP, a much-relied upon and consistent source
of information on the Red menace, passed on reports from a British
source that a "fascist" takeover in Finland featured persecution of
communists.72
The man who usually made crucial Immigration decisions (then
instructed the Minister, as well as his own subordinates) was the type
who allowed his head to rule his heart. Frederick Blair had joined the
Department by the turn of the century; in 1905 he became an Immigration
officer and moved up rapidly. After a spell as Secretary, he became Acting
Deputy Minister, and in 1936, Director (equivalent to Deputy Minister
in rank). He was a wonderful bureaucrat, which was particularly easy
because he had determined most of the rules under which he operated.
He was anti-Semitic, anti-radical, anti-East Indian, anti-Eastern European,
and anti-Southern European - a typical churchgoing English-Canadian
civil servant, exemplifying much of the worst of Canadian society of the
time. It was Blair who played a major part in refusing entry to and
deporting Polish Jews around 1920, and who held the line (even in the
face of occasional rebellions by his Minister) against European Jewish
refugees in the late 1930s, even after he began to realize that they were
going to be killed in Europe.73 Blair was perfectly capable of knowingly
deporting communists to prisons or worse.
It was not just Blair. Discussions of this issue in the files of the
Department reveal a punitive attitude. Assistant Commissioner Munroe
commented to RCMP Director of Intelligence Charles Hamilton that he
hoped deported radicals would "appreciate the laws and conditions which
prevail [in their own countries] better than those which we have in Canada
and which they decry so violently.'' The RCMP Commissioner wrote Jolliffe
about two Yugoslav radicals who had escaped in Germany during their
deportation, picked up clothes and false passports, and fled to the U.S.S.R.
If they had gone to Yugoslavia, it would have meant their deaths, said
Starnes. The response of Immigration was to tighten up procedures to
prevent more escapes.74
Publicly the Department denied that there were any risks.
Concerning an "alleged danger to those men following deportation," it
wired the CLDL, "they will unquestionably have the full protection
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of the laws of their native countries to which they are being returned."
During December 1932 when arrangements for the deportation of the
Halifax Ten were being completed, there were massive protests sent to
the Department about the dangers awaiting the men in native countries
now under repressive governments. Arvo Vaara and Martin Parker, for
example, were to be sent back to Finland, where the Whites had been
in power for more than a decade (which they had initiated with concen-
tration camps and executions for Reds) and were busily carrying out anti-
radical campaigns of their own through the agency of fascist thugs.
Immediately after receiving strong warnings of dangers to Vaara and Parker
in Finland, and pleas to let them go to the Soviet Union instead, the
Department ordered extra guards and arranged particularly tight security
to ensure their delivery to Finland. Perhaps the best that can be said about
the Department officials is that they did not take the warnings seriously,
even those given by the RCMP. They hid behind the law, which said that
deportation sent immigrants back whence they came; if there was any
reluctance in this choice, it is not evident in the records. As Guthrie said
about the protests, he received too many to acknowledge. "I merely hand
them over to the Mounted Police in order that a record may be kept of
the names and addresses of the people who sign them and I make this
statement so that the petitioners may know what I do with them."75
What is evident, and perhaps more to the point, is the importance
of links to overseas security organizations. If overseas governments were
anti-communist (and this was characteristic of fascist and pro-fascist
governments in Europe), then their law enforcement agencies would treat
communists as enemies of the state; appropriate information would be
shared with fellow law enforcement organizations, usually through
diplomatic channels. Canada was especially reliant upon the British who
were only too happy to co-operate with anti-communist authorities in
Europe.
There are many examples of the Department of Immigration being
fed such information. In 1926, before the extreme crackdowns in Finland,
a communist newspaper celebrated its third anniversary by printing
congratulatory messages from a number of Canadian Finns, whose names
and addresses were published. A copy of it was sent to Commissioner
Starnes of the RCMP who sent it to the Deputy Minister of Immigration
for action. As the Finnish government stepped up its anti-communist
activities, the RCMP was kept informed. In 1928 it passed on a list of
communists purged by the government, obtained from a confidential
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source; later, photographs were sent and distributed to Immigration
officers, in case any fugitives sought refuge in Canada.76
Acting on another RCMP tip in 1932, Immigration told its agents
to "closely examine" persons returning from Russia, "irrespective of
the documents they present in the nature of passports or citizenship
papers." (Canadian citizens were by law not subject to re-entry exami-
nation. Once Immigration determined they were citizens, it had no legal
right to examine them.) In 1934, the Department issued a general order
to be on guard for Canadian Finns who had "confessed" to the Finnish
police that they were spies for Russia, in fact, these people had fled the
dreadful conditions of Karelia, a Finnish socialist colony in Russia. The
source of the report on the "spies" was the British Consul in Helsinki,
whose report was forwarded by the British government to Canadian
authorities.77 The validity of such information, or the conditions under
which it was obtained, are nowhere questioned.
Similarly, the RCMP regularly sent on the Immigration secret
circulars from the Home Office consisting of a series of cards giving the
name, date of arrival in the United Kingdom, and passport details of various
radicals. British Immigration also communicated directly with its Canadian
counterpart, sending on its "suspect index" of people to be rejected or
detained. This information was considered to be sufficiently confidential
to order previous editions burned upon receipt of updated editions.78
American sources were also utilized. Canadian authorities kept
abreast of U.S. crackdowns on Reds, of course. As well, Canadian
Immigration regularly received a "lookout list" for American "Reds"
who had been active in "riots" and the like - in other words, had been
involved in organizing workers or the unemployed, free speech move-
ments, and other social protests most of which were not illegal. Such
exchange of information was not a phenomenon of the Depression. Similar
channels had been in existence for decades. They were without question
acted upon by Canadian Immigration authorities.
Officers of the Department must have found it frustrating when,
despite their best efforts, subversive foreigners kept slipping through the
net and popping up in Canada. Officers of the RCMP must have been even
more frustrated. The head of the RCMP in Vancouver wrote to his chief
in Ottawa pleading for changes to the Immigration Act to reduce protection
against deportation; as it was, he could not do his job. The Vancouver
area was a hotbed of "foreign agents'', as he called radicals.' 'Deportation
is the one effective weapon against foreign agents and one of which
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they are in continual fear." But a recent ruling by the Commissioner of
Immigration was creating problems for the Mountie.79
Fearing court intervention, Jolliffe had ruled that communist
deportations had to be based on evidence of active (as opposed to nominal,
former, or alleged) involvement with the Party. And the only way to
provide the necessary evidence was to have a Mountie spy testify at the
Board of Inquiry. "Uncovering a secret agent" ended that agent's
usefulness. Alas, agents were hard to replace. The high level of commit-
ment among radicals in the vicinity made it hard to recruit agents from
radical ranks (because there were so many "foreign agents" around,
argued the Mountie).80
Political deportation relied heavily on RCMP spy reports. The best-
known example is the testimony of Sergeant Leopold, who not only
identified the official functions of suspects, but provided the evidence of
centralized control and universal applicability of Party discipline that was
necessary to declare the Communist Party an illegal organization. Leopold's
testimony was supported by documents seized from Party offices and
members' homes. Other RCMP sources relied less on evidence, documen-
tary or otherwise. Some like Secret Agent #125 Tatko or Constables Upton
and Bordeau were regular RCMP officers. Others were disaffected radicals,
anti-labour or anti-radical informers, and less savoury elements not noted
for their integrity or intelligence. An RCMP Crown witness against radical
Allen Campbell in Vancouver claimed the alphabet had thirty-six letters.81
He was far from the worst.
In addition to the paid agents, there were public-spirited citizens
only too pleased to turn in their neighbours. For example, the Reverend
Thomas Jones from Sudbury was responsible for Arvo Vaara's 1929
sedition conviction. It was Jones who got a Finnish fellow missionary to
translate Vaara's "seditious" editorials, then took the translations to the
Sudbury Star for publication. The town was duly stirred up, the Legion
passed resolutions, the local Crown Attorney stepped in and brought the
wrath of His Majesty's Government on Vaara's head. Jones was certainly
a patriot. Nonetheless, as Betcherman points out, he had a few grievances
against Vaara. The success of the Red Finns and Vapaus was a serious
hindrance to Jones' missionary work. Vapaus made fun of the missionaries.
Equally bad, Vapaus was campaigning to organize a union for the Northern
Ontario miners. The timing was inopportune; two major nickel companies
were negotiating a merger. Queen's Park, ever a friend of the mine owners,
would not have approved of any hitches.82
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By 1934, public opinion was beginning to change. It was no longer
merely the communists who objected to mass deportation, the curtailment
of civil liberties, and Section 98. Mackenzie King had found it expedient
to oppose the worst of Bennett's Iron Heel policies. He had promised that
if elected he would repeal Section 98 and, by implication, stop the abuses.
The Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF), whatever support it
mustered, also opposed mass deportation and Section 98 as violations
of civil liberties and common decency.83
Many people, who were untroubled by the summary deportation
of radicals, were not so sanguine about wholesale deportation of the
unemployed. Challenges in the courts had combined with public opinion to
cause the Department of Immigration to become slightly more circumspect
in its activities. By 1933, the Department had to tighten up on irregular
or illegal practices. As the Commissioner of Immigration noted in a direc-
tive, the courts were increasingly reviewing deportation cases upon habeas
corpus applications by the prospective deports. When courts found proce-
dural irregularities, they were empowered to order the release of the
appellant. Any departure from strict legality could destroy a case, and
lead to "an adverse decision with embarrassing consequences and
complications."84
The excesses of some local authorities had begun to come under
fire. The Toronto Police's Red Squad had been under criticism for some
time, because of its heavy-handed and arbitrary actions: beating up
suspects, seizing papers, almost at Red Squad leader Nursey's whim.
Whims were no substitute for good judgement or legality. Lawyers and
judges began to express concern. In the fall of 1933, the Toronto Police
Commission (its two most rabid members had retired) told Nursey that
henceforth he could only raid meetings that were clearly in violation of
the law.85 That cooled down Toronto considerably.
After 1934, the worst was over. That year was a turning point.
The most spectacular event was the arrest and trial for sedition of
A. E. Smith, the head of the CLDL. It all began with a play called Eight
Men Speak, put on by the CLDL in Toronto in December 1933. It castigated
prison conditions, the shooting of the Estevan strikers, and the attempted
shooting of Tim Buck, allegedly on orders from high authority. The play
was quickly closed by Toronto police.
Bennett was furious about the play. He hated Smith and had been
seeking a way to silence him. Two weeks later Smith publicly accused
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Bennett of giving the order to shoot at Buck.86 Bennett ordered Smith
charged with sedition.
This time Bennett and his men had gone too far. They were criticized
in the press. Support for Smith came also from mainstream labour and
church groups. Then the trial revealed that the Crown had no case against
Smith; he was found innocent. And if he was not guilty, other sedition
cases were cast into doubt. A few months later, all of the remaining
Kingston communist prisoners were set free, save Buck who was held
until November. Bennett had backed down.87
The Department of Immigration still carried on. It scoured the jails
periodically to find those "convicted as a result of identifying themselves
with riots, or disturbances of a communistic nature."88 But when the
country-wide crackdown against Reds lessened, so did the supply of
radicals in the jails who could be deported for their political activities.
When King repealed Section 98, early in 1936, the authorities lost their
strongest weapon for political deportation. Immigration still had all its
apparatus intact; it merely had to return to a more discreet style of
operation, relying on other methods and other charges for deporting
immigrants judged undesirable.
Deportation ultimately depended on a network of referrals from
criminal justice, relief, medical, and political authorities. When such
referrals became inexpedient, deportation diminished. There were limits
to what could be accomplished by administrative fiat from the top down.
The limits had been reached. After 1935, deportation declined to "normal"
levels.
8
4 Shovelling Out" the Redundant,
1930-1935
1 he deportation of the unemployed
in the 1930s continued well established practice, but at the same time
intensified to such a degree that it became a change in kind. The tradition
of expelling immigrants who had become public charges had been estab-
lished some fifty years earlier. The unemployed who had gone on relief
were the main target group for the Department of Immigration during
the Depression. Just as unemployment became a mass phenomenon, the
response of the Department to it was the mass production of economic
deportation.
The Department had claimed, during an earlier period of high
unemployment, that it was not its policy to deport the unemployed, unless
there were other factors that would make these people unlikely to succeed
in Canada. The Department's claims were necessary to balance the
conflicting interests of the transportation companies and the municipalities.
It was usually the companies who had brought in the immigrants and
who would be asked by the Department to pay the costs of sending deports
back whence they came. It was the municipalities who had to pay the
costs of maintaining immigrants who became public charges. Except in
times of economic crisis the Department had been able to balance these
conflicting interests. One of the most important tactics used by the
Department in this balancing act was the claim that it did not automatically
and arbitrarily ship out the otherwise desirable and fit immigrants who
160 WHENCE THEY CAME
had fallen on hard times. Such a claim helped the Department to avoid
political controversy.
Despite the attempts of the Department to argue that it deported
the unemployable rather than the unemployed, the mass deportations
of the 1930s aroused a good deal of controversy. Leftwing and liberal
public opinion (from the Communist Party to the Co-operative Common-
wealth Federation to the churches, for example) attacked the Department
for "shovelling out" the down and out. The municipalities were caught
in a severe financial squeeze, as they were overwhelmed by spiralling
relief costs. Neither the provinces nor Ottawa were willing to contribute
anything substantial to the high costs of relieving immigrants. The
municipalities attacked immigration policies, accused the federal govern-
ment of importing undesirables, and demanded stronger action. Canadian
nativists demanded that the "foreigners" be sent back home so that
"white men" could find jobs. None of this was unique to the 1930s,
but the scale of the problem was unprecedented.
The official position of the Department of Immigration during the
Depression was that it did not systematically deport the unemployed. The
records do not support that claim. The general policy of the Department
in those years was to deport those unemployed immigrants who had gone
on relief. Within that general policy there were some slight deviations.
During 1929 and the first six months of 1930, the Department balked
at a very few requests for specific deportations. From the summer of 1930
to the fall of 1935, the official policy was one of automatic deportation
of the unemployed, while claiming that they were unemployable and
undesirable. By 1932, certain ameliorative practices were developed,
mostly in response to public outrage and pressure. Most of these practices
were related to suspending deportations. Reliefers who found work might
have their proceedings put into abeyance; Britishers might be ordered
deported but the order never carried out.
These years were noteworthy for a concerted effort by the Depart-
ment of Immigration officials to conceal, deny, or justify their practices.
Spurious or misleading statistics were cooked up and purveyed, editors
regaled with letters and rationalizations, statements made in Parliament,
in public, and in private. In some instances, the Department representatives
misled; in others they lied.
By the fall of 1935, the worst was over. The economic situation
had bottomed out and was slowly improving, but it was the changes in
the political climate that were crucial. The new Minister of Immigration,
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Thomas Crerar, was wishy-washy, rather than determined to "shovel
out" all of the unemployed. Large numbers of the general public, many
Members of Parliament, and perhaps most importantly, numbers of
municipal councillors, had condemned the deportation of the unemployed.
Even with a compliant Minister (and most of them had little real under-
standing of what went on in their Department), it was no longer possible
to "shovel out" vast numbers at the rate of previous years.
Not that the Department stopped; rather, it retreated. Circumstances
directed public attention elsewhere, while the Department continued its
usual activities on a scale diminished in comparison to the heyday of the
early 1930s, but still higher than in previous decades.
By the fall of 1929, there were already sizeable numbers of unem-
ployed immigrants to be shipped out as public charges. The Department
had already begun to send back large numbers of young British men who
had come over earlier that year as trainees under the auspices of the
Ministry of Labour. A special procedure was set up: the men would be
received at the Immigration Building at Montreal, thus qualifying as
public charges, then face Boards of Inquiry at which they would be
ordered deported as public charges,' 'they of course refusing farm work.''
Deporting these men was enough of a political embarrassment, but the
special procedures adopted had the potential to create a worse one.
The problem was that many other able-bodied unemployed Britons
did not see why they too could not be promptly received and deported.
In Montreal, the alternatives for the unemployed were very grim. The
immigration Building meant food and shelter. But the Department argued
that these men could find work if they wanted it. While it would be
simple enough to hold Boards of Inquiry and deport these unemployed
immigrants, the Eastern Division Commissioner of Immigration predicted
that if this were done, there would "be a rapid increase in the number
of cases the Division will have to deal with and we will develop more
or less into a booking agency."1 That would not only be politically
awkward, it would swamp the Montreal Agency with bodies and papers.
Neither the staff nor the building could stand the extra load.
The Commissioner of Immigration in Ottawa concluded that the
Department of Immigration must take a firm stand to discourage
immigrants who were unwilling to work, in anticipation of "quite a number
of these cases.'' Men who were unemployed and refused farm work were
to be told, "they will have to make their own way" back home. The
162 WHENCE THEY CAME
Montreal Agency was told that no special procedures would be permitted
to those who applied.2
By the following spring, municipalities were clearly using depor-
tation as an alternative to relief. The regional office of the Department
in Winnipeg was receiving deportation complaints against immigrants who
had received miniscule amounts of relief. Single unemployed men who
had gotten payments of $2 to $4 had been labelled as "public charges''.
Ottawa balked: Immigration was willing to "co-operate"' with the munic-
ipalities, but not to "extend facilities in the matter of deportation on such
slim grounds" if there were no other reasons than unemployment.
Immigrants might stop trying to find jobs and "adopt the line of least
resistance, which means a free trip home." If the municipalities wanted
to deport these people, it was up to them to show that "whoever is
involved is a misfit or a type who cannot become established."3 In other
words, the cases had to be somewhat differently constructed and
presented. Relief payments of $4 were not in themselves sufficient grounds
for deportation in May 1930.
The following month, the Deputy Minister told the Winnipeg
Division Commissioner to pass the word to Calgary municipal officials
that Immigration would not issue deportation orders against a group of
immigrants who had received relief payments ranging from $1-3 for
individuals, to $11 for a family.' 'Unless there is an unfavourable history
behind each one of these, they should be given a chance to make good,''
he wrote.4
By 1930 there was intense pressure from the municipalities to
deport public charges. Relief costs had begun to escalate. In Winnipeg,
for example, relief costs for 1927-28 had been $31,394; for 1930-31,
they rose to $1,683,386. In March 1930, representatives from British
Columbia, Ontario, and Prairie provincial governments and a number of
Western municipalities had presented to Cabinet figures outlining the
financial costs of high immigrant unemployment, in an unsuccessful effort
to force the federal government to pay these costs. The federal govern-
ment's alternative to paying immigrant relief costs was to order deporta-
tion of the unemployed. A directive to that effect was issued in the summer
of 1930.5
Drastic enough, such a policy was conservative in comparison to
what had been proposed by Minister of Immigration Charles Stewart. The
municipalities had sought sterner measures. While on a visit to the West,
Stewart was persuaded to wire his Department to bypass legalities and
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ship out the unemployed en masse to clear the relief rolls. His staff reacted
with dismay to this politically explosive proposal. Deputy Minister William
Egan wired Stewart that certain steps could not be bypassed. "Summary
returns impossible unless Department pays all transportation costs both
rail and ocean.'' Because so many of the unemployed were British, Egan
feared that "following procedure [outlined] your wire yesterday means
those returned would be mainly British and the effect would be disastrous
once this becomes known as it will the moment movement begins." Egan
suggested instead that the Department stick to a formula of "50% British,
50% foreign and handle all by regular procedure. This only safe course.
Using telegraphic warrants will facilitate action. Will act immediately on
your reply." And such remained the policy of the Department for a
substantial period.6
Although it was at the request of a Liberal Minister that' 'shovelling
out'' the unemployed was intensified, the policy continued after the July
1930 elections. The new Tory Minister of Immigration, Wesley Gordon,
was briefed by his staff that August. He was told (on Egan's orders) that
it had been and should continue to be the policy of Department to deport
unemployed reliefers as a matter of routine. Although harvest work might
take the burden off Western cities for a time, by winter most of the
unemployed men would return to the cities. Either because they would
be ' 'determined not to help themselves'' (that is, take winter farm' 'jobs'',
usually for little more than room and board) or because ' 'they cannot
obtain employment,'' these immigrants would be "public charges at least
through the winter," reasoned Department bureaucrats. The new Minister
should be acquainted with these facts and his permission asked to continue
deportations of the unemployed.7 He apparently did not object to his
staff's proposals.
Despite the fact that Egan had insisted to Stewart that it was
necessary for the Department to follow legal and routine procedures, the
Department regularly used illegal shortcuts. Telegraphic warrants, for
example, were not illegal in themselves, but "Minister's Orders" for
examination were supposed to be issued only after certain basic facts of
the case had been sent to Ottawa for perusal. These niceties broke down
under the load of public charge deportations. By the summer of 1931,
several cities in the West had hundreds of complaints backlogged. The
Winnipeg regional office was overwhelmed and unable to process them.
Up to May 1930, Ottawa Immigration officials had been sending tele-
graphic warrants after receiving lists of immigrants' names by nightletter
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telegram, without knowing the facts of each case. The Commissioner of
Immigration had ordered this practice stopped. But a year later, being
swamped under work posed the greater danger. Ottawa agreed to resume
the illegal practice of sending warrants in response to wired lists of names.
The documentation would be sent to Ottawa after the cases were heard
by Boards of Inquiry and deportations ordered.8 The Immigration Act set
out clearly the procedures to be followed, and violations were knowingly
tolerated for years at a time for the sake of convenience. Such illegalities
were usually well concealed in internal documents and seldom uncovered
by the courts.
The Department of Immigration played a key role in the early part
of the Depression. Worsening economic conditions and widespread
unemployment meant heightened social unrest. Powerful interest groups
such as employers' lobbies and corporations wanted industrial and social
peace at any price, so long as they did not have to pay for it. Municipal
governments (and taxpayers) were frantic about relief costs. There were
political as well as financial limits to municipal sources of revenue. Local
elites were determined to keep the lid on. Angry citizens and all manner
of protest groups, from fraternal organizations to veterans' associations,
blamed immigrants for taking jobs away from Canadians.9 The Depart-
ment served all these and the government as well, by shipping out the
unemployed; none were satisfied and all wanted increased service.
On the other hand, there was a storm of criticism in the press and
from a variety of organizations and associations - including some
churches, unions, and the moderate and far left - and from foreign govern-
ments. Complaints about the deportation of "foreigners" could usually
be dismissed or sidestepped. More worrisome was the furor in Canada
and Britain about the deportation of unemployed British immigrants. Many
of these had come in the 1920s through the Empire Settlement Act. They
had been wooed and subsidized as highly desirable settlers. Now unem-
ployed and on relief, they were labelled as "undesirables" and shipped
back home.
Their arrival in Britain often caused howls of protest. His Majesty's
Government made inquiries. Memoranda were exchanged. A few scan-
dalous incidents were discussed in the Canadian and British press. Two
particularly outrageous deportations were condemned: Miss Alice Barton,
an epileptic who had been resident in Canada for seventeen years, and
Mrs. Arnsworth, here twenty years, also an epileptic and an inmate
of a hospital for the insane. Despite their long residence, they were
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exportable; as members of the prohibited classes they could never legally
obtain domicile. These two cases created such controversy that Immigra-
tion Minister Gordon ordered that all proposed mental or epileptic depor-
tation cases of immigrants here more than five years were to be submitted
for Deputy Ministerial review.10 Such matters were handled more
cautiously thereafter.
Most criticism was directed at public charge deportations. As
unemployment and hence public charge deportations increased, so did
criticism. By the end of 1930, the Department had decided to take the
offensive. The Minister and his staff initiated a campaign to conceal their
policies and justify their actions. The campaign took three main
approaches. First, it attempted to build up a case that deports were not
just the unemployed but rather the unemployable, because they were
unable or unwilling to work. Second, it attempted to create and display
evidence that the majority (the figures vary) of the deports did not mind
being deported and in fact were eager to go home. These were referred
to as "voluntary" deportations. Third, the Department tried to conceal
the true nature and extent of the deportation of unemployed immigrants
who had become public charges, both by misleading statements about
its policies, and by publishing figures based on statistics compiled to
buttress the "unemployability" and the "voluntary" claims. Such a public
relations exercise was to preoccupy Department officials for the next
several years.
The campaign began with carefully aimed letters. Deputy Minister
Egan, who was fully aware of the Department's policy, wrote to the Council
for Social Service of the Church of England in Canada, claiming quite falsely
that' 'we have n o t . . . adopted any policy of sending people back home
in any numbers merely because they are in temporary distress through
unemployment." Egan pointed out that the Minister of Immigration had
stated publicly that he was not in favour of mass deportation.11
Gordon wrote explanatory letters to the editors of daily newspapers,
hoping to improve the Department's publicity. By January he was citing
case studies and analyses based on Department statistics. He claimed that
deportation had "affected approximately only one half of one per cent
of the immigrants who came to Canada since the commencement of the
century."12 He circulated to editors an analysis of the deportation cases
of immigrants on a recent sailing of the Ascania, of which there had been
much criticism. The analysis purported to justify these deportations on
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the grounds that each one was necessary, not just the result of a policy
of "shovelling out".
The analysis was not particularly convincing on the face of it. The
Ascania contingent had consisted of 72 men and women ordered deported,
37 of whom were accompanied by their families, including 6 Canadian-
born children. Of the grounds for deportation, five were due to physical
problems (three men were public charges, due to unemployment, and
claimed they could not work because of physical disabilities, even if jobs
were available; one man was tubercular and ordered deported under
Section 33b as a member of the prohibited classes; and one woman, a
domestic servant, suffered from pleurisy which the Department regarded
as a tuberculosis case). There were four female domestic servants deported
as public charges, but in addition these had "unsatisfactory records",
meaning that three were unmarried and pregnant and one was accompa-
nied by her illegitimate child. Five of the men had been convicted of
unspecified, crimes. (A vagrancy conviction, followed by a brief prison
term, was an oft-used method of deporting unemployed immigrants as
criminals.) Fifteen men were public charges allegedly unwilling to take
farm work. Twenty-nine claimed that they were unable to obtain any kind
of work. By the Department's own description, a substantial proportion
of these people were being deported for unemployment alone. But the
Minister claimed in his analysis that "not one of them was deported
because employment could not be found for them on the land."13
Justifications such as this may not have been entirely convincing,
but without inside information on the methods used by the Department
to compile such data, little real criticism could be levied. Few daily
newspapers questioned the Department's assertions, however little they
liked the situation. The Ottawa Citizen was one of the exceptions. Editor
Charles Bowman did not believe that the Department deported only the
unemployable. "What about the other 200,000 unemployed in Canada?
Are they similarly unemployable?" demanded his editorial.14
Not surprisingly, statistics normally kept by the Department were
not particularly useful for its public relations campaign. They tended to
damn rather than justify the Department's actions. By February 1931
the bureaucrats were creating new evidence. In order to show that British
immigrants were only too pleased to be sent back home, Immigration
officials were told to obtain written statements from any Britons requesting
or agreeing to deportation.15
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Not only were officers supposed to produce written evidence that
deportations were voluntary, they were also given specific instructions
to try to have immigrants say that they would refuse work if offered,
and did not want to' 'become established'' in Canada. By combining these
techniques, the Department attempted to argue that "in every case they
wanted to be sent home" or, alternatively, even though the statutory
cause for deportation was "becoming a public charge", the real reason
for becoming a public charge was "something more than unemploy-
ment."16 The unemployed were thus the unemployable, and the blame
shifted from the economy to the individual who was to be deported.
The system of obtaining "evidence" was applied with a venge-
ance. In short order the practice of having some willing British immigrants
sign written requests for deportation rapidly expanded to the point where
it was applied to all British subject deports. Such zeal could be trouble-
some.- in May 1931 Division commissioners were told to have their officers
return to the practice of obtaining handwritten statements from those
immigrants who had asked to be sent back. They were no longer to require
all those who had been reported for deportation investigations by munic-
ipal authorities or other sources to sign forms attesting to their voluntary
deportations.17 Department officials may have stopped extorting signa-
tures; municipal officials continued the practice and applied it to more
than the British immigrants. This issue would blow up in Winnipeg and
other cities within a short period of time.
Other means were used by the Department to collect evidence that
immigrants were volunteering to be deported. Boards of Inquiry were
repeatedly instructed to have immigrants agree that they would not take
a job, did not want to become established in Canada, and wanted to go
home. High-level officials in the Department insisted that these instruc-
tions be carried out. They sent pointed reminders. "These instructions
were issued with a definite purpose and a rather awkward situation has
arisen through failure ... to carry out the instructions," scolded one
missive in November 1931.18
By this time Canada's deportation policy had become an Imperial
issue. The British Secretary of State for External Affairs had told Bennett
that not only had British public opinion been aroused by the large number
of public charge deportations from Canada, but the issue would be taken
up by Parliament and the press if the numbers continued high during the
winter. This could be especially awkward in view of the upcoming Imperial
Conference in Ottawa. The U.K. government was unhappy about the
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deportation of Britons for problems "beyond their control." Australia
treated its British immigrant unemployed as Australians, and Britain
wanted Canada to do likewise. More than ever, the Department needed
evidence manufactured at Board of Inquiry hearings to "prove" that its
victims wanted or deserved deportation. "I wonder if you can put your
hands on any cases where Britishers or others have smashed windows
or done something of that sort in order to get deported?'' asked the Deputy
Minister. The answer is not recorded.19
The Department seized on any local improvement in the labour
market as evidence that immigrants who remained unemployed did so
by choice. Seasonal farm jobs were golden opportunities which the Depart-
ment insisted lazy immigrants threw away. Departmental officials in
Ottawa urged their regional subordinates to send them examples of such
stubborn refusals to give up the posh life of a reliefer. In June 1932, for
example, a circular to all Immigration offices discussed the inexplicable
increases in public charge deportations despite the chances for farm jobs
offered by the coming of summer. Blame for continued unemployment
must "to some extent be attached to the individual who is unwilling or
refuses to accept what is available, as well as to labour conditions
generally . . . . The Department is anxious to have definite evidence
. . . where deportation is ordered solely on the public charge ground . . .
which will indicate whether or not the individual concerned is prepared
to accept work, or refuses to do so."20 The implication was clear: if such
evidence were lacking, it was because of the failure of the Boards of Inquiry
to produce the hoped-for statements.
Some small concessions were visible, usually as a result of wide-
spread criticism of the Department's practices. For example, some
Immigration offices had been requiring recently employed immigrants to
leave their jobs in order to attend their Boards of Inquiry for public charge
deportation based on their previous receipt of relief. In June 1932 local
offices were told that they could no longer do this unless the immigrant
were undesirable for reasons in addition to previous unemployment.21
This was a political rather than a legal decision. The legalities were
confused. The Department of Justice had ruled in 1926 that anyone who
"is" or ' 'has been'' a public charge before acquiring domicile was legally
liable for deportation, even if they were no longer a public charge at the
time the deportation concluded. On the other hand, an April 1927
Department of Immigration memo had ruled that if someone ceased to
be a public charge between the time the deportation complaint was
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received and the Board of Inquiry held, they were not deportable under
Section 40 as a public charge. This ruling was not generally applied in
the early 1930s; the tendency was to follow the older Justice ruling. In
1933 the Department of Justice ruled that if a family received relief for
a brief period and subsequently became self-supporting and paid it back,
they probably should not be deported as public charges.22 This ruling
would not have greatly affected deportations, because few families would
go on relief (or, for that matter, be granted it) if they had any other
resources. Few could hope to remain only briefly on relief, find work paying
enough to repay it, and thus escape liability to public charge deportation.
In practice, going on relief usually meant a one-way ticket home
for single or family immigrants. In some cases, family ties to a reliefer
were sufficient grounds for deportation. For example, if a husband were
ordered deported, his wife and children were usually included in the order,
whether or not they were living apart from him. In many cases, Canadian-
born children who were not legally deportable were sent along as' 'accom-
panying" rather than being listed on the order. Even if the wife were
self-supporting, her legal ties to the husband might be sufficient grounds
to include her in the deportation order. Admittedly she might not actually
be sent with him when the time came. It depended on individual circum-
stances, and on the discretion of the Department.23
The municipalities were essential partners in the enterprise of
"shovelling out" the unemployed. Public charge deportations were
initiated at the request of municipal officials. Most cities were eager to
remove reliefers. On the other hand, elected officials had to pay some
attention to public opinion. By 1932 the situation was desperate in many
Canadian cities. In Sudbury, for example, the city was running out of
money. In the spring of 1932, Sudbury City Council had asked Immigration
officials to deport all undesirables. By the end of that year, the definition
of undesirability must have expanded somewhat. The city was spending
$1,700 daily on relief: $5 a week in food vouchers for a family of two
adults and four children. City Council had initiated money-saving measures.
Civic workers' wages were cut and their hours reduced to three weeks
per month for married, one week for single. Notices were placed in
newspapers that a year's residence was required for relief eligibility.
Couples married less than six months were ineligible. Property owners
receiving relief had a lien placed against their property. Reliefers who
were residents elsewhere were cut off and sent back home. Some reliefers
were sent directly overseas to get them off relief: one family was sent
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back to Norway. Deportation was even better: someone else would pay
the shipping costs. Council told the municipal relief committee to compile
lists of all non-citizen reliefers so that they could be considered for
deportation.24
Routine reporting for deportation of all immigrants who had become
public charges was the rule in a number of cities. In Montreal, for instance,
there was much unemployment, resources were scarce, and relief hard
to get. Large numbers of immigrants were reported destitute and on the
verge of starvation. The City reported them to the Montreal Immigration
Office for deportation. The local agent said that the office was' 'filled daily''
with public charge immigrants who had been ordered deported, and who
wanted to know what would happen to them. He said that they seemed
to him to be eager to work, and regarded deportation as a last resort.
Edmonton likewise reported all immigrants on relief. The Oshawa City
Council had passed a similar policy. In Sault Ste. Marie, immigrants had
to sign a request to be deported, before they could obtain relief.25
Traditionally a gathering point for the unemployed, Winnipeg was
particularly hard hit. By 1932, Winnipeg's percentage of unemployed
was the second highest in Canada. Since 1930, the city had been
borrowing to pay its relief costs. In June 1930 the Winnipeg City Council
passed a motion to deport all immigrants who were public charges.26
Council was always on the lookout for ways to cut costs or find more
money. Councillors seemed unaware of the human costs of such measures.
But after a few years of the Depression, some Councillors began to evince
a different attitude.
In June 1930 there had been no dissent to the motion to deport
all public charge immigrants; in fact it was initiated by two pro-labour
Councillors. But by January 1932, a request by the City of Montreal to
join in a scheme for "voluntary repatriation to their native lands'' of all
unemployed aliens was only narrowly passed (nine "yes", eight "no"
votes) .27 Later that year, deportation was to become a contentious issue
in Winnipeg municipal politics.
The reaction of the City of Winnipeg to the deportation issue
illustrates several significant factors: the point of view of the municipalities;
the development of deportation into an issue in civic politics (both partisan
and across party lines); the roles of elected city officials (as opposed to
city bureaucrats) in deportation; the legal and political ramifications for
the municipalities and the federal government of the Immigration Act
provision for city officials to report public charge deportation complaints;
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the response of civic officials to public outrage (and to a certain extent
their own) when the facts were revealed about their complicity in the policy
of "shovelling out" the unemployed.
In the absence of studies of other municipalities it is unclear to what
extent the situation in Winnipeg was representative. In terms of the local
arena, certain tentative conclusions can be drawn. It seems evident that
most members of Winnipeg City Council did not know in 1932 that their
own City Relief Department was forcing immigrants to sign deportation
requests in order to obtain relief. Nor did Councillors know the extent
of relief deportations, that is, that the Relief Department was routinely
reporting for deportation all those who went on relief after less than five
years in Canada. This ignorance was reinforced by the lies about proce-
dures and policies told early in 1932 by Fraser, the Director of the Relief
Department. It was not until late 1932 or early 1933 that sufficient
evidence had accumulated to convince the majority of Councillors that
improprieties and injustices were the norm rather than being caused by
oversights, happenstance, and exceptions to the rule.
In Winnipeg it was for the most part the Labour rather than the
Citizens faction on City Council who questioned deportation practices. Ed
Rea has noted that Winnipeg politics have operated along class lines drawn
in the 1919 strike. Winnipeg City Council has long been split between
the descendants of pro-striker (Labour) and anti-striker (Citizens) factions.
(Although Council's positions on deportation did not always follow the
usual patterns, Rea's analysis remains helpful.)28 The Citizens represen-
tatives, who were the budget-conscious spokespersons for the Winnipeg
political and economic powers-that-be, were only briefly recruited to the
anti-deportation side. They were likely drawn there by dismay that British
principles of fair play and justice had been betrayed, and the shrewd
calculation that it was politically unsound to support a practice widely
regarded as morally reprehensible and possibly legally questionable. What
none of the Councillors realized was that British justice and fair play
had no part in the deportation system, Depression or no. After the mists
cleared from their eyes, Councillors found themselves blackmailed by the
Department of Immigration. Mounting relief costs and pleas from a few
immigrants to be deported, combined with Ottawa's blockade on all public
charge deportations (as opposed to the unemployed public charge depor-
tations to which Councillors had objected) eventually led to sober second
thoughts about their refusal to report reliefers for deportation. After seven
months of standoff, a morally and politically palatable compromise was
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developed. Desirable unemployed immigrants would be safeguarded and
not reported for deportation; the "unfit" would be liable to deportation
without their consent. Council got itself off the hook with this policy and
the deportation machinery was set into motion again.
Deportation became a public issue when early in 1932, Winnipeg
began to cut off relief for some people. There were public protests not
only about access to relief but about deportation of reliefers. In February
a large demonstration in front of the Legislature complained that one
W. Musali had been cut off relief because he ' 'refused to sign for voluntary
deportation."29 Other demonstrations protested wholesale deportation
of the unemployed. City Council began to look more closely at the
relationship between relief and deportation.
Shortly after these demonstrations a Labour Councillor moved that
the Unemployment Relief Committee should not report for deportation
those immigrants who were on relief solely because of unemployment
(unless they had asked to be deported). A Citizens Councillor countered
with a motion to tell the Unemployment Relief Committee to request the
deportation of all those eligible. The heated debate which followed posed
the argument that the deportation of the law-abiding unemployed was
' 'unhuman'', against the fear that Winnipeg would become a relief haven.
Eventually the matter was turned over to the Committee to consider. The
debate revealed splits on Council over the deportation issue. More
importantly, it revealed that Councillors had little information about the
actual deportation practices of the city. Some Councillors were beginning
to wonder if there were not something wrong with the situation. Indeed
there was. At this time, Manitoba's per capita deportation rate was higher
than Ontario's, which deported the greatest number of immigrants during
the Depression.30
Winnipeg City Council was drawn more directly into the issue in
June 1932 when the Consuls of Germany, Sweden, Hungary, Norway,
Poland, and Denmark wrote wanting to know why so many of their
nationals had been deported as public charges. They asked three ques-
tions: 1) What city regulations provided that immigrants resident more
than twelve months were deportable for being on relief due solely to
unemployment? 2) What were the regulations for those resident longer
than twelve months? 3) Many of their nationals had appealed deporta-
tion, yet the Consuls had been told that Winnipeg deported only if the
immigrant so requested. Was there a city regulation that reliefers who were
willing to work could be deported only voluntarily at their own request?31
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Winnipeg City Council asked J. D. Fraser, head of the City Relief
Department, and City Solicitor Preudhomme, about the city's procedures.
Fraser's report (which may have been drafted by one of his staff) mis-
represented the actual practices and policies of his Department. Whether
or not it was Fraser who wrote the report, he sent it on to Council as
his, and he continued to misrepresent his Department's practices on
subsequent occasions.32
Fraser's memo is worth citing in detail for what it reveals about
the rationale of municipal bureaucrats (as opposed to elected officials)
for relief deportations. The memo stated correctly that there was no city
bylaw governing deportation: the federal Immigration Act said that anyone
not a citizen or domiciled (then five years' legal residence) could be
deported if they became a public charge. The deportation was set in motion
by complaint from municipal officials. Cases were handled ("thoroughly
gone into") by Boards of Inquiry which had some discretionary powers.
About the issue of voluntary deportations, he said only that the Immigra-
tion Act did not require that immigrants apply for their own deportations.
Nonetheless, his Department provided a form for that purpose. "Last year
we had many letters from persons on relief asking for deportation, and
as a matter of convenience to them and for the purpose of having a uniform
application form for deportation, the present form in use was adopted."
Fraser did not mention that it was not necessary to apply for deportation
to be sent back. The city often paid for all or part of the trip in order
to remove people from the relief rolls. There are numerous such examples
in the minutes of the Unemployment Relief Committee.
Fraser's memo concluded with a statement that was blatantly
misleading. "The City of Winnipeg does not propose deportation other
than in cases where the same has been voluntarily asked for except in
exceptional cases, and then only for good cause." The Relief Department
had "no fixed rules or regulations" on deportation. When an "applica-
tion for deportation" was received, the Department obtained from the
"applicant" information about birth, residence, immigration, kin, and
so on, to determine if they were a ' 'bona fide resident1'. The information
was sent on to the local Immigration officer, who would decide the next
step. The "applicant" could have legal counsel at the deportation hearing.
Unless Immigration asked for further information (such as a change of
address or the "amount of relief ... obtained from" the city), Fraser
concluded, his Department had no further interest in the case.33 This
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memo reveals what Councillors knew officially about the deportation
practices of the city.
City Solicitor Preudhomme's memo to Council was similarly detailed,
legalistic, and repeated much of what Fraser said. Preudhomme explained
that unemployment relief was managed by the Unemployment Relief
Committee under the control of three levels of government. Since the city
had only one-third of the seats, it was not solely responsible for the
Committee's regulations and actions unless these had been separately
approved by Council. Council had not passed any regulations or officially
' 'taken any action'' about deportation; it was a federal matter governed
by the Immigration Act which was a Dominion statute. Moving to the
city's procedures, Preudhomme discussed the record keeping practices
of the Relief Department. Obviously he had been talking to Fraser or a
member of Fraser's staff.
The form which is being used by the Unemployment Relief Committee
is something which, I take it, has been adopted purely for keeping
on record the fact that individuals making voluntary applications to
be deported have done so to the Unemployment Relief Committee, so
that this committee can have on record the names of persons who
have been on relief and should be on the nominal roll of the Committee
and may in consequence or deportation be removed therefrom. I can
see no other reason for the matter going through the Unemployment
Relief Committee.34
Preudhomme apparently understood little about the procedures used
in deportation. He was also confused about the difference between the
Relief Department and the Unemployment Relief Committee. The latter
was dominated in numbers by Council members but in practice and policy
by the provincial representative, Public Works Deputy Minister Arthur
MacNamara. The sole federal representative seldom interfered, although
he did occasionally find some federal money. The committee in fact did
not oversee all deportation cases. Moreover, it seems likely from the
records that the Committee was not aware of the specific procedures used
by the Relief Department. The Committee did hear appeals from people
who were refused relief, wanted reinstatement or, infrequently, requested
deportation proceedings be halted. There is no evidence in the minutes,
however, that the Committee's knowledge went beyond the tip of the
iceberg. After 1932, Fraser was the Secretary of the Committee, and would
have had control over how much and in what form information reached
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the Committee, which in turn was dependent on Fraser for information
about the concerns of the Relief Department. There were frequent com-
plaints about Fraser, his staff, and his methods, but most of these were
dismissed after superficial investigation. Despite occasional and usually
veiled criticism of Fraser by Committee members and others, he easily
retained control of his Department and had virtually unchallenged power
over relief matters during the 1930s and beyond.35
On the basis of memos received from Fraser and Preudhomme,
Council told Preudhomme to draft a letter to the Consuls. The letter was
quite misleading, but is useful for what it shows about the city's official
views on deportation (assuming that Preudhomme's statements were
sincere). Under the British North America Act, he said, the City of
Winnipeg had "no power to propose deportation on any grounds; but
of course, if any resident appeals to the officials of the city to be volun-
tarily deported, then the only thing the City Official can do is to submit
the appeal to the proper authorities of the Dominion Government."
Preudhomme repeated Fraser's version of the procedures followed by the
Relief Department, and his own description of the structure of the
Unemployment Relief Committee and the city's consequent lack of respon-
sibility for the Committee's actions and policies. In any case, he concluded,
misleadingly, "the Unemployment Relief Committee cannot take any
effective actions towards deportation. The matter is an entirely Dominion
matter ... the City does not propose deportation and cannot decide on
what grounds deportation will be ordered."36
Both Fraser and Preudhomme had mentioned "forms". Anyone
applying for relief had to fill out numerous forms. They had to record
the length of residence in Canada and in Winnipeg. Immigrants eligible
for deportation could easily be identified. When Council found out more
about deportation, it would oppose collecting such information. City
officials elsewhere had already balked (in Toronto in March 1931, for
example), but such obstreperousness usually came to naught. There were
other forms to be completed when applying for relief, about which Council
was informed; for example, a form promising to repay any relief money
granted on penalty of seizure of property. Council had passed a motion
to authorize this policy shortly after learning that the 1931 relief bill was
$2,408,474 (of which $788,728 was paid by the federal government).37
Council did not know that the Relief Department was also forcing
immigrants to sign a form requesting deportation, as a condition to obtain
relief.38 Other city officials outside the Relief Department probably did
1 76 WHENCE THEY CAME
not know of this, either. The strongest evidence for this ignorance is
provided by Preudhomme's fury when he found out about this practice.
Sometime in January 1933, Preudhomme came across documents
showing that the Relief Department had forced reliefers to sign a volun-
tary deportation form. The Department had been using these forms to
extort repayment of relief: pay up or be deported, in effect. As well, the
form was used to initiate deportations. In the cases which came to
Preudhomme's attention, the Relief Department had asked the Department
of Immigration to suspend deportation proceedings against two immigrants
who had begun to repay the money that they had received in relief.
Preudhomme was furious. He exploded (in a letter marked Confidential)
to Fraser,
It is very startling to see that this contract was made, and perhaps
some of the aldermen would be astounded to know that the facts as
set forth in this contract have occurred. This question of deportation
has come upon the floor of the council on several occasions and charges
have been made and denied that the Unemployment Relief Department
has taken any action whatsoever in deportation proceedings. The
agreement in the very first recital states that the Unemployment Relief
Department is "minded and disposed to enter a stay of action in the
deportation proceedings" . . . clearly indicating that the city of
Winnipeg did take proceedings for deportation and was in a position
to stay these proceedings . . . .39
Preudhomme warned Fraser against continuing the practice and advised
that the Unemployment Relief Committee (which he presumed had directed
Fraser - an assumption not wholly supported by the records) should be
guided by policy established by Council. Preudhomme sent copies of the
letter to the City Clerk and to Councillor Andrews who was Chair of the
Unemployment Relief Committee.
There is no evidence in Council or Committee records that Councillors
or Committee members saw the letter or knew the complete details
of the situation. The Committee did discuss the two cases to which
Preudhomme referred, and decided to press for repayment without legal
action, but the issue appears in the minutes as a routine and brief matter.
There is no hint of controversy, no hint that the issue raised questions
beyond how to collect relief repayments from these two individuals. Fraser,
as Secretary, wrote the minutes; he probably also prepared the agenda
and presented the matter as he thought wise. There is no evidence that
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anyone but Fraser saw Preudhomme's letter (City Clerk records are
missing; Council records contain no comment at all). The absence 'of a
recorded reaction to the letter suggests that no one on Council was shown
it by Andrews, who must himself have seen it unless his copy was directed
to the Committee. In that case Fraser might have opened it. The City Clerk's
copy is probably the only one existing in the files.40
The issue of deportation arose in Council two months after
Preudhomme's angry letter was written. Why, and why then? Crucial
documents are missing, existing records reveal little. Did members of
Council or those on the Unemployment Relief Committee hear privately
of Preudhomme's letter? Did the Labour group (which had three seats
on the Committee in 1933) hear about it from Preudhomme, or Andrews,
or some other source in the City Clerk's office? Or was it simply that the
stories told by frightened immigrants or occasionally reported by the press
added up to a pattern that could no longer be explained away as
exceptional instances of unfairness or injustice?
A precipitating factor was certainly the flood of deportation
complaints sent by the Relief Department to the Winnipeg Immigration
office in the spring of 1933, to remove many reliefers who were about
to gain domicile. Councillors heard stories about these people, and some
decided injustices were occurring. Councillor Andrews, head of the
Unemployment Relief Committee, had come back from a national confer-
ence on unemployment spouting spurious statistics created by the
Department of Immigration to conceal its actions in "shovelling out'' the
unemployed. Andrews denied that deportation was being abused. He
repeated Ottawa's claim that 2,153 out of 5,532 public charge deporta
tion cases between 1 November 1931 and 31 October 1932 had requeste
deportation, and only six per cent of all immigrants ordered deported
had appealed (fifteen per cent of the "foreign-born" or non-British
immigrants).41
Such claims were no longer believed by leftwing Councillors from
immigrant wards who were being ' 'beseiged'' by people under orders
of deportation. The issue came to a head in June 1933 when over
1,000 people marched on the Winnipeg Immigration office in a demon-
stration organized by the Canadian Labour Defense League, the
Neighbourhood Council Movement, the Unemployed Ex-Servicemen's
Association, and the Committee of the Single Unemployed. The group
protested the city's practice of forcing the unemployed immigrants to sign
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voluntary deportation request forms before receiving relief, and demanded
that the Department of Immigration put an end to this practice.42
When the local Immigration official sent the protest to his superiors
in Ottawa, they denied that such a practice was in force. The Winnipeg
man called on the Relief Department and got a copy of the form in question
(the same form Preudhomme had enclosed in his angry letter to Fraser),
as well as an admission that the form had been ' 'in general use'' through
1932. He also got a string of limp excuses: it was only for those who
wanted to be deported, and anyway it was no longer used and the man
(not identified) who had put it into use was no longer with the Relief
Department.43
It is possible that the local Immigration officer had been unaware
of some of the procedures followed by the Relief Department. He continued
to check out the legality of Relief practices in his correspondence with
Ottawa. For example, he wrote asking if a promise to repay' 'on demand''
the full amount of relief received (which relief recipients had been forced
to agree to, since January 1932) were a legal promissory note. Was the
person signing such a promise legally deportable for failure to honour
it? The reply of Immigration officials in Ottawa is not recorded. Nonethe-
less, reneging on such an agreement could be construed as evidence of
undesirability. Preudhomme had said that such agreements were illegal
and unenforceable as contracts, and that the Relief Department had no
authority to enter into or act upon them. Yet it is clear that the Relief
Department, and the Hospital Commission, and possibly other city bodies,
were routinely using such agreements extralegally to blackmail immigrants
into repaying, by threatening them with deportation.44
By the fall of 1933, the Immigration official in Winnipeg had pieced
together enough information from gossip, hard luck stories, and press
reports to make some shrewd guesses at what had been going on behind
the scenes in municipal politics over the last few months. He thought
the Relief Department had been trying to use the Department of Immigra-
tion as a buffer between itself and some of the City Councillors. Pressure
from some Councillors opposing deportation had caused the Relief
Department to refrain temporarily from its usual practice of sending over
deportation complaints for all immigrants on relief. By the spring of 1933,
the Relief Department had a backlog of immigrants who were about to
acquire domicile. Delay was impossible: the Relief Department sent over
a long list, the stories became public, and hence the uproar.45
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By December, deportation scandals were featured in the local press.
City Councillors began to give names; for example, four Britishers who
had been in Canada nearly five years, were told that they were going
to be deported because they were on relief. None had committed any other
offence. The Winnipeg Immigration officer fanned the flames by telling
the press that no one was ever deported solely for being on relief. He
labelled as "fantastic" the charge that the Department of Immigration
wanted to deport all reliefers, and claimed that in only five per cent of
cases was deportation actually carried out. In any case, he said, depor-
tation originated in written complaints from the city. His Department only
carried out deportation, it did not initiate it.46
Such claims about suspended deportations can only be regarded
with skepticism. Figures are not available on the actual number of
suspended public charge deportations, but the Department claimed to have
suspended (that is, ordered but not carried out) fourteen per cent of cases
for 1932-33. The memo in which this claim was made, however, con-
tains a number of demonstrably false statements, so the figure is not
reliable. It may be based in part on deportations which were never
completely processed and ordered. For example, in the spring of 1932,
the Winnipeg office reported that if an immigrant who had received only
a small sum of relief got a job and got off relief, the office usually suspended
deportation proceedings. According to other documents it was not until
several months later that the Department began routinely to suspend some
British public charge deportations.47 The claim that ninety-five per cent
of public charge deportations were suspended is simply ludicrous.
All of this erupted in a tumultuous City Council meeting in mid-
December 1933. There were three issues: the deportation policies of the
Department of Immigration; the practices of city officials; and the legal
position of the city in regard to deportation. The crux of the first issue
was whether or not the Department of Immigration was routinely deporting
otherwise desirable immigrants who had gone on relief solely because
of unemployment. Debate on this question became so heated that the
second and third issues were not much discussed. At the outset, some
Councillors reiterated the Department of Immigration's oft-repeated claim
that it did not deport people merely for being on relief. McKerchar, dubbed
' 'watchdog of the treasury'', piously reminded his colleagues that Mayor
Webb had said "again and again that no one was being deported for being
on relief alone." Such statements rang hollow in the face of mounting
evidence to the contrary.
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Thirteen people on unemployment relief had come to Councillor
Flye for help: they were being "badgered and harried" and had been
ordered deported. J. S. Woodsworth had confirmed to Flye that such cases
were common, and that other municipalities were pushing for deporta-
tion. Flye spoke of one Winnipeg family he knew who had gone off relief
after being threatened with deportation, and were being kept from
starvation by the charity of neighbours, until their five years were up
and they would be safe from deportation. Blumberg told his colleagues
about an English family who had been in Canada for four-and-a-half years.
They had arrived with $5,000 in cash, but had gradually been forced
to use up their capital, and eventually had to seek partial relief. They
had been ordered deported. The family was devastated, the wife ' 'nearly
crazy with worry." Blumberg insisted that it was not an unusual case,
and that people in such circumstances were often ' 'driven to despera-
tion." The example of this family showed why relief deportations had
to be stopped, he said.48 Other Labour Councillors added to the evidence.
Such accounts may have swayed skeptics on Council. Their skep-
ticism began to turn to shock, and finally to outrage, when irrefutable
documentary evidence was presented. Flye passed around a sheaf of
Department of Immigration documents and correspondence given to him
by people appealing for help. Simpson read out an actual deportation order.
Councillors began to react. Lowe said that he now believed that it was
true that the Department of Immigration was trying to send out as many
of the unemployed as possible; this was a "blot on the good sense of
Canada and the officials responsible for a policy of this kind." Lowe's
reaction is not surprizing; he was an Independent Labour representative
who usually sided with the left on Council, who were leading the attack
on deportation. But Lowe's moral outrage was echoed by other less likely
allies. Rice-Jones, who probably spoke for a number of the Citizens faction,
expressed "alarm" over injustices, saying that the policy was "almost
incredible"; he could not understand "how any government could get
away with that policy!''
The outcome of the discussion was twofold: first, a demand
that the Minister of Immigration declare publicly that nobody would
be deported solely for being on relief. Second, the Council would try
a course of "passive resistance." This position was not unanimous,
nor easily reached. Originally, Flye and Lowe had wanted Council to tell
Immigration to stop proceedings in all cases where no criminal charges
were involved. Councillors Andrews and Gunn, concerned with possible
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legal consequences of a refusal to report deportable immigrants to the
Department of Immigration, wanted some reassurances. It was their idea
to ask the Minister to make a public statement on Department policy;
they also wanted to ask him to relieve the city of its legal obligation to
report. Their proposal passed only when Acting Mayor McKerchar broke
the tie by voting with them. (The split was along predictable class lines.)
Next, Council agreed without much heat to tell the Unemployment Relief
Committee to eliminate from their relief forms any questions on length
of residence in Canada. Similarly smooth in passage was a motion that
Council was opposed to deportation of reliefers with no other charge
against them.49
Local evidence based on direct testimony from people ordered
deported strongly contradicted official statements from Ottawa. By
Christmas 1933 the Department of Immigration had been claiming to
whomever would listen that between 1 November 1931 and 21 August
1933, 48 per cent of British and 28 per cent of foreign-born deports had
"applied for deportation . . . [and] during the Board of Inquiry, a further
43 per cent of British and 56 per cent of foreign-born" had asked to be
sent home. In the calendar years 1932and 1933, a total of 8,75 8 persons
were deported as public charges, and hundreds more not counted in the
official figures were sent back as ' 'accompanying persons". In this same
period deportation for other causes brought the total deported up to 12,785
with 1,130 accompanying persons. Of these, 7,586 deports were British
(59 per cent).50
In a similar statement, the Department claimed that in 1932-33,
of the 8,758 public charge deportations, 41 per cent of the people said
that they wanted to go home, 23 per cent refused to consider further
employment, 8 per cent demanded impossible wages. In a very consider-
able proportion of public charge cases, the Department said, these
individuals had been admitted to Canada to do agricultural work, but many
had worked only briefly on farms, then had gone to the cities for indus-
trial work. Others had never worked on a farm at all. "In a number of
these cases ... the men were anxious to join their dependents'' at home
and glad to be deported.51
Internal documents of the Department leave no doubt that these
statistics were unreliable, misleading, and sometimes patently untrue.
These figures were derived from charts with such headings as "desire
for deportation expressed", or "desire for deportation not expressed";
1 'applied to be deported'',' 'refused to consider employment'',' 'demanded
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impossible wages or working conditions", ' 'illness'', ' 'anticipated employ-
ment in native country". They also tabulated "appeal dismissed" and
"would consider employment but did not appeal".52
Spurious deportation requests were produced by various methods:
words of testimony before Boards of Inquiry were twisted; immigrants
were forced by municipalities to sign deportation requests. There were
manipulative questions asked at Boards. Immigrants who had been assured
that they would be deported were asked if they looked forward to seeing
their families and friends; if they agreed, the response was counted as
a request to be deported or a desire to go home. The Department included
numbers of those who "did not appeal" in its voluntary deportation
figures. Similarly, if during the Board of Inquiry immigrants made any
statements indicating a lack of enthusiasm for a specific job or work
experience (such as saying they preferred an industrial job they once had,
to farm work, because the former paid better) or a field of work, or even
if they expressed discouragement about their ability to find a job, the
Department made use of such statements in their statistics showing that
public charge deports were unemployable, unwilling, or undesirable. There
are cases on record where the Department stated in its memo on the appeal
that the immigrant had refused farm work, when in fact the Board of
Inquiry transcript showed the opposite.53
Labour Councillors in Winnipeg had reached much the same
conclusion. After the New Year they served notice that they were not
going to let the deportation issue rest. They presented further information
about federal deportation policy and practices, and pressed for action.
The local Immigration officer took note of this and wrote to Ottawa
suggesting relief cases no longer be processed. If the policy was in truth
not to deport immigrants on relief because of unemployment, as Ottawa
had been claiming, then those deported as public charges were labelled
as undesirable without ever being charged or examined as such, he pointed
out. Such cases, even if suspended, were politically dangerous; people
treated like this became "centres of propaganda very unfavourable to
Government."54
Ottawa did nothing. Council had to act. Public opinion had been
aroused by hard luck stories of struggling, respectable families. The press
raised embarrassing questions about the deportation of the unemployed,
about the Relief Department and its Director, and the responsibility for
and substance of orders under which he may have been acting. The
increasing ire of the respectable lent weight to that of the radicals, the
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unemployed, and the "foreigners". As well, the new Council had equal
numbers of Citizens and Labour representatives, with the election of
Jake Penner for the Workers Unity League.55
At the end of January 1934 Council decided that unless they were
officially notified that they must do so, the City would cease to report
for deportation any cases of public charge solely because of unemploy-
ment. Locally, the decision was applauded. The Tribune spoke of the
previous policy of automatic reporting and deportation of the unemployed
as an abuse and misapplication of the deportation clause in the Immigration
Act, and expressed particular concern that nearly ninety per cent of the
relief deportations of the last few years had been British immigrants. (In
fact, automatic public charge deportations were perfectly in accord with
the provisions of the Act, but few people outside the Department of
Immigration ever understood that.)56
The response from the Department of Immigration expressed
concern over potential bureaucratic difficulties, irritation at the persistence
of the issue, and a determination that the Winnipeg City Council be given
enough rope to hang itself. The federal Department of Immigration gave
Council what it had asked for. Commissioner of Immigration Jolliffe wrote
from Ottawa that he and the Minister had agreed to discontinue all proceed-
ings; he would not order the city to report relief recipients. In fact, no
public charge deportations would be undertaken from Winnipeg.57 In
effect, Winnipeg was to be starved out.
The standoff was by now part of a national issue. Were munici-
palities required by law to report public charge immigrants to Ottawa?
Technically the answer was yes, but the situation was confused by
Ottawa's tactics of playing off the municipalities against interest groups.
For example, the Canadian Legion had protested to the Department that
many municipalities had been threatening veterans with deportation. The
Minister of Immigration wrote back denying that veterans had to worry
about this. Even if municipalities had been threatening veterans, it was
Ottawa, not the municipalities, that had the power to decide who would
and would not be deported.58
The issue was raised in Parliament. Winnipeg M.P. Abraham Heaps
suggested in the Commons that it be optional for municipalities to report,
pointing out that the legislation had been framed' 'before the war, when
unemployment was a social crime in the land.'' But Minister of Immigration
Wesley Gordon opposed the proposal, claiming that he reviewed all cases
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and did not authorize deportation until he was satisfied that the individual
could riot find gainful employment.
There is much evidence that Gordon's statement that he reviewed
all cases was a lie. A 1936 memo described the situation clearly. Under
the Immigration Act the Minister was responsible for dealing personally
with all appeals, while the Deputy Minister was responsible for issuing
warrants and so on. These duties were statutory and could not be delegated
(except to an Acting Minister or Acting Deputy Minister). Because of the
heavy workload, "it has been the practice for years" for the Deputy
Minister to deal with "most" of the appeals. The courts had decided that
this practice was invalid (the memo cited several decisions). Immigrants
had been released on these grounds by the courts. The Department of
Justice concurred with this view and had told Immigration that the Minister
must personally review cases as provided by law. As an alternative, Blair
(who in 1936 became Director, with Deputy Minister status) had proposed
that the Minister would be given only those cases where the Departmental
officials recommended that the appeals be refused. In other words, even
after strong recommendations that blatant illegalities cease, the Department
continued these practices.59 Other documents make it amply clear that
even if it were physically possible for the Minister to review all cases (and
it was not), it was not the policy of the Department that he should
do so.
Gordon's argument against optional reporting by the municipalities
rested on more than his spurious claim that he personally prevented
abuses. He argued that it would create a situation in which the law would
not be equally and consistently enforced throughout the country. "Control
would be transferred from the federal to the municipal" level of govern-
ment, which was contrary to immigration law and policy. Apparently
preferring to see the law flouted rather than changed, Gordon softened
his stand by saying that no municipality in Canada was now reporting
all its cases of immigrants on relief. Of course this statement raised
questions about the motivations and actions of the municipalities. As
Saturday Night tartly pointed out, if municipalities now reported selec-
tively, civic authorities were actually using discretion, while hiding behind
the compulsory reporting clauses and "using the statute as an axe over
the heads of unfortunate non-citizens."60
The freeze on deportation from Winnipeg meant that the city could
not remove any immigrant who had become a public charge. Deportations
had stemmed from four sources of complaints. The Municipal Hospital
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Commission reported cases where immigrants had unpaid bills for medical
treatment or had become inmates of asylums and other institutions at
public cost. In theory, these cases could be deported for medical reasons,
but public charge deportations were simpler to carry out if the immigrant
had been here less than five years. For medical deportations it was usually
necessary to prove that the conditions had existed at entry, and that
required more documentation and effort than deportation as a public
charge. The second source was the Social Welfare Commission which dealt
with relief for the unemployable. These were safe targets. In the thick
of defending itself over deporting the employable unemployed, the
Department claimed that it deported only the unemployable. Few would
challenge immigration policy aimed at acquiring settlers able to contribute
to the country. The unemployable might be so through no fault of their
own, but there was little protest against their deportation. The third and
fourth sources of complaints were the Unemployment Relief Committee
and the Relief Department, in charge of relief for the employable unem-
ployed. Official records do not indicate the proportions of deportations
initiated by each of these sources, but evidence suggests that the Relief
Department (unbeknownst to city officials, or at least to Council) was
responsible for the bulk of them.61
City Council's manoeuvre boomeranged. Council had been reacting
to wholesale deportation of the unemployed over which it had little control.
It was not necessarily opposed to deportation of the unfit or unemployable.
Nor was it opposed to legitimate voluntary deportation cases. By the end
of March 1934 a few immigrants on relief had appealed to be deported.
The Unemployment Relief Committee or Social Welfare Commission were
willing to agree to the requests, but the Council's January decision (and
Ottawa's reaction) meant that their "hands are tied," they complained.
Council tried another ploy. It authorized Mrs. Stewart-Hay, a social worker
formerly the Secretary of the Unemployment Relief Committee, now with
Social Welfare, to act as an official City Relief Officer and report to the
Immigration authorities all legitimate voluntary deportation cases.62
Ottawa refused to act on the complaints. Council tried other tactics.
Minnie Watt was a test case. A twenty-eight-year old Scot, she had
immigrated in 1929 under the Empire Settlement Act. A linen factory
and restaurant worker in Scotland, she had worked in hospital and school
laundries in Winnipeg until she became unemployed in June 1933. Soon
thereafter she went on relief. Her family had found her a job at home.
Officials of the Women's Division of the City Relief Department and on
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City Council supported her request. Mrs. Stewart-Hay asked Immigration
to arrange Watt's "repatriation".
She was rebuffed. The Department did not' 'repatriate''; it deported.
The transportation companies had to pay for deportations of defective
immigrants whom they had brought over, and they would not pay for
repatriation. Moreover, the Winnipeg office could not deport Watt because
Ottawa had ordered that there be no public charge deportations from
Winnipeg. If City Council wanted to reconsider its motion, said the
Winnipeg Commissioner, perhaps he would be in a position to act.63
Council reconsidered, led by Citizens representatives. A motion for
rescinding was defeated. It had been supported by five of the Citizens,
but opposed by all the Labour Councillors, augmented by four from the
Citizens side. The impasse continued until it was broken by a compromise
in July 1934. Carefully selected deportations would be initiated in' 'isolated
cases" by the Unemployment Relief Committee, the Social Welfare
Commission, and the Municipal Hospital Commission. The Relief
Department was specifically forbidden to initiate complaints unless told
to do so by the Unemployment Relief Committee.64
After a bit of procedural housekeeping over the next few weeks,
the deportation machinery again began to operate. It appears that Council
kept a closer watch on the system. Certainly those who sat on the
Unemployment Relief Committee did so. They required a written request
for deportation before they would hear such cases; they had to be satis-
fied that the person truly wished to be deported. Individuals usually
appeared in person before the Committee. If the Committee were not sure,
they investigated.65
Not everyone on Council was satisfied with the procedures. There
were some attempts by Labour members to make further changes, all
of which came to naught. Nonetheless, from August 1934 onwards,
Ottawa resumed public charge deportations from Winnipeg. The city's
surrender was timely; belt-tightening was in order. In September the city
cut off relief to 500 families and 1,600 single men (most of whom were
Central Europeans) who had arrived in Canada after 1 January 1929.66
Winnipeg City Councillors had been shocked by the procedures of
deportation and by the cost in human unhappiness of "shovelling out"
the unemployed. If they had known more about the day-to-day realities
of the experience of deportation, they would have been horrified, as
would have been most Canadians. Despite initial fears expressed by the
Department that lazy immigrants would use deportation as a free trip
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home, deportation was no picnic. As larger numbers of deports over-
whelmed the system, conditions which had always been unpleasant
became abominable. For example, a trainload of deports sent in January
1933 from central Canada to Halifax complained that the food on the
train consisted of sandwiches; they were not given clean blankets; they
were not allowed to move freely about the train. They criticized the deten-
tion centres: clean sheets, pillowcases and blankets should be provided;
Board of Health limits on numbers of children per room should be observed;
families should not be separated; the rooms should be clean and sanitary;
there should be suitable food for babies and small children (instead of
pork and beans); all food should be hygienically prepared; the mentally
ill and handicapped should be segregated from other inmates; guards
should be cleaner in their appearance and habits and more civil to inmates;
there should be no alcohol permitted on duty. These complaints were dis-
missed by the Department of Immigration as the work of communists.67
In fact, there was good reason for complaints such as these.
Departmental files reveal that conditions were rarely good at deportation
facilities. By 1932 they had deteriorated until they were disgraceful. The
main centre was at Montreal, where immigrants "of all classes and
conditions, deports being collected from all over Canada and sent . . .
for either embarkation or for transmission to the port of embarkation''
were gathered and held.68 The Montreal Detention Hospital, which was
primarily a prison, had been a main deport clearing house since 1907,
and for most of those years had been plagued by understaffing, over-
crowding, and inadequate facilities. As deportation increased each year
(except during the war, but then Montreal was overcrowded with long-
term detentions and prisoners of war held for the Militia) the building
deteriorated. By the late 1920s there were serious problems.
They ranged from breaches of propriety to dangers to health. There
were "nasty declarations" written on the walls of rooms used to hold
families and children. It took nearly two months of complaints and a
personal visit by a shocked Deputy Minister (who said of the writers ' 'it
is a wonder such people are allowed to live1') to have them painted over.
There was severe overcrowding and frequently more bodies than beds.
People slept on mattresses on the floor. There were not enough rooms
for families, so men and women were put in one big room; a curtain
segregated male and female sleeping quarters. ("Mothers and daughters
are amply protected'' the Division Commissioner assured his superior after
a press expose.)69
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There was no way for inmates to have fresh air or exercise, and
there was nothing to do all day. They were often kept locked up inside.
On at least one occasion seventy people were locked into a dayroom meant
for a much smaller number. Verandahs formerly used in warm weather
were now forbidden because the floors were rotten and iron bars loose;
prisoners escaped, or indecently exposed themselves to passers-by. Only
patchwork repairs were authorized: Immigration simply ordered the staff
at Montreal to "exercise proper supervision" to prevent such incidents.
Perhaps it was to prevent escapes that fire escapes were kept locked.
Although it was called a Detention Hospital, medical facilities were inade-
quate. The doctor's examining room was too cold in winter to carry out
proper examinations. If he opened a window for ventilation while examin-
ing a tuberculosis case, he could not raise the temperature above
50 degrees Fahrenheit. There had always been something wrong with
the heating system. To warm up the doctor's room to 60-65 degrees,
the rest of the building would be at 75-80 degrees. There was no proper
segregation of the inmates with contagious diseases during the 1930s.
Immigrants with tuberculosis or venereal disease, or other illnesses, were
mixed with those who were insane, convicted criminals, or ordinary public
charge cases.70
Things got worse. In 1932 the boiler blew up, and failed again
later for six weeks during which there was no hot water, so inmates did
not wash. The blankets were lousy and vermin were in plain view in the
building. Nothing could be sterilized. The disinfecting machine did not
work. Even when the equipment was operating properly, there were still
vermin; the building, the bedding, and the inmates were infested. The
Department blamed it on the deports. The staff made "every possible
effort" to fumigate, the Department claimed. But in fact, their efforts
consisted of telling the guards to ask inmates if they had lice; no routine
measures were taken. Vermin were brought in "practically every week
by deportees," was the excuse of the Division Commissioner. When it
got too bad, the Department sent some long-term inmates over to a
debusing service run by a City of Montreal refuge.71
Although Department officials admitted freely in their internal
correspondence that these conditions existed and were improper, they
were unwilling to take effective measures for improvement. They decided
that deports would have to live with the lice: "it would be impossible
and not advisable to adopt a general practice of debusing every deport
held over in the building.'' Officials including the Deputy Minister admitted
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that the existing Montreal Detention Hospital was overcrowded and a
danger to health for the inmates (because of filth, vermin, and lack of
segregation of infectious cases).' 'Proper care cannot be given to detained
persons." As early as July 1931 they had concluded that the old building
was beyond repair and a new facility was needed. They expected depor-
tation to increase and with it, conditions to deteriorate in the Montreal
Detention Hospital. They knew criticism would continue, but expected
that it would come primarily from deports. This did not pose a danger
to the Department. "We can better face this than justify heavy capital
expenditure at this time."72
Their predictions were accurate. By 1935 the Montreal Detention
Hospital, still the main deport clearing house, was in a disgusting state.
It was due only to the secrecy with which deportation was carried out
that there was not a major scandal.73 Luckily for the Department, most
"nice" people did not concern themselves with such matters. The
Department's dirty secrets were relatively safe.
Although the Department was remarkably unresponsive to criticism,
there had been so much trouble over deporting British unemployed who
were otherwise desirable immigrants, that by the spring of 1934 the
Department was suspending "some" of these deportations. It continued
to deny that it had been or was routinely deporting the desirable
unemployed. In 1934, the Minister wrote to Member of Parliament
Kennedy that it was not "the policy of the Department to effect depor-
tation solely" on account of becoming a public charge because of
unemployment caused by generally depressed conditions. "In all cases
of deportation on public charge grounds, other factors have been present."
Backpedalling behind the scenes, the Department sent out a directive in
August 1934 ordering all its offices not to carry out British public charge
deportations based solely on unemployment, after they had been ordered.
Many of these immigrants were almost eligible for domicile, the directive
explained. There were Canadian-born children in these families who could
not be legally deported. The directive recalled that many of these
immigrants had been regarded as highly desirable when they were recruited
and screened under the Empire Settlement scheme. They were now
undesirable solely on grounds of unemployment, which in the vast majority
of cases was due to general economic conditions rather than individual
failings. The Department felt that it was only fair that "if their unsuit-
ability arose out of conditions over which they had no control, we keep
them rather than send them back to be a charge overseas."74
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Such a policy had long been sought by the British government.
Local events were also important. The excesses of the Canadian govern-
ment had led to a sizeable protest against deportation, coming not only
from the poor and the radical, but from a broad spectrum including respect-
able sources: international craft unions, churches, the CCF, the Liberals,
and increasing numbers of middle class people. The Bennett Iron Heel
policy had become politically awkward. If it now seemed untenable to
persecute the communists, how could it be justified to deport the otherwise
unobjectionable British unemployed?
The effect of the directive to suspend British public charge depor-
tations is unclear. For the British immigrants ordered deported as public
charges, it delayed rather than eliminated deportation. Agents were told
to inform such immigrants that it was "extremely unlikely" that their
deportations would be carried out; they were to "try to settle success-
fully in Canada."75 Such advice must have rung hollow. These people
lived under a cloud: if Ottawa deported only undesirables, they were
officially labelled as undesirable by the deportation order, carried out or
not. As well, they lived under a sword of Damocles: deportations were
suspended, not cancelled. They could be reactivated at any time for any
reason.
An official policy to suspend the deportations of desirable British
public charge cases did not mean that public charge deportations came
to a halt. Rather, it meant a shift in the description of cases (other grounds
had to be brought forward) and in the nationality of the immigrants
deported. The overrepresentation of Britons among the public charge
deports had long been a political problem for the Department. Relief depor-
tations still continued. For example, a "Statement showing amounts of
relief for public charges deported during the month of August 1934" (when
the rate of unemployed deportations had slackened) showed the following
average amounts of relief for which people were deported: to Scotland
$49; Czechoslovakia $126; Finland $33; France $320; Germany $80;
Lithuania $100; Poland $120; Roumania $563; Sweden $510. The
average amount was $118. Although deportations continued at high levels
through 1935, there were several thousand fewer than there had been
in 1934. In fact the number of deportations in the fiscal year ending 1935
was smaller than in any year after 1921 (although the percentage of
deports compared to numbers of immigrants over the three years previous
was still higher than 1931). Public charge deportations still took place
with the same intensity they had in fiscal 1930.76
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When Thomas Crerar became the new Minister of Immigration after
the July 1935 elections, Department bureaucrats had to prepare
memoranda to brief him on policy and activities of his new Department.
What they told him does not accord in many respects with what unpub-
lished Department documents show to have been happening. His staff
told Crerar that "over a period of three years an effort has been made
to determine the attitude of individuals to deportation." The Department's
research led one top official to say "I think it is quite correct to say
that at least 90% of the British public charge cases dealt with wanted
to go home." They told Crerar that between 1902 and 1934, 27,185
immigrants had been deported to all countries as public charges.
Immigrants had become public charges for a variety of reasons: illness
in the family, death of the breadwinner, unemployment, criminality,
insanity, and so on. But the most important reason, especially in the last
few years, had been unemployment, "sometimes due to the inability or
unwillingness of the immigrant to accept or undertake the sort of work
that may be available." The Immigration Act provided that immigrants
who became public charges were to be deported, and this had been done
until the spring of 1934 when the Department began to suspend some
British public charge deportations. Later that summer, these deportations
were generally suspended. The Department's practice was not consistent
with the law "as it stands", they told Crerar. One of his first decisions
as a Minister concerned this issue. Should the Department carry out the
deportations of British immigrants who had become public charges solely
because of unemployment?
The Minister's reply was consistent with the Department's claimed
policy, but in opposition to its practice. British immigrants should be
deported as public charges if they had been and would continue to be
a serious problem in Canada, or if they were anxious to go home and
had friends and relatives to go to and the municipalities were urging depor-
tation. But the Department should distinguish between those who were
public charges solely because of unemployment and had no other problems,
and those who otherwise had problems such as being ill or incapacitated,
he said.77 It is clear that there was no question of suspending the depor-
tation of non-British public charge cases. Also left open was the option
to continue to claim that there were other problems than unemployment
to justify public charge deportations of Britons. Crerar may have cared
about what was done to the unemployed, but he was told what his
subordinates wanted him to know, in the time-honoured tradition of the
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Department. There was no cleanup, no new broom; merely a confirmation
that the more contentious of the Department's practices should be carried
out more discreetly in politically acceptable ways.
Internal documents prepared to summarize Depression deportations
refute the Department's claims that it was the unfit rather than the
unemployed who were "shovelled out". In a report prepared in 1935,
the Department attempted to analyse the number of deportations due
to illness. There were 10,805 public charge deportations between
1 November 1931 and 31 January 1935 (those accompanying not
included). Only 797 of these (7.4 per cent) were listed as related to illness.
For the British the illness rate was 394 of 6,684 cases (5.7 per cent);
for the non-British, 403 of 3,941 (10.2 per cent). Another analysis of
public charge deportations for the calendar years 1932 and 1933 showed
that of a total of 8,758 cases, 622 (7 per cent) involved illness; of the
5,578 British cases, 314 were illness related (5.6 per cent), while the
rate for the 3,180 non-British cases was 308 (9.6 per cent).78 Clearly
illness was not a factor in most public charge deportations. Then what
was meant by unfit? Was unemployability a matter of attitude rather than
physical condition? The Department's records offer no satisfactory answers
to these questions.
The extent of public charge deportations was considerable.
According to unpublished Department figures, between the beginning of
November 1931 and the end of January 1935, the Department deported
10,805 immigrants as public charges (not including accompanying). The
published statistics of the Department from the annual reports show even
greater numbers. Between fiscal 1929-30 and fiscal 1934-35, a total of
17,229 public charge deportations were carried out (not including accom-
panying).79 There is every indication that the vast majority of these
people were simply unemployed.
A sympathetic view would have it that the Department was caught
in the middle during the Depression. If it had balked at deporting the
unemployed, the municipalities would have been up in arms and the
provincial governments could have used the issue to pressure the federal
government to assume more of the costs of relief, especially for
immigrants. On the other hand, if the Department openly and admittedly
' 'shovelled out'' the unemployed in the tradition of the British poor law
and its own deportation policy, public protest would have added to political
pressure that the Department and federal government could ill afford to
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increase. The Department either had to change its practice, or change
what people could find out about its practice. It chose the latter course.
It began by trying to build airtight cases for public charge depor-
tations, and to include other grounds, such as medical grounds, when
possible. It also tried to purvey the claim that it did not deport the desirable
unemployed. It made this claim to the municipalities, the transportation
companies, Parliament, the press, prominent individuals, the left, and
the general public. Further, it tried to sell the notion that most public
charge deportations were ' 'voluntary". The evidence on which it based
these claims was questionable to say the least.
The general public did not have access to this information. Nonethe-
less, the files did not conceal the practice of having deports sign voluntary
relief forms, whether done by the municipalities or by the Department
(as it was done at various times for British and other immigrants). The
case that the Department tried to build for public consumption was based
on statistics which could be proved fallacious only by insiders. The
Department created categories of evidence which it then used to produce
statistics that were more or less technically correct but gave an essentially
false picture of Departmental activities.
The Department's game of passing the buck on deportation requests
from the municipalities was clever; it was literally true that the Department
responded to municipal requests for deportation. Yet since 1906 the
municipalities had been required to report deportable immigrants. While
there was little the Department could do to enforce this provision, it is
also clear that since 1906 it had been the practice of the Department to
seek out deports actively, using the legal provisions for municipal reporting
as a crucial part of the seeking-out mechanism.
The Department tried to escape being caught between conflicting
interest groups (or more accurately, tried to avoid being caught) by the
device of suspending some British public charge deportations. Ordering
but not carrying out deportation was supposed to stop protest and calm
public opinion. It had the opposite effect in some cases. If only the
undesirable were deported, then ordering a deportation was tantamount
to labelling someone as undesirable without allowing them to hear or refute
the charge. This was a familiar tactic, used by the Department to manage
its own employees.
In public charge deportations, the Department acted arbitrarily when
it could, and retreated behind the smokescreen of lies and red tape
when public or interest group pressure created political repercussions.
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Deportation policy and practice during the 1930s served the interests of
government (federal first, municipal last), and of corporations and
employers. When cheap labour became redundant labour, the Department
got rid of it. There was little humanity in its policy or its managers who




1 he Department of Immigration was
arbitrary in the management of deportation. Curbs on this arbitrariness
were few and ineffective. As J. F. Hodgetts points out,' There is a paradox
in the fact that the administrative branch of the government is by far
the largest of our public and private institutions and yet, even to the
informed members of the general public, it is the least visible."1
The Department's immigration and deportation practices were not
visible to, and therefore not controllable by, outsiders. A 1940 study by
legal scholar C. F. Fraser comparing deportation in the U.K., Ireland,
Northern Ireland, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa,
concluded that Canadian practices were the most arbitrary. Unchecked
by an apathetic judiciary, the power of Canadian officials had grown
dangerously, gone beyond its legislative authority, and continued to
increase.2
The two likeliest sources of outside control over the deportation
practices of the Department were Parliament and the courts.3 Parliament
was consistently uninformed or misinformed, and judicial review was
severely limited by the Immigration Act. Neither chose to test the limits
set upon their sphere of inquiry. Even the recurring and sometimes
protracted debates in the 1920s about the repeal of the extraordinary
powers added to Section 41 in 1919, revealed massive ignorance, and
almost equally massive indifference in both Houses about deportation.
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The mere expediency (rather than the principle) of the law was at issue,
and Ministerial responsibility was easily shrugged off. The Senate espe-
cially made it clear that it did not disapprove of arbitrary proceedings
against "agitators".
As Eraser's study commented, "The most notable feature of depor-
tation cases in Canada is the apparent desire to get agitators of any sort
out of the country at all costs . . . .[T] he executive branch of the govern-
ment, in its haste to carry out this policy . . . displayed a marked disregard
for the niceties of procedure."4 The Department of Immigration for many
years operated a clandestine and illegal immigration policy, established
by executive fiat of the Minister, without benefit of Parliamentary debate.
These decisions were carried out clandestinely by Ministerial action "on
account of the desire not to mention in any Order-in-Council that one
country was preferred to another." This course of action had been decided
at a conference with the transportation companies. In 1910, the Minister
had ordered the admission of immigrants from "preferred" countries,
in violation of the Immigration Act. Discrimination against the immigrants
from Southern and Eastern European countries had been in practice "all
the time,'' Deputy Minister Egan testified in 1928 to the House Committee
on Agriculture and Colonization. Asked by a surprised Committee member,
' 'How could the Minister go behind the Order-in-Council?'', Egan replied,
' 'It was a practice in vogue, and he did it, and not in any isolated cases
at all, but in hundreds of cases it was done all the time."
In 1922, an amendment to the legislation established a system of
admission based on occupations. The Department continued its parallel
illegal policy and practices. Egan described how the Department had evaded
specific provisions such as landing-money, continuous voyage, and
passport technicalities established by Orders-in-Council to exclude the
unwanted and ill-equipped. When attractive immigrants from "preferred"
countries did not meet these requirements, the Department illegally
"disregarded] the money test sometimes, or the passport regulations,
particularly in connection with the countries of Northern Europe."
Decisions like these determined who was admitted and who was
deported. As Egan testified, these particular practices had been in effect
for at least eighteen years. Parliament had known nothing about this
powerful extralegal system that went beyond the legislated limits and
procedures of Departmental actions. In reality, these decisions had neither
been made, controlled, nor implemented by Parliament.5 Subsequent
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years would bring no significant increase in Parliamentary knowledge of
or control over the Department's practices.
The Senate displayed a marked tolerance for contradictory and
unsupported claims from those responsible for the management of depor-
tation. Tory Senator Gideon Robertson, who as Minister of Labour had
been instrumental in breaking the Winnipeg General Strike, had insisted
in 1920 that the added (Section 41) powers of 1919 had been used to
clean out so many dissidents that they were now superfluous. In subse-
quent years, others were to claim that these powers, or even the original
Section had never been misused. Senator Calder, who had been Minister
of Immigration in 1919, and should have known what went on in his
own Department, claimed in a 1926 debate on the 1919 Winnipeg General
Strike that the deportation powers of the Department were neither arbi-
trarily nor summarily exercised. Immigration Secretary Blair promptly
assured Bruce Walker, Director of European Emigration in London, that
Calder's statement was "absolutely incorrect as a matter of law and the
[Immigration Act] section as it stands does exactly what Mr. Calder said
no Government would do, viz. put into the hands of any Board of Inquiry,
even of one person, the power to order deportation." Like their counter-
parts in Cabinet, Senators were often little more than mouthpieces for
the Department.6 Debates were focused on policy rather than practice,
on legalisms rather than reality.
Debates in the House were only slightly more critical, and not much
better informed. Even those who pressed for deportation reform were
uninformed and naive about the Department's practices. For instance,
Woodsworth's 1920s campaign to repeal the extended 1919 powers of
Section 41 was based on the complaint that these extended powers allowed
deportation for political offences without trial by jury. In fact, jury trials
had never been a part of deportation proceedings. Immigrants charged
with crimes might be tried by juries in the courts, but deportation proceed-
ings were separate and apart. Criminal proceedings took place in a court
of law, and the accused had recourse to certain rights and a certain
protection under that law, at least in theory. Deportation proceedings
were conducted by a closed administrative tribunal. The Department
wanted to avoid "purely technical and unwarrantable interference by
pettifogging lawyers."7 Woodsworth and his colleagues in both Houses
remained apparently unaware of such practices and perhaps of such
attitudes. It was Parliament which passed the laws relating to deporta-
tion, but the records of the Department make it clear that Parliament
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neither made those laws, nor knew, nor controlled how those laws were
carried out.
As for the courts, their power to intervene in deportation matters
was virtually nonexistent under the Immigration Act. The Act provided
that "all matters pertaining to the detention and deportation of any rejected
immigrant should be dealt with by the executive and not the judicial branch
of the Government," as Mr. Justice Irwing explained. The Department
had been careful to preserve its immunity from interference by the courts,
arguing that the rights of deports were not jeopardized by such an exclu-
sion. If the Department exceeded the law, then the courts could inter-
vene; that was sufficient. The Department did not deny that its powers
were increasingly broad; it argued that it should be trusted with these
powers. Minister Calder on 14 May 1919 wrote in this vein to the Canadian
Jewish Congress: "The Act . . . undoubtedly places large discretionary
powers in the hands of the executive and its administrative officers . . . .
I need scarcely assure you that every effort will be made to see that these
powers are exercised sanely and reasonably."8
Given the exclusion of the judiciary from deportation matters, there
was little the deport could do when the Department not infrequently failed
to follow the path of sanity and reason. C. F. Eraser's study of 121 selected
cases concluded that in Canada, "The earlier cases show a casual and
unintentional rather than intentional disregard for the judiciary. The later
cases indicated a premeditated intent to deprive the alien . . . of his right
to judicial protection."9
There was almost no dissent from the courts. Typical was Mr. Judge
Gibson's comment that Parliament intended and provided that all such
questions should be dealt with "exclusively by the machinery of the
Department of Immigration . . . subject only to an appeal to the Minister,
and without any powers of review or control by the courts." Section 23
of the Immigration Act said that no court has jurisdiction to review, quash,
reverse, restrain, or interfere with any proceeding, decision, or order of
the Minister, Board of Inquiry, or Officer-in-Charge, concerning deten-
tion or deportation, ' 'upon any ground whatsoever,'' except in the case
of Canadian citizens or domiciled immigrants. He argued against the use
of certiorari: the courts could not interfere with Boards of Inquiry even
in cases of misunderstanding or misinterpretation of the law or regula-
tions, or of illegal evidence, error, informality, or omission, "which
may fairly be classed as a matter of procedure, or of departmental
regulation."10
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Such a position was not unusual; Canadian courts on the whole
acquiesced to the informal and extralegal system of justice operated by
the Department. As long as the Department was not caught exceeding
the law or violating procedures laid down in the Act and regulations
governing deportation, it had a virtual free hand insofar as the courts
were concerned.
Judicial apathy or unwillingness to challenge this star chamber
system, was clear in some cases: because deportation was not a criminal
proceeding, the deport did not have the right to bail, to a speedy and
fair trial by a jury of his or her peers, to know the evidence against him
or her, or to confront his or her accuser, according to a series of Canadian
court decisions. As Mr. Justice Mathers of Manitoba held, "Proceedings
under the Immigration Act for the deportation of an undesirable alien are
in no sense criminal and a person arrested and detained for such purpose
is not committed for any crime . . . ." The Supreme Court of Canada
confirmed this point of view on appeals by a group of radicals detained
in Halifax awaiting deportation. Deportation was not a subject for the
courts; it was "a purely administrative proceeding." In Eraser's view,
"the most remarkable feature of the cases is that nowhere does there
appear to be any appreciation on the part of judges of just how far their
jurisdiction has been infringed by the executive without any apparent
legislative authority for such infringement."11
The acquiescence of Canadian courts to the withholding of due
process from deports may have been extreme compared to other Common-
wealth countries, but it was similar to the actions of American courts.
The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in 1893 that Congress could hand over
the power to deport to administrative agencies, and that the courts were
forbidden to interfere. Deportation was held not to be punishment for
crime, so a deport was not entitled to the same protection as a criminal.
A criminal under both American and Canadian law was presumed inno-
cent; it was up to the prosecution to establish the guilt of the accused.
But a deport was presumed guilty, and it was up to the accused to show
why deportation should not take place. In 1932 William Van Vleck, Dean
of the George Washington University Law School, pointed out, "There
is a striking similarity in fact between the purposes and results of the
expulsion process and those of a criminal trial. The courts have said, how-
ever, again and again that they are in legal theory entirely dissimilar."12
Some American judges argued against this interpretation. A
dissenting opinion in the 1893 U.S. Supreme Court case had argued that
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deportation was punishment involving arrest, removal, and forcible
expulsion from the country. Punishment implied a trial; according to
common law, due process required a hearing before condemnation. The
U.S. Immigration Act, in this opinion, "inflicts punishment without a
judicial trial. It is, in effect, a legislative sentence of banishment."13
Such questions had become of even greater importance by the
1920s when, according to the U.S. Commissioner General of Immigration,
deportation was "rapidly becoming one of the most important functions
of the Immigration Service." American scholar Roscoe Pound, in his
analysis of the development of administrative law from "delegated
legislation", argued that the U.S. Immigration Bureau epitomized the
practice of making law by administrative fiat. Protests about the actions
of these officials came not from Congress or the courts but from' 'lawyers
and humanitarians." U.S. courts "have confined within narrow limits
the scope of their review of the administrative decisions of immigration
officials."14
The similarities between the American and Canadian departments
are striking. Lest it be thought that the United States was more arbitrary
and more extreme, the somewhat wistful comment of the Dillingham
Commission on the Canadian Immigration Act of 1910 is worth
considering:
The most striking feature of the Canadian immigration law, and the
one in which it differs most widely from the United States law, is its
flexibility, or adaptability to emergencies or changed conditions. The
Canadian law confers almost unlimited power on the governor general
in council in matters respecting immigration. In fact, it would seem
under the terms of the law that the administration could, if deemed
desirable, not only prohibit any particular class of immigration, but
practically prohibit all immigration to Canada.15
The 1910 Act remained the legal basis of Canadian immigration practice
until well after the Second World War. The 1919 Act merely increased
ministerial discretion and thus increased flexibility.
After 1919, the Department's legal power to act arbitrarily was
increased in degree, rather than modified in kind. The question was not
of legality, but of practice. As long as deportation management remained
an administrative matter and Department practice remained concealed
from the public or Parliamentary eye, there was very little check on the
power of the Department to do what it deemed appropriate. Efficiency,
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modernization, and rationalization of its procedures went hand in hand
with increased arbitrariness and authoritarianism.
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CHAPTER TWO
1. Public Archives of Canada (PAC) Record Group (RG) 76, File 653, Chief Medical
Officer Bryce to Medical Superintendent Hattie of Nova Scotia Hospital in Halifax,
22 August 1905. The proper name of the immigration service at this time was Immigration
Branch of the Department of the Interior-, it will be referred to as "the Department" or
the Department of Immigration throughout for the sake of consistency; see Superintendent
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cited by William Van Vleck, The Administrative Control of Aliens. A Study in Adminis-
trative Law and Procedure, New York, The Commonwealth Fund, 1932, p. 9; see William
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Notes 207
25. File 653, Blair to Deputy Minister, 31 March 1926; Criminal Code Amendments
97A and 97B, Post Office Department Circular to Post-Masters, No. H-85, no date.
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Section 41," 1 June 1926, [Illegible] to Blair, 30 June 1924.
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47. Ibid., Blair to Minister, "Memo prepared for the Minister to use in the House,"
29 April 1926.
48. Ibid., An Act to Amend the Immigration Act, 1926; Blair to Dandurand, 14 June
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CHAPTER THREE
1. Department of Immigration and Colonization, Annual Report, 1933-34, p. 85. All
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3. Computer graphs were produced with the assistance of David Millar and Greg Smith.
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2. Ibid., Department to Canadian Pacific Railway Agent McNicholl, 9 March 1895;
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assumptions about desirability, see Leon Kamin, The Science and Politics oflQ, Potomac
Maryland, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1974, especially chapter 2, "Psychology and
the Immigrant." For a glimpse of day-to-day immigration medical work, see Allan
McLaughlin, "How Immigrants are Inspected," Popular Science Monthly, February 1905.
On the role and work of Canadian doctors in the Immigration Branch, see Barbara Roberts,
"Doctors and Deports: The Role of the Medical Profession in Canadian Deportation Policy
and Practice, 1900-1935," Canadian Ethnic Studies, January 1987.
11. File 563236, Bryce to Southworth, 25 October 1906. It is not clear why Blanche!
was appointed to scour Quebec, but perhaps patronage was partly responsible. There
would seem to be no compelling necessity for personal contacts by an officer'of the Depart-
ment. File 567097, Scott to Blanchet, 11 October 1906; Blanche! to Scott, 15 October
1906; Memo, 16 October 1906; Scott to all Wardens etc., 16 October 1906. For Ontario,
see File 563236, passim; see for example Ontario Inspector of Asylums and Prisons,
Armstrong to Bryce, advocating rounding up inmates and shipping them back in a group.
The problem was to assure their reception on the other side. This sort of thing was
commonly done by New York State, according to Armstrong, 23 November 1906. See
also Armstrong's letters of 1 May 1907, and Dr. Clarke's letters of 11 May 1907 and
23 March 1908. Dr. Clarke, head of the Toronto Asylum, wanted to deport British inmate?
who had gained Canadian citizenship by many years of residence in Canada. This was
not legeil in 1908, although it soon would be. See also Bryce's lengthy discussions in
his Annual Reports, in the Annual Reports of the Department. See Chuen-Yan David Lai,
Notes 211
"A 'Prison' for Chinese Immigrants," Asianadian, Vol. 2, No. 4, 1980, on the conditions
for Chinese immigrants in the Victoria Detention Hospital.
12. File 563236, Scott to Southworth, 7 November 1906; Scott to Warden of Dorchester
Penitentiary, 7 November 1906; Scott to Provincial Governments, 17 November 1906;
Scott to Premier of Saskatchewan, 20 November 1906.
13. Ibid., Scott to Provincial Secretary of Quebec, 14 September 1908; Blanchet to
Scott, 19 September 1908; Scott to Southworth, Ontario Director of Colonization, 7 October
1908; Scott to R. H. Lane, Secretary of Charity Organization Society, Montreal, 1 October
1908.
14. Ibid., Scott to R. H. Lane, 12 October 1908.
15. Ibid., Scott to Mayor of Englehart, Ontario, Dr. R. C. Lowney, 13 October 1908.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid., Scott to City Clerk of Toronto, 30 October 1908; Scott to Montreal Agent
Hoolahan, 30 October 1908.
18. Ibid., Scott to Lane, Charity Organization Society. Montreal, 6 November 1908;
Scott to Town Clerk of Deseronto, Ontario, 16 November 1908.
19. Michael Piva, The Condition of the Working Class in Toronto, 1900-1921, Ottawa,
University of Ottawa Press, 1979. See pp. 66-7, on the 1908 and 1913 depressions.
File 563236, Scott to Alfred Coyell, Relief Officer of the City of Toronto, 19 June 1913.
20. File 837, Ottawa to CPR Agent McNicholl, 9 March 1895; File 563236, Scott to
Winnipeg Commissioner of Immigration, 17 March 1908, and, passim, Scott to various
municipalities, for example, 16 November 1908.
21. Ibid., Memo, "Minister's ruling concerning undesirables in the different towns
and cities," 30 December 1908.
22. Ibid., Scott to Lane, Charity Organization Society, 22 January 1909; numerous
memos, passim, February 1909.
23. Ibid., Deputy Minister of Justice to Scott, 3 June 1908; Ottawa to Winnipeg, 7 May
1908. "Smoothly" meant no official or public outcry would be raised, on either side
of the Atlantic. Another amendment passed 4 April 1911 specified that the first two
years of this residence must take place immediately following landing. See ibid., Assistant
Superintendent of Immigration to Deputy Minister of Justice, 26 November 1913; Scott
to Edmonton Agent Clegg, 15 April 1914; Scott to Medical Superintendent of Battleford
Asylum, 27 April 1914.
24. Ibid., Memo, 7 March 1913; see for instance the "Report of the Interview with
Robert Rogers" (then Minister), Inspector of Prisons and Public Charities for Ontario to
Scott, 8 October 1913; MacGill to Scott, 6 October 1911. MacGill shortly thereafter left
the Department. Scott's reply: 25 October 1911.
25. Ibid., Vancouver Agent Malcolm Reid to Scott, 9June 1912; Scott to Reid, 22 June
1912.
26. See for example, File 961162, Secretary Blair to Agent, 18 December 1919,
concerning suspect Nicholas Babyn. Blair noted that Babyn was registered as an Austrian.
If he had been interned he would have been very easy to deport, "as a matter of course
and without any further examination or difficulty." Babyn was an OBU sympathiser.
Blair suggested attempting to deport him under Section 41, but was afraid that Babyn
might be '' prepared to fight for his supposed principles." The Department was not eager
to be "in the position of having to put a man on the witness stand without first being
able to establish that we have a case against him" under Section 41. Because he was
domiciled, deportation for other causes (such as criminal conviction) was not possible.
Concluded Blair, "I think, however, if it is desired to get rid of him, the best plan is to
have him interned and then his deportation is very simple.'' Or see ibid., memo regarding
212 WHENCE THEY CAME
' 'Minister's comments on examinations of aliens under Section 41," 27 April 1920. Else
Saborecki was a German national, who arrived here 1 June 1914. She was "associating
with enemy subjects," was a Communist Party member, a "revolutionist of a pronounced
type." Her deportation was ordered under Section 41 but not carried out since she could
not be sent to Germany during the War. She was interned and' 'repatriated'' as a "prisoner
of war1' on 2 7 February 1920. See also Donald Avery,' 'Continental European Immigrant
Workers in Canada, 1896-1919: From 'Stalwart Peasants' to Radical Proletariat,"
Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology, Vol. 12, 1975, pp. 60-4.
27. File 803230, Winnipeg Commissioner of Immigration to Scott, 18 September 1914;
Scott to Winnipeg, 15 September 1914. File 563236, Assistant Superintendent of
Immigration Robertson to Department Officers, 11 September 1914; Scott to Winnipeg
Office, 6 October 1914.
28. File 563236, Scott to Inspector of Prisons and Public Charities for Ontario,
5 November 1915; copies to other municipalities and institutions.
29. Ibid., Scott to Belleville Ontario City Clerk, 24 March 1915.
30. Ibid., Scott to Mssrs. Smoke and Sanders, Paris, Ontario, 26 May 1915.
"Foreigners" were not protected by any patriotic concern for their countries' welfare
during the war, and feared deportation for unemployment. See Roseline Usiskin, "Toward
a Theoretical Reformulation of the Relationship Between Political Ideology, Social Class,
and Ethnicity: A Case Study of the Winnipeg Jewish Radical Community, 1905-1920,"
unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Manitoba, 1978, pp. 213-220 about fear of
deportation in the Jewish community, and the Social Democratic Party of Canada's organiz-
ing around this issue. See also File 563236, Winnipeg Office to Scott, 8 January 1917.
The use of vagrancy convictions for political or other forms of deportation was made
easier by the passage of the 1918 Order-in-Council known as the "anti-loafing" law,
requiring ' 'every man in Canada from the age of 16 to 60 . . . regardless of his financial
position ... [to be] engaged in some useful occupation.'' Borden described it as "a very
good law in time of war . . . [and] a pretty good law in time of peace." Quoted by
R. C. Brown, "Whither Are We Being Shoved? Political Leadership in Canada During
World War I" in J. L. Granatstein and R. Cuff, eds., War and Society in North America,
Toronto, Thomas Nelson, 1971, p. 108. Enforcement was in the hands of municipal
authorities.
31. File 563236, Scott to Windsor, Ontario Inspector, 13 July 1917; Windsor to Scott,
18 July 1917.
32. Ibid., Scott to Hoolahan, 14 October 1915; Scott to Inspector of Prisons and Public
Charities for Ontario, 5 November 1915; Scott to Deputy Minister of Justice, 28 October
1914.
33. Ibid., Scott to heads of institutions, etc. May 1, 1915.
34. Ibid., Scott to Inspector of Prisons and Public Charities for Ontario, 20 February
1918 and 5 July 1919.
35. On using wartime conditions to get rid of agitators, see File 912791, Secretary
Blair to Commandant of the Vernon Internment Camp, 11 October 1919. For camps,
see Desmond Morton, ' 'Sir William Otter and Internment Operations in Canada During
the First World War," Canadian Historical Review, March 1974. See also File 563236,
Deputy Minister of Justice to Scott, 21 July 1919. See also note 26 above.
36. Ibid., Scott to Fred Wilson, NewLiskeard, Ontario, 7 March 1916, and File 912971,
Scott to Lt. Colonel MacPherson, Internment Operations Office, Ottawa, 21 November
1916.
Notes 213
37. File 912971, Scott to Director of Internment Operations, 26 November 1918,
Director to Scott, 26 November 1918 and 6 February 1918, and Privy Council of Canada
Report, 23 January 1919. See also Desmond Morton, "Sir William Otter," Ibid.
38. Ibid., Scott to Director of Internment Operations, 25 April 1919, 7 May 1919;
Director to Scott, 16 May 1919; Scott to Director of Internment Operations, 15 May 1919
and 17 May 1919.
39. Ibid., Scott to Director of Internment Operations, 16 May 1919. File 563236,
Deputy Minister of Justice to Blair, 12 October 1919. In File 912971, see for example
Scott to Director of Internment Operations, 26 August 1919, and Superintendent of Verdun
Asylum to Secretary of Immigration, 17 November 1919. It is unclear if these people
were sent over on later sailings.
CHAPTER FIVE
1. Public Archives of Canada (PAC) Record Group (RG) 76, File 900111, see Mayor
of Winnipeg to Minister Oliver, 9 April 1908; Superintendent Scott to Department of Justice,
15 April 1908; Justice to Scott, 4 May 1908. In a memo to the Minister of Immigration,
Scott suggested that "we might perhaps debar her on the grounds of insanity if she
attempts to come across the boundary." Oliver decided against this plan; 15 December
1908. See also File 817610, Vancouver Agent to Scott, 15 February 1912. On the strike,
see A. R. McCormack, Reformers, Rebels and Revolutionaries. The Western Canadian
Radical Movements, 1899-1919, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1979, pp. 106-9.
See also I. Abella and D. Millar, eds., The Canadian Worker in the Twentieth Century,
Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1978, pp. 59-72.
2. File 563236, Deputy Minister of Justice to Acting Minister of Justice, 6 November
1913. This omission was deliberate-, see Minister of Interior Oliver, House of Commons
Debates, 1909-10, p. 5814. Canada did not include the provision because it was not
effective in the U.S. See also ibid., p. 5870, Calder, on exclusion of alleged anarchists
without proper proof of such beliefs.
3. On the former, see McCormack, Reformers, p. 130; see also D. Bercuson, Fools
and Wise Men. The Rise and Fall of the One Big Union, Toronto, McGraw-Hill Ryerson,
1978, p. 58. On the last, see McCormack, ibid., Bercuson, ibid., and Edward Laine,
"Finnish Canadian Radicalism and Canadian Politics: The First Forty Years," in Jorgen
Dahlie and Tissa Fernando, eds., Ethnicity, Power and Politics in Canada, Toronto,
Methuen, 1981. On the U.S. scene see William Preston, Aliens and Dissenters. Federal
Suppression of Radicals, 1903-1933, New York, Harper, 1963. See also Joyce Kornbluth,
ed., Rebel Voices: An IWWAnthology, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1964,
for an account of the Chicago trial, pp. 319-320; for persecution and prison conditions,
pp. 320-322; raids, 324-325.
4. Bercuson, Fools, p. 99.
5. Ibid., pp. 101-3.
6. PAC MG 26 HI(a) V 104-OC519(1), Militia Department Records, Leonard,
St. Catherine's, to Captain Coventry, DIO, Camp Borden Ontario, 30 July 1917.
7. Ibid., 13 August 1917, and RG 76, File 917093, 4 October 1917.
8. File 917093, Scott to Harvey, McCarter, Macdonald and Nesbitt, Cranbrook, British
Columbia, 1 May 1917; Scott to Minnesota Commissioner of Public Safety, Minneapolis,
16 July 1917.
9. Ibid., Minister of Labour to Scott, 16 July 1917; Scott to Minister of Labour, 17 July
1917.
214 WHENCE THEY CAME
10. Ibid., Scott to Minister of Labour, 28 July 1918.
11. Ibid., 24 July 1917.
12. Ibid., Scott to Travelling Inspector for Alberta and British Columbia, 25 July 1917
and 2 August 1917 and Winnipeg Commissioner of Immigration to Scott, 27 October
1917. RCMP Report on P. Lintz, MacLeod, Alberta, 31 July 1917. See also RCMP Special
Agent's Report of 3 August 1917, for an explicit reference to illegal interception of
correspondence.
13. Ibid., 11 August 1917.
14. Ibid., Scott to Winnipeg Commissioner of Immigration, 17 August 1917, my
emphasis.
15. Ibid., Winnipeg to Ottawa, 16 August 1917; Commissioner of Immigration at
Winnipeg to Scott, 18 September 1917.
16. Ibid., Vancouver Agent to Scott, 10 April 1918.
17. Ibid., Inspector Jolliffe, Vancouver, to Scott, 3 September 1918, and 5 September
1918.
18. McCormack, ibid., pp. 149-152.
19. Militia Department Records, Cahan to Minister of Justice Doherty, 26 September
1918.
20. RG24, Vol. 2543 File 2051, 14 October 1918, 16 January 1919. See Ian Angus,
Canadian Bolsheviks. The Early Years of the Communist Party of Canada, Montreal,
Vanguard, 1981, p. 26.
21. RG 76, File 917093, Scott to Deputy Minister of the Department of Militia and
Defence, 6 September 1918.
22. Ibid., Deputy Minister of Jutice to Scott, 9 September 1918. Based on F. D. Millar,
"Labour and Welfare Law in Ontario, 1867-1977," np, nd, and Ed Laine, ibid., p. 28.
See also File 917093, Scott to Agents, 18 October 1918; Acting Winnipeg Commissioner
of Immigration to Scott, 5 June 1919; RCMP to Scott, 3 July 1919.
23. On spies see RG 24 Vol. 2544 File 2051, for example 29 April 1919, McLean
to Davis (enclosing a thirteen-page memo on the extent of spying and nature of conclu-
sions); 30 April 1919, McLean to Davis (enclosing Winnipeg detectives' report on the
One Big Union); 3 May 1919, secret memo passed to Lt. Governor of Manitoba, Inspector
General for Western Canada, etc. See also RG 18 B2 Vol. 68 File 18, RNWMP Commander
to Superintendent Starnes, Winnipeg, 15 February 1919; on secret agents in various
unions, see 15, 17, 20, 24, 27February 1919; Secret Agent 32's memo, 15 April 1919.
On generally held views see William Byron, "The Menace of the Alien," Maclean's
Vol. 32, No. 10, 1919.
24. RG 76 File 961162, ' 'Report on a conference between Ireland and Blair, Canadian
Department of Immigration, and United States Commissioner of Immigration Caminetti,"
24 November 1919. File 917093, Percy Reid, Chief Immigration Inspector, to Minister
of Immigration, 12 December 1919. See also Blair to Caminetti, 17 December 1919. Ron
Adams, ' 'The anti-communist role of the RCMP in the Depression,'' Canadian Historical
Association, 1978, says he found no evidence the RCMP and the U.S. exchanged intelli-
gence data in the interwar period. Yet Immigration records show that such practices were
well established by the end of the First World War. See for example Blair's memo about
preparing an index to list radicals whose names were sent by U.S. authorities. These
names were given by Ottawa to Canadian immigration officials at ports of entry:
File 961162, 21 June 1920.
25. Bercuson, Fools and Wise Men, pp. 88, 89; RG 24 Vol. 2543 File 2051, Cahan
to General Gwatkin of the Militia, 3 January 1919.
26. RG 76 File 917093, Blair to Ireland, 28 November 1919.
Notes 215
27. Preston, ibid., pp. 216-8.
28. File 917093, Blair to Caminetti, 23 December 1919.
29. File 961162, Blair to Immigration Agent, 18 December 1919. A wartime Order-
in-Council ordered the deportation of all interned enemy aliens who were "dangerous,
hostile or undesirable" under order of the Minister of Justice. (The order applied to those
interned at the time the armistice was signed, not to those previously interned.) On this
seeCalder, House of Commons Debates, 1919, p. 1977. According to Joseph Boudreau,
"The Enemy Alien Problem in Canada, 1914-21," unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University
of California, 1964, 1,644 Germans, about half from British colonies in the West Indies
and elsewhere, and 302 '' Austrians'' (i.e., Eastern Europeans) were deported as enemy
aliens after the First World War. Some of these were deported because of nationality despite
the fact that they were established immigrants. Radicals were particularly liable to depor-
tation by this method, especially after 1919. There were 106 " prisoners'' sent to asylums
during the war and 103 subsequently deported. See also Desmond Morton, ' 'Sir William
Otter and Internment Operations in Canada during the First World War," Canadian
Historical Review, March 1974. The Department of Immigration said there were over
8,000 still legally classed as internees as of 1 May 1919, 6,130 of whom were paroled,
100 being deported. Over 81,000 were still reporting monthly or quarterly: File 884866,
Scott to Calder, 1 May 1919. For illegal deportations see RG 18 A2 Vol. 137 (Comptroller
McLean's Letterbook, 27 February - 14 April 1919), letter to Scott discussing Thomas
Tasckent's deportation, 6 March 1919.
30. Ibid., Blair to Colonel Margeson, Pensions Board, Ottawa, 5 January 1920.
31. For the blind spot, see ibid.; also see F. D. Millar, ' The Winnipeg General Strike,
1919: A Reinterpretation in the Light of Oral History and Pictorial Evidence," unpub-
lished M.A. thesis, Carleton University, 1970. Roger Graham claims that the real reason
that deportation proceedings were never begun against the 17 June 1919 strikers was
that the strike had collapsed. So it was decided by Cabinet to go to the courts for criminal
trials under the new Section 97A and 97B. Of course, deportation would have been impos-
sible in some cases; George Armstrong, for example, was Canadian-born. The Criminal
Code amendments had been recommended by a special Parliamentary committee on sedition
and seditious propaganda, appointed before the Winnipeg Strike started, Graham points
out. But the June 1919 changes to both the Criminal Code and Immigration Act were
' 'obviously designed'' to deal with Winnipeg. Roger Graham, Arthur Meighen, Volume I.
The Door of Opportunity, Toronto, Clarke, Irwin, 1960, pp. 242-3. For pertinent
correspondence, File 961162, Blair to Margeson, 5 January 1920 and especially 8 October
and 24 December 1919; 13, 15, 29 January, 4 February, 28 May, and 2 June 1920.
See also B. Roberts, "Shovelling Out the 'Mutinous': Political Deportation from Canada
before 1936," Labour/Le travail, January 1987. On prevention, see File 961162, Blair
to Undersecretary of State Mulvey, 9 January 1920.
32. Ibid., Gelley to Blair, 10 January 1920, and Blair to Gelley, 12 January 1920,
and passim, January 1920.
33. Ibid., U.S. Department of Justice to RCMP, 22 January 1920; Commissioner of
Immigration Little to Travelling Inspectors, 9 February 1920.
34. File 961162, passim, January 1920.
35. Ibid., Acting Deputy Minister of Immigration to Sir Joseph Pope, Undersecretary
of State for External Affairs, 26 May 1920.
36. Record Group 13, Volume 241, File 2321, Pt. Arthur T.L.C. to Department of
Justice, 17 September 1919; File 2374, Secretary of Immigration Blair to Acting Deputy
Minister of Justice, 11 September 1919 and 23 September 1919.
216 WHENCE THEY CAME
37. Record Group 76, File 917093, Assistant Vancouver RCMP Commissioner
Wroughton to Vancouver Commissioner of Immigration Jolliffe, 11 April 1921; RCMP
Superintendent for Manitoba District to RCMP Commissioner, Ottawa, 9 September 1921,
for example. See File 817510, Vancouver Agent to Secretary of Immigration, 21 September
1921 and Secretary of Immigration to Winnipeg Commissioner of Immigration,
29 December 1922. See also File 917093, Gelley, Winnipeg, to Travelling Investigating
Officer George, Calgary, 13 October 1923; RCMP to Deputy Minister of Immigration,
23 June 1923, warning of IWW activity in Vancouver; Jolliffe of Vancouver, to Gelley
of Winnipeg, 6 August 1923, concerning rumours of plans for an IWW organizing drive
among wheat harvest workers; RCMP memo to officers in Saskatchewan districts,
5 September 1923; Gelley to RCMP Commanding Officer, Regina, 12 September 1923;
memo to Travelling Officer George, 13 October 1923.
38. File 917093, Gelley to RCMP Commanding Officer, Regina, 12 September 1923.
39. Ibid., Munroe to Gelley, 30 October 1923, Ottawa to Gelley, 30 October 1923.
40. Ibid., Calgary Herald, to Minister of Public Works, 23 January 1924; Minister of
Labour to Calgary Herald, 23 January 1924; Vancouver Board of Trade to King,
23 February 1924.
41. Ibid., 13 March 1924.
42. Ibid., Jolliffe to Reid, 26 March 1924.
43. Ibid., Reid to Vancouver RCMP, 14 May 1923 [sic, but internal evidence dates
this letter in 1924].
44. File 267931, Immigration to Deputy Minister of Justice, 7 August 1924.
File 563236, Justice to Immigration, 24 August 1924; Ottawa to Vancouver, 2 September
1924. See also Preston, ibid., pp. 145-51.
45. File 917093, Blair to Minister of Immigration, "Memo: Appeal of Sam Scarlett,"
24 September 1924. File 563236, Acting Minister of Justice to Deputy Minister of
Immigration, 24 August 1924. File 917093, Commissioner of Immigration, Winnipeg,
to RCMP, Regina, 12 September 1924, and to Minister, "Memo: Appeal of Sam Scarlett,"
24 September 1924, copy of the appeal attached to Blair's memo. File 961162,
Immigration to Justice, 24 September 1924, and Justice to Immigration, 24 September
1924. File 917093, Blair's pencilled note on margin of letter from Justice to Immigration,
24 September 1924.
46. File 917093, Blair's memo re: the appeal, 24 September 1924 and passim,
September 1924.
47. File 267931, Commissioner Jolliffe, Ottawa, to Winnipeg Division Commissioner,
23 July 1925. See also Donald Avery, "Sam Scarlett," Canadian Ethnic Studies, Vol. 10,
No. 2, 1978.
48. File 961162, 7 March 1925. See Kenneth McNaught, "Political Trials and the
Canadian Political Tradition," University of Toronto Law Review, 1975, p. 151.
49. File 961162, Blair to Egan, 7 March 1925.
50. Record Group 13, Vol. 237, file 1432, entitled "Deportation of persons coming
under Section 41 of the Immigration Act," Scott to Deputy Minister of Justice, 23 May
1919.
51. Record Group 76, File 917093, Winnipeg Commissioner of Immigration to Scott,
5 October 1917, and 11 October 1917.
52. File 961162, "Comments by the Minister on examination of aliens under
Section 41," 27 April 1920. In these cases as well as others, other Sections of the Act
may finally have been used on the deportation order, although the charge for which they
were examined was political offences, Section 41.
Notes 217
53. See Henry Trachtenberg, "The Winnipeg Jewish Community and Politics: Thelnter-
war Years 1919-1939,'' Manitoba Historical and Scientific Society Transactions, Vol 35,
1978/79-1979/80, pp. 119-20, 143. On 1 July 1919 the RCMP raided homes of various
Jewish activists including Charitonoff, Boris Daviotkin, Max Tassler, Yude Austin, and
Henry Geller. Trachtenberg comments that "many Jews lived under the fear o f . . .
possible arrest and deportation," ibid., p. 120. Almazov later moved to Toronto.
Blumenberg was freed on appeal and left Canada, possibly to avoid further deportation
attempts. On this see Lyle Dick,' 'Deportation under the Immigration Act and the Canadian
Criminal Code, 1919-1936," unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Manitoba, 1978.
Transcripts of the Blumenberg, Almazoff and Charitonoff Boards of Inquiry are in RG 18
Vol. 3314 File HV-1 (4), 14 July 1919, 16 July 1919, 16 July, 14 and 15 August 1919,
respectively. On the presence of Noble on the Board see RG 76 File 653, Blair to Bruce
Walker, 17 June 1926.
54. Record Group 13, Vol. 241, File 2241, Deputy Minister of Immigration Cory to
Deputy Minister of Justice, 10 September 1919; memo for Deputy Minister of Justice,
12 September 1919.
55. See Donald A very, Dangerous Foreigners: European Immigrant Workers and Labour
Radicalism in Canada, 1896-1932, Toronto, McClelland and Stewart, 1979, pp. 85-6.
The Schoppelrei case was not as clear cut as the cause for deportation might suggest.
He had "illegally entered" by coming in as a recruit for the military forces. According
to the record, a recruiting officer had told the men to say they were Canadian-born, but
Schoppelrei's counsel was not allowed to say so at the deportation hearings. Another
black mark against Schoppelrei was his refusal to inform on his friends, when asked
questions at the Board of Inquiry. See RG 18 HI Vol. 4, 17 July 1919. See also RG 76,
File 912971, Murray to Calder, 30 October 1919; as cited by Avery. See also F. D. Millar,
"The Winnipeg Strike," chapter 5.
56. Millar, ibid..
57. Bercuson, Fools and Wise Men, p. 101.
CHAPTER SIX
1. Public Archives of Canada (PAC) Record Group (RG) 76, File 563236, Blair to
Winnipeg Commissioner, 18 November 1920; Blair to Gelley, 21 December 1920; Blair
to Minister Calder, 6 December 1920.
2. Ibid., 18 November 1920.
3. Ibid., 6 December 1920.
4. Ibid., Vancouver Agent to Secretary Blair, 6 October 1921; Blair to Minister,
9 December 1922.
5. Ibid., Blair to Colonel Dennis, 10 May 1927.
6. Ibid., Commissioner to Fraser, 5 February 1929; Assistant Deputy Minister to
Badgley, 15 September 1927.
7. Ibid., Deputy Attorney General to Vancouver Commissioner of Immigration, 6 January
1923; Deputy Minister of Immigration to Deputy Minister of Justice, 6 November 1923;
Justice to Immigration, 10 November 1923.
8. Ibid., Winnipeg Commissioner of Immigration to Blair, 19 September 1922; Blair
to Winnipeg, 22 September 1922.
9. Ibid., Blair to Vancouver Commissioner Jolliffe, 30 January 1924.
10. Ibid., Ottawa to Winnipeg Commissioner of Immigration, 8 November 1922; Blair
to Director of Department of Soldiers, Civil Re-establishment, 29 December 1922.
218 WHENCE THEY CAME
11. Ibid., Blair to Amyot, 7 May 1921; Amyot to Blair, 10 May 1921.
12. Ibid., Memo to Blair, 17 May 1923 (my emphasis).
13. Ibid., Blair to staff, 21 May 1923.
14. Ibid., Commissioner of Immigration to Dr. D. A. Clarke, Assistant Deputy Minister,
Department of Health.
15. Ibid., Division Commissioner Fraser to Jolliffe, "Memo, regarding cause of
deportation," 21 June 1928.
16. Ibid., Commissioner Jolliffe to Deputy Minister Egan, 26 June 1928.
17. Department of Immigration and Colonization, Annual Report, 1924; File 563236,
Blair to Consul General of Poland, 13 February 1923.
18. Annual Report, ibid., 1924.
19. File 563236, Little to Montreal Agent, 2 November 1922; Blair, "Memo concerning
conference with Department of Health re: deportation costs," 13 November 1922. Health
had agreed to advance funds to Immigration because the latter had not yet gotten an
appropriation to pay for deportations done outside the provisions of the general Immigration
Act. This was a temporary, makeshift measure, quite without significance here.
20. Ibid., Reid to Agent Regimbal, 4 January 1923.
21. From Annual Reports, 1925, 1926, and 1928, respectively.
22. See for example the 1924 Annual Report, p .44. That year from the Pacific Division
there were 123 Chinese deported, and 116 deportations under the ONDA, only one of
whom went to the U.S., the rest to "other countries". The Division said that the OND
was used to deport' 'undesirable chinamen'' who had acquired Canadian domicile. There
were 39,587 Chinese in Canada in 1921, according to the census; 23,533 in British
Columbia (out of a total B.C. population of 524,582). See J. Morton, In the Sea of Sterile
Mountains: A History of the Chinese in British Columbia, Vancouver, J.J. Douglas, 1974,
pp. 237-241 for an account of the passage and implications of, and B.C. reactions to,
the 1923 Chinese Immigration Act.
23. File 563236, Winnipeg to Commissioner Little, Ottawa, 14 March 1923.
24. Ibid., Whitton to Deputy Minister Egan, ISJuly 1929; Egan to Whitton, 16August
1929 and 4 September 1929; Whitton to Egan, 2 October 1929.
25. See Emily Murphy's The Black Candle (1921), on the prejudices of the latter group.
On the OND see Elizabeth Comack, "The Origins of Canadian Drug Legislation," in Thomas
Fleming, ed., The New Criminologies in Canada. State, Crime, and Control, Toronto,
Oxford, 1985.
26. File 563236, Scott to Winnipeg Office, 24 September 1915.
27. Ibid., Walker to Scott, 27 September 1915.
28. Mrs. K. A. Chiman, "State Guardianship of Young People," Report of the
International Congress of Women, Toronto, June 24-30, 1909, Vol. II, Toronto, National
Council of Women of Canada, 1910, p. 362-3.
29. PAC Manuscript Group (MG) 281, Volume 13, "Reports of the Y.W.C.A.
Immigration Committee, 1912-1916," Report of June 11, 1914; Volume 37, Miss
Falconer, "On Immigration in Canada," "Our Unfolding Purpose". Report of the World's
Y.W.C.A., Stockholm, 1914, pp. 137-9.
30. Ibid., Volume XIII, No. 1, January 1914, pp. 53-5, 56. See also Suzann
Buckley, "British Female Immigration and Imperial Development," Hecate: Women's
Interdisciplinary Journal, January 1977, and Barbara Roberts, "A Work of Empire:
Canadian Reformers and British Female Immigration," in L. Kealey, ed., A Not Unreason-
able Claim: Women and Reform in Canada, 1880's-1920's, Toronto, Women's Press,
1979.
Notes 219
31. Roberts, "A Work of Empire," passim; see also Barbara Roberts, "Sex, Politics,
and Religion: Female Immigration Workers in Conflict, Montreal 1880's-1920's," Atlantis,
A Journal of Women's Studies, Fall 1980; MG 281, Volume 14, "Immigration and
Travellers' Aid Committee Papers,'' Meeting of the Y Immigration Committee, 23 February
1925, and Miss Burnham to Y worker, 20 March 1923. The Y decided that only trained
workers could do follow-up work for purposes of' ' protection and prevention of exploita-
tion," so it was not practical to institute this system on a large scale. 10 April 1923.
32. Ibid., Meeting of the Y Immigration and Travellers' Aid Committee, 2 February
1925; Burnham to Committee, 11 January 1926, 5 May 1926, and 10 September 1926;
Committee Minutes, 4 October 1926 and 2 November 1927.
33. Roberts,' 'Sex, Politics and Religion,'' and Buckley,' 'British Female Immigration.''
See MG 281, ibid., Committee Minutes, 4 April 1927, 9 May 1927, and 10-11 October
1927.
34. RG 76, File 563236, Blair to Superintendent of Immigration for Canada, London,
England, 7 December 1922; Report of Investigating Officer Munroe, Regina, 12 December
1922 and 12 January 1923.
35. Ibid., Blair to Accountant, 19 January 1923.
36. Ibid., Memo, 2 December 1927. The Calgary Agent went too far. He raided a bawdy
house with the police, and '' assumed the duties of a police constable." He was criticized
for being overzealous. The Winnipeg Commissioner complained to Ottawa that Department
Officials should neither be "expected" nor "permitted" nor "encouraged" to do this
sort of thing. Ibid., 3 March 1921.
37. File 434173, passim; Memo, 19 February 1937.
38. Ibid., "Report on minor problems under the Aftercare Agreement," not dated,
1932; "Report on unmarried mother cases under the Empire Settlement Scheme," not
dated, 1933.
39. File 563236, Memo, Assistant Deputy Minister to Jolliffe, 29 June 1926;
Macnaghten to Secretary Blair, 18 June 1928.
40. Ibid., Commissioner to Little, 7 July 1928.
41. Ibid., Blair to Macnaghten, 17 July 1928 and 18 July 1928.
42. Ibid., Macnaghten to Blair, 3 November 1928.
43. File434173, "Report on unmarried mother cases . . . ," 1933; "Analysis of major
problem cases coining to attention up to 31 December 1932 under the Aftercare
Agreement," not dated.
44. "Analysis of major problem cases coming to attention up to 31 December 1932
under the Aftercare Agreement," not dated.
45. Ibid., "Causes for deportation of Empire Settlement women showing the contributing
factors which necessitated deportation, to the end of March 1934," not dated.
46. Ibid., "Non-Empire Settlement major problems dealt with between 1 January 1921
and March 31, 1934, for British women." Not dated.
47. Ibid., ' 'Statement showing year of arrival of Empire Settlement problem cases which
arose during the fiscal year ending 31 March 1932," not dated.
48. Ibid., "Aftercare Report from 1 January 1926 to 31 March 1933," not dated;
this report includes those who had arrived in January, February and March of 1926, after
the advent of the Aftercare Agreement but before the beginning of fiscal 1926-27. This
study differed from the one cited before in two respects: the latter included 262 immigrants
and 18 "problems" from the January through March 1926 arrivals (out of the total of
1,885, and was based on problems arising for a period twelve months longer than the
first study.
220 WHENCE THEY CAME
49. Ibid., "Major problem cases coming to the attention of the Department between
1 January 1926 and 31 March 1936," not dated. By this date, all who had remained
here would have satisfied the requirements for domicile (five years) and therefore could
probably not be deported, unless perhaps it were shown that they had never been legally
landed because they belonged to prohibited classes. Presumably the bulk of these
immigrants deportable under these (in effect) retroactive exclusionary clauses of the
Immigration Act had been deported by this date. See also "Standing of above problems
as of 31 March 1936," not dated.
50. Ibid., The following computations are based on the figures in this report.
51. "Bad conduct" cases listed in 1934 gave these behaviours as examples:
"Attempted suicide, petty theft, incorrigible, refused to accept employment, etc." Ibid.,
'' Causes for deportation of Empire Settlement women to the end of March 1934, showing
the contributing factors which necessitated deportation.''
CHAPTER SEVEN
1. William Beeching and Phyllis Clarke, eds., Yours in the Struggle: The Reminiscences
ofTimBuck, Toronto, NC Press, 1977, p. 161; hereafter Buck, Yours. Ian Angus claims
the CP itself was partly to blame for not responding effectively in court; it had lost most
of its members and isolated itself from the broader left movement, and the Buck group
were so focused on sectarianism and adventurism and a suicidal clash with the authorities
(which they called revolutionary) that it almost invited persecution. On internal splits
within the Party during the thirties, see Ian Angus, Canadian Bolsheviks. The Early Years
of the Communist Party of Canada, Montreal, Vanguard, 1981. For 1930s political depor-
tation from Canada, see Barbara Roberts, "Shovelling Out the 'Mutinous': Political
Deportation from Canada before 1936," Labour/Le travail, Autumn 1986.
2. In 1930 the absolute minimum upon which a worker's family could live with some
degree of health and decency, although certainly not in comfort, was $20 weekly. This
figure is based on unpublished research by F. D. Millar, "Real incomes in Manitoba";
see also Barbara Roberts, "Social Policy, Female Dependence and the Living Wage,"
paper to the Canadian Women's Studies Association, Learned Societies, 9 June 1982,
Ottawa, and Roberts and Millar, "Living with less," Western Association of Sociology
and Anthropology, Regina, 1984. For an account of such activities see J. Petryshyn,
"R. B. Bennett and the Communists," Journal of Canadian Studies, November 1974,
and "Class Conflict and Civil Liberties: The Origins and Activities of the Canadian Labor
Defense League, 1925-1940," Labour/Le travailleur, Autumn 1982. See also Merrily
Weisbord, The Strangest Dream, Toronto, Lester and Orpen Dennys, 1983, pp. 10-48.
3. Michiel Horn, "Keeping Canada Canadian: Anticommunism in Toronto, 1928-29,"
Canada. An Historical Magazine, September 1975, and "Free Speech within the Law:
The Letter of the 68 Toronto Professors, 1931," Ontario History, March 1980; the
Canadian Labor Defender (CLD) 1930-1934 passim describes many such campaigns.
Weisbord's brief account of the 1931 sedition trials in Montreal is illuminating: pp. 35-7.
She notes that one of the Montreal sedition prisoners, David Chalmers, was deported
to Scotland after he served his one-year prison term at Bordeaux: p. 39.
4. City of Winnipeg Archives, Winnipeg City Council Papers, File 15141, Sudbury City
Clerk to Winnipeg City Clerk, 11 May 1931; Barbara Roberts, "Shovelling Out the
Unemployed: Winnipeg City Council and Deportation, 1930-35," Manitoba History, Fall
1983; Lyle Dick, "Deportation under the Immigration Act and the Canadian Criminal
Notes 221
Code, 1919-1936," unpublished M.A. thesis, Department of History, University of
Manitoba, 1978, p. 118.
5. Public Archives of Canada (PAC) Manuscript Group (MG) 26K, (Bennett papers),
File C-650, "Communists, 1931, S98", Webb to Bennett, 29 May 1931; Webb to
Robertson, 9 July 1931, cited by Michiel Horn, ed., The Dirty Thirties, Toronto, Copp
Clark, 1972, pp. 457-8. The Bennett papers are an excellent source of examples. PAC
Record Group (RG) 76, File 95027, Winnipeg Commissioner of Immigration Gelley to
Commissioner of Immigration Jolliffe, 25 June 1931. All RG 76 files will hereafter be cited
only by file number.
6. Henry Trachtenberg,' The Winnipeg Jewish Community and Politics: The Inter-war
Years, 1919-1939," Manitoba Historical and Scientific Society Transactions, Vol. 35
(1978/9-1979/80), p. 131.
7. Ron Adams, "The 1931 Arrest and Trial of the Leaders of the Communist Party
of Canada," Canadian Historical Association, 1977; Lita Rose Betcherman, The Little
Band, Ottawa, Deneau, 1983, chapters 15-17, is the best published account, especially
when read with Tim Buck, Yours.
8. Public Archives of Ontario (PAD) Attorney-General's Department, Record Group 4,
Series D-1-1-, File 3188/1931, Justice Minister Guthrie to Ontario AG Colonel Price,
18 March 1931 and 1 April 1931. See also Petryshyn, "Bennett", Betcherman, Band,
Buck, Yours. Weisbord describes the problems with the indictment, which Chief Justice
Rose refused to accept as initially written. He did not accept the view that mere member-
ship in an illegal organization was an offence as provided in Section 98; he believed the
accused had to be an officer of the organization and commit the illegal actions laid out
in the Section, to be indictable. The prosecutors had to negotiate with Justice officials
in Ottawa, and eventually change the wording of the indictment: see her discussion
pp. 36-9.
9. For biographical sketches see CLD December 1931, pp. 4-5; William Rodney, Soldiers
of the International, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1968, pp. 161-70; Anthony
Rasporitch, "Tomo Cacic: Rebel without a Country," Canadian Ethnic Studies, Vol. 10
No. 2, 1978; and Files 513173 part 2 and 531057.
10. FrankScott, "The Trial of the Toronto Communists," Queen's Quarterly, August
1932; Adams, "1931 trial," Betcherman, Band, have details. The transcript can be found
in Rex v Buck et al., Ontario Court of Appeals, Mulock CJO, Dominion Law Reports
(1932)3.
11. Petryshyn, "Bennett", p. 45; Rasporich, "Cacic"; Dick, "Deportation", pp. 124-5
citing Sedgewick to Price, 17 October 1931, "it would establish the unlawfulness of the
association, and future proceedings could be taken against those who are mere members
of the association, as was always intended." Ontario AG papers, File 3188/1931.
12. Lome and Caroline Browne, An Unauthorized History of the RCMP, Toronto,
Lorimer, 1978, p. 64 citing McNaughton papers, Vol. 10 File 46, Secret memo of Chief
of General Staff to Adjutant General, 14 October 1931.
13. File 563235, Memo from the Assistant Deputy Minister, 26 June 1931; see also
Shin lmai, "Deportation in the Depression," Queen's Law Journal, Vol. 7, No. 1, 1981,
p. 89; he points out that in the fiscal year ending March 1932, there were 239 certificates
revoked, a six times greater rate than average. He also mistakenly claims the Department
did not resort to illegalities: on this see B. Roberts, "Purely Administrative Proceedings:
The Management of Canadian Deportation, Montreal 1900-35," unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Department of History, University of Ottawa, 1980, and "Shovelling Out
the Unemployed." File 513157, Jolliffe to Mulvey, 18 November 1931, Mulvey to Jolliffe,
24 November 1931. File 513057, RCMP Commissioner J. H. MacBrien to Jolliffe,
222 WHENCE THEY CAME
16 November 1931. Bennett had appointed MacBrien to succeed Starnes. According to
Sawatsky, MacBrien was "an even greater anti-Communist fanatic" thanStarnes: John
Sawatsky, Men in the Shadows: The RCMP Security Service, Toronto, Totem, 1980, p. 65.
14. The order to tell Mulvey etc. was underlined in ink on the original typed memo:
File 513057, Department memo, 19 November 1931. Radicals were not infrequently
warned not to apply, or rejected for citizenship in the 1930s. See "Branded as a Communist
in 1930s," Toronto Globe, 17 June 1974, p. 8, about Nick Urkewich who was told by
the RCMP not to apply, after a 1932 strike in Crowsnest Pass; when he finally did apply
in 1972, he was rejected, presumably on the basis of his involvement in left and other
labour causes in the 1930s. Others in the area were in a similar situation and it took
intervention by their MP to get citizenship, after 40 years. See also comments on citizen-
ship refusals by Shin Imai, "Deportation", pp. 70-1.
15. The list of 82 is in RG 26, Vol. 16, "Deportation of Communist Agitators,
1931-1937."
16. File 513047, Mulvery to Jolliffe, 24 November 1931. File 513116 (Arvo Vaara)
Memo, Immigration to RCMP, 21 November 1931.
17. File 513057, Memo for file, 17 June 1932, and see also RG 26 Vol. 16.
18. File 513057. Deputy Minister of Immigration to Secretary of State Skelton, External
Affairs, 20 June 1932. They were Tekla Ogrodnuk (Mrs. Pete Sarakopas), Anna Schurbatz
(Mrs. Tony Zingle), and Anton Pysanuk.
19. "Deportation Abuses," Winnipeg Tribune, 26 October 1931.
20. Oscar Ryan, Deported!, Canadian Labor Defense League, Toronto, nd [1932], p. 10,
and RG 26 Vol. 16.
21. Satu Repo, "Lakehead in the 1930s - A Labour Militant Remembers" [Einar
Nordstrom], This Magazine, July/August 1979.
22. File 563236, Department memo requested by High Commissioner for Canada
Ferguson, London, 4 March 1931.
23. File 274485, Memo for Mr. Jolliffe, 23 July 1927. Three-page RCMP spy report
included. Similar cases are discussed passim.
24. Personal communication, John Ferris, Sault Ste. Marie, 19 August 1981; see also
CLD June 1930.
25. Discussion about his research with Mauri Jalava, 27 July 1981. At the time he
was researching an M.A. thesis on leftwing Finns in Sudbury, for Laurentian University.
26. For examples of deportation after vagrancy convictions, see file 563236,
Commissioner of Immigration to Divisions, 26 June 1931; Leslie Morris, "Labour Defense
and the Vagrancy Laws," CLD September 1930.
27. See for example discussion of the need to hire legal counsel for the Department
if the Poles detained in Winnipeg had been charged under Section 41: File 817510,
Winnipeg to Ottawa, 3 September 1931. File 563236, Winnipeg Commissioner to Ottawa,
5 September 1931, Ottawa to Winnipeg, 2 October 1931, and 6 November 1931.
File 817510, Winnipeg Commissioner to Ottawa, 3 September 1931. The Poles had refused
to sign passport applications but the Department ingeniously found their photographs
and other necessary documentation on their entry cards, as they had come in under the
Railway Agreements, a series of 1920s agreements permitting the transportation
companies to bring in agricultural immigrants.
28. File 513057, Memo for file, 17 June 1932; names on RG 26 Vol. 16 list.
File 513057, memo to Jolliffe, 17 June 1932; CLD November 1932; eight names appear
on the RG 26 list, for the Rouyn deports: Mathias Ruhinski, Lauri Renko, Emile Suorsa,
Kalle Simola (all domiciled Finns), Steve Garich, Mitar Mrdic, Steve Pavletich (Yugoslavs,
Pavletich domiciled), Byll Semergo (Pole, here since 1913). For Timmins, the following
Notes 223
were listed: Arvi Tielinen, Thomas Pollare (aka Tom Blaren), Viljo Piispa, Emil Maki
(Makynen), (all Finns, none domiciled). File 513057, memos 17 June 1932. CLD January
1931, January 1932, May 1933; Hautamakki is on the RG 26 list; so is Karpenkower,
whose case is mentioned in CLD September 1931. Jacobsen is on the RG 26 list, and
is mentioned in the CLD of February 1931. For Panjata see Canadian Forum, May 1931,
pp. 284-5.
29. For Hymie Sparaga see CLD January 1931 and May 1931; Canadian Forum May
1931, p. 284; Louise Watson, She Never Was Afraid. The Biography of Annie Butter,
Toronto, Progress, 1976, p. 111. See also Stanley Hanson, "Estevan 1931," in Irving
Abella, ed., OnStrike, Toronto, James Lewis and Samuel, 1974, p. 57. GryciukandRevay
are on the RG 26 list. Relief camp strikers also risked deportation as radicals. See Ralph
Pimlotte's account of the May 1933 "riot" in Saskatoon: "Closing Relief Camps Sparks
Riot," Briarpatch, January-February 1983; several of his fellow 'rioters' were deported
for their pains, p. 29. See Glen Makahonuk, "The Saskatoon Relief Camp Workers' Riot
of May8, 1933: An Expression of Class Conflict," Saskatchewan History, Spring 1984.
Thomas O'Hara, convicted of unlawful assembly and sentenced to nine months' hard
labour, plus three months for assaulting police, was deported 10 August 1934; Patrick
O'Dare was also deported for his part in the riot: see Makahonuk pp. 67-9, and the RG 26
list. James Forrest was also deported: see Makahonuk, p. 70, and RG 76 File 563236
Saskatoon Workers Defence League to Minister of Immigration, demanding the release
of 21 men from the Prince Albert gaol (some of these were from the riot), and protesting
the deportation of Forrest, Furlong, and Sutton, 6 January 1934. See also ibid., Women's
Labour League Saskatoon Branch to Minister of Immigration, 14 March 1934, protesting
the deportation of prisoners upon completion of sentences; this likely refers to some of
the rioters.
30. See ' They're Killing Sophie in Jail," CLD June 1932; see also CLD December 193
November 1932; she is on the RG 26 list.
31. File 244957, Secretary of Immigration to Prime Minister's Secretary, 6 October
1932; see also Ryan, Deported!-, RG 26 Vol. 16; CLD November 1932.
32. Photographs of Reinkanen's and a Mrs. Morton's bruises in CLD August 1931;
jail and deportation information, CLD November 1931. He is on the RG 26 list. For Langley
and Farley see CLD January 1932, RG 26 Vol. 16, and Betcherman, Band, pp. 44-50
For Zepkar see CLD October/November 1934; he is on the RG 26 list.
33. Personal communication, Ferris to Roberts, 19 August 1981.
34. See Roberts, "Shovelling Out the Unemployed," for a discussion of reaction to
the deportation of the unemployed.
35. All information from File 530021, "Kluchnik, Sam, Undesirable, Winnipeg,
1932-52"; includes Board of Inquiry transcript, 21 July 1932.
36. File 513116, memo, Immigration to RCMP, 24 November 1931; Secretary of State
to Commissioner of Immigration, 24 November 1931; warrant for the arrest of Dan
Chomicki sent by Minister to Jolliffe, 4 December 1931. Subsequent testimony in Orton
Wade's case revealed that his warrant had been issued at about the same time.
37. File 513111, warrant to search Dan Chomicki's residence.
38. House of Commons Debates, 6 May 1932, pp. 2658-9.
39. Account taken from Frank Scott, "Immigration Act: False Arrest, llegal Treat-
ment of Arrested Person," Canadian Bar Review, January 1936; see also Wade v Egan
etal., Manitoba Court of Appeal, Prendergast CJM, Canadian Criminal Cases 193 Vol. 54.
40. The Halifax Agent pointed out the danger of using only Section 41 in such cases,
suggesting that Section 3 be used as well or instead. Under S3 when membership in the
prohibited classes was established, persons were illegally in the country, no matter how
224 WHENCE THEY CAME
long they had resided here. File513057, Personal to Munroe, 9June 1932. For Cessinger,
File 513057, Assistant Commissioner of Immigration Munroe to Commissioner Jolliffe,
11 May 1932. See also File 513111 containing his Board of Inquiry transcript and other
documents relating to the case.
41. File 513057, Memo on Sembaj, 10 May 1932. The spy was Secret Agent #125
J. M. Tatko.
42. File 513057, Munroe to Jolliffe, 16 May 1932.
43. File 513057, Munroe to Jolliffe, 14 May 1932.
44. Canadian Forum, February 1934, p. 165; File 513057, 13 May 1932.
45. For earlier details on Vaara's "criminal" activities, see File 513116, passim;
Betcherman, Band, pp. 30-41; File 513057, Munroe to Jolliffe, 16 May 1932.
46. File 513057, Memo, Halifax Inspector in Charge to Commissioner, 26 May 1932.
47. File 513057, Munroe to Jolliffe, 25 May 1932.
48. File 513057, 6 May 1932.
49. RG 26 Vol. 172 File 3-10-111, "Communist name cases . . . Robinson, Reid, Carr
etc.," Memo from V. J. LaChance, Chief, Bureau of Records, on Parker et al. appeals,
15 October 1932. See also Arvo Vaara and others v the King, Canadian Law Reports,
Supreme Court of Canada, (1932) 37-43, and File 513057, R. B. Curry to Brother
Stanislaus, 24 February 1966.
50. For the CLD see Petryshyn, "Class Conflict" and "Bennett"; see also Rodney,
"Soldiers," p. 122.
51. Buck, Yours, pp. 162-4 and Betcherman, Band, p. 177.
52. Horn, "Free Speech". Several of the founders of the League for Social Recon-
struction, which arose in part out of this experience, were among the 68. See also Kenneth
McNaught, A Prophet in Politics. A Biography of J. S. Woodsworth, Toronto, University
of Toronto Press, 1959, pp. 256-60.
53. McNaught, Prophet, pp. 242-5. Woodsworth did not support the CLDL; not
surprising given CP attacks on the CCF as a "fascist" organization. See ibid., pp. 266-70.
For efforts in Parliament see for example House of Commons Debates, 22 February 1932,
pp. 380-4 and 7 March 1932, pp. 842-5.
54. Ryan, Deported!-, the pamphlet discusses several specific cases, providing some
details not given in the CLD and other sources.
55. Contrast this view to Donald Avery's discussion of the existence of a hidden system
of importing industrial workers, hidden under Canada's ostensible policy of promoting
permanent agricultural settlement: Dangerous Foreigners, Toronto, McClelland and Stewart,
1979, chapter 1. See also B. Roberts, ' 'Shovelling Out the 'Mutinous''' and Oscar Ryan,
Deponed!, pp. 7-10.
56. CLD, September 1932; Ryan, Deported!, p. 12; for evidence that deporting radicals
as public charges was a long standing practice of both the U.S. and Canada, see
File 961162, "Report on Conference between Ireland and Blair, Canadian Department
of Immigration, and United States Commissioner of Immigration Caminetti," 24 November
1919.
57. Petryshyn, "Bennett", pp. 46-52, and "Class Conflict", p. 63.
58. On Cacic, see Rasporich,' 'Tomo Cacic'', passim; case records on File 513173-2.
Also see Rasporich, For a Better Life. A History of the Croatians in Canada, Toronto,
McClelland and Stewart, 1982, pp. 136-44 and especially 142, for a clear and percep-
tive discussion of conditions causing radicalism, the risks of militant activity, and the
threat of political deportation for Croats and other immigrant industrial workers. Rasporich
incorrectly cites RG 26 Vol. 16 as RG 76 Vol. 16; see his footnote 27, p. 163 for example.
Notes 225
59. See File 513109, memo from Assistant Commissioner to Jolliffe, 27 August 1932:
' 'You will remember there was a question as to whether we would take action against
those men under Section 41 ... The majority of those concerned are either Canadian-
born, British subjects with Canadian domicile, or have the protection of their Canadian
naturalization certificates." He noted that the State Department did not seem happy about
the proposal to cancel the naturalization certificates in this case, and suggested that
although it might be a good idea to have Boards of Inquiry for all of them, a Ministerial
Order had to be issued soon for Cacic's Board. See also ibid., Munroe to Officer Reynolds,
"Memo for guidance in Board of Inquiry," 1 February 1933.
60. See ibid., Fall 1933 passim.
61. Ibid., Minister of Immigration Gordon to Jolliffe, 15 November 1933; Yugoslav
Consul General, Montreal, to Department of Immigration, Ottawa, 17 October 1933;
Roberts, "Shovelling Out the Unemployed," particularly discussion of letter from several
European consuls; the letter had to be answered but it certainly had little impact.
File 513173-2, Department to Consul, 24 October 1933.
62. Ibid., to Minister of Justice, 10 November 1933. See also N. Dreisziger et al.,
Struggfe and Hope. The Hungarian-Canadian Experience, Toronto, McClelland and Stewart,
1982. Deportations are discussed pp. 141-2 only in terms of economic causes (public
charge). A brief note on the attractions of communism for Hungarians is found pp. 151-2,
and some information on the Hungarian Workers' Club[s], pp. 158-9.
63. File 513173-2, Gordon to Jolliffe, 15 November 1933.
64. Ibid., Jolliffe to Guthrie, 14 November 1933, Assistant Commissioner of
Immigration, Memo for file, 14 November 1933.
65. Ibid., Acting Deputy Minister of Justice to Immigration, 2 December 1933.
66. Ibid., 5 December 1933, 11 December 1933; transcript of Board of Inquiry,
December 14-18 1933.
67. Ibid., Guthrie to Jolliffe, 10 December 1933. One wonders if Immigration would
have reacted as nervously as Justice, had the telegram been differently addressed.
Immigration tended to be more blase. On the other hand, Bennett was pulling the strings.
68. In his first Board of Inquiry, he had stated he would not appeal; he saw it as an
expensive and useless formality. For a transcript of his first Board, see ibid., 2 February
1933; Assistant Commissioner of Immigration to Warden of Kingston Penitentiary,
19 December 1933; Deputy Minister of Justice Edwards to Minister of Immigration Gordon,
19 December 1933.
69. Ibid., Onie Brown to Minister of Immigration, 19 December 1933; Stewart Edwards
to General Ormond, 20 December 1933.
70. Ibid., passim, December 1933; Assistant Commissioner Munroe to Deportation
Officer Howell, 22 December 1933.
71. Ibid., David Goldstick, CLDL lawyer, toGordon, 25 December 1933; see also Ottawa
Citizen, 28 December 1933; File 513173-2, Halifax Agent to Munroe, 2 January 1934.
Cacic escaped en route and got to Moscow. Later he fought in Spain and was held in
a French concentration camp after leading a group of refugees out of Spain. He escaped
the camp in 1941 and fled to Yugoslavia where he fought with the Partisans. He died
in 1969. See Rasporich, "Tomo Cacic" for details. On the deportation, see also Canadian
Forum, February 1934, p. 165.
72. File 95027, Starnes to Jolliffe, 15 August 1930. See also Becky Buhay, "Bennett's
Answer to the Unemployed: Deportation,'' CLD June 1931, especially her comment about
Don Evanov of Toronto and the consequences of his deportation to Bulgaria. There is
a further mention of Evanov in "Facing Bulgarian Gallows,'' CLD July 1931. See as wel
discussion of the case of Peter Zepkar, a Croat arrested in a Ft. Frances lumberworkers'
226 WHENCE THEY CAME
strike in January 1934 and ordered deported to Yugoslavia: CLD October/November 1934.
Other cases include Ted Merino of Vancouver, ordered deported to Japan, CLD January
1935, and Nick Stitch of Pt. Arthur ordered deported to Hungary, Labor Defender, April
1935.
73. Irving Abella and Harold Troper, None is Too Many: Canada and the Jews of Europe,
1933-1948, Toronto, Lester and Orpen Dennys, 1982, pp. 7-9. The Reds and the Jews
not infrequently (but not necessarily admittedly) were linked as twin demons in the official
mind: see a rare instance of such views in print, from the RCMP quarterly magazine quoted
by Merrily Weisbord, The Strangest Dream, p. 30: "tearing the camouflage from the
Red beast," destroying "the ugly cancer gnawing at the vitals of the Dominion," and
confronting the "dark Jewish conspiracy."
74. File 513057, 1 December 1932, 3 December 1932; Immigration to RCMP,
15 December 1932.
75. Ibid., Minister Gordon to CLDL, 17 December 1932. A. Upton, The Communist
Panics of Scandinavia and Finland, London, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1973. He points
out that in 1918 about 20,000 Reds were killed directly or died in prison camps as a
result of repression by the Whites: p. 119. By the late 1920s, communists in Finland
were being arrested for political activities. By 1930, fascist vigilantes were terrorising
communists with the approval of the government. In October 1930 anti-communist laws
were passed and during the 1930s there was very little communist or communist front
activity in Finland: it simply was unsafe. See pp. 153-5, 178-93. For a brief mention
of the anti-communist regime in Hungary, see Dreiszinger et al., Struggle, pp. 16-18.
See also File 513057, Ottawa to London office, 20 December 1932; House of Commons
Debates, 14 February 1933, pp. 2101-2.
76. File 95027, Starnes to Deputy Minister of Immigration, 22 November 1926; 31 July
1928.
77. Ibid., Commissioner of Immigration to Commissioner of RCMP, 29 January 1932;
Commissioner of Immigration to Department of Immigration Inspectors, 24 March 1934.
For an account of the experiences of some Canadian Finns in Karelia, see Larry Warwaruk,
Red Finns on the Coteau, Saskatoon, Core Communications, 1984, pp. 65-83.
78. File 961162, RCMP to Immigration, 21 August 1933, for example; Immigration
Branch, Home Office, U.K., to Canadian Immigration, passim 1934; Canadian External
Affairs to Canadian Immigration, 5 January 1935.
79. For example, File 969713, Windsor Agent to Ottawa, 9 March 1932, enclosing
a clipping on the Ford Motor Company "riots"where four "rioters" were killed. Some
names such as that of Foster, remained on the "lookout" list for years, all through the
twenties and thirties.
80. File 513057, RCMP Commander Wood, E Division, Vancouver, to RCMP
Commissioner, Ottawa, 14 May 1933.
81. On this point see memos re: appeals from the Halifax Ten, File 513057, May 1932
passim; R. Curtis, "Demand the Release of Campbell," CLD June 1931; A. E. Smith,
"Terrorism - Capitalism's Secret Weapon Against the Workers," CLD July 1931 mentions
Campbell's sentence to Oakalla. See also Betcherman, Band, pp. 92, 94-95, 154-5 on
Campbell.
82. Betcherman, Band, pp. 29-33. Vaara was not Jones' only target. See File 95027,
Jolliffe to Starnes, 23 April 1930, re: Jones' letter informing on Hannes Sula, another
Red Finn returning to Sudbury after a visit to the U.S.S.R. Jolliffe ordered his officers
to take "any action possible under the circumstances."
Notes 227
83. Petryshyn, "Class Conflict," pp. 50-3: Justice Minister Guthrie's comment that
in the repeal campaign "the CLDL had managed to build up a huge protest movement
with even the churches committing themselves." See the Regina Manifesto, Section 12,
Freedom, in McNaught, Prophet.
84. File 563236, Ottawa to Winnipeg Commissioner, 1 April 1933.
85. Betcherman, Band, p. 124.
86. Justice Minister Guthrie gave credence to such accusations later when he said that
the eleven shots had been fired at Buck "to frighten him." Winnipeg Free Press, 27 June
1934, cited by Betcherman, Band, p. 215.
87. Petryshyn, "Class Conflict," pp. 53-9. See also Buck, Yours, pp. 247-8.
88. File 513057, Division Commissioner of Immigration at Vancouver to Commissioner
at Ottawa, 11 February 1935; Ottawa to Vancouver, 19 February 1935.
CHAPTER EIGHT
1. Public Archives of Canada (PAC), Record Group (RG) 76, File 563236, Eastern
Division Commissioner of Immigration to Mr. Munroe, 22 October 1929.
2. Ibid., Eastern Division Commissioner to Mr. Munroe, 22 October 1929, 25 October
1929. Much of this unemployment was the result of the great 1929 drive to bring out
British unskilled labour for farms. Most of these were city men. Discontented, they flooded
Toronto and went on relief, according to the Province. Ontario Department of Labour
Report, Special Paper No. 23, 1930, p. 37.
3. File 563236, Ottawa to Western Division Commissioner at Winnipeg, 27 May 1930.
4. Ibid., 10 June 1930.
5. "Minutes of an interview of representatives from certain municipalities in Ontario,
Manitoba, Alberta, Saskatchewan and British Columbia, and of the Provincial Governments
of Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta and British Columbia with the Cabinet, 26 February
1930 to 1 March 1930, Ottawa," as cited by Donald Avery, Dangerous Foreigners, p. 113.
6. File 563236, telegram from Egan to Charles Stewart, then at the Royal Alexander
Hotel in Winnipeg, 18 June 1930. The Ottawa Commissioner of Immigration had only
the previous month ordered a stop to the practice of requesting Ministerial Orders in bulk
by wiring lists of names. Adopted as an emergency measure to expedite large numbers
of public charge deportations from the West in the fall of 1929, the practice was "not
in keeping with the requirements of our regulations."
7. File 563236, Memo to Mr. Little, 18 August 1930.
8. Ibid., Winnipeg to Ottawa, 6 July 1931; Ottawa to Winnipeg 18 July 1931.
9. See Avery's discussion of these conflicting interests, Dangerous Foreigners,
Chapter 4. See also File 563236, Memo 16 February 1931.
10. Montreal Star, 29 October 1930; File 563236, Egan to Jolliffe, 4 November 1930.
Such deportations continued less conspicuously until February 1932, when the Department
of Health informed the Department of Immigration that, although it would continue to
report such cases, it would not press for deportation. Ibid., confidential memo, Immigration
to Health, 9 February 1932. The Department of Immigration lied about this type of
deportation, too. For example, it wrote to the YWCA that deportation was ' 'never" carried
out after ten years' residence and only very rarely after five years' in the cases of
immigrants who were members of the prohibited classes. Ibid., 19 June 1931. Yet cases
like this continued. For example, Sofia Fekete had come to Canada in 1909. In 1932,
a public charge patient at the Ontario Hospital, Hamilton, she was ordered deported.
After unsuccessful attempts to get the parish priest to intervene, the CLDL was called in.
228 WHENCE THEY CAME
They argued for a stay of proceedings based on the position that when her husband had
applied for and been granted citizenship in 1932, she, as his wife, had automatically
been naturalized along with him. The new law ending such practice, which had gone
into effect in January 1933, did not affect her status. She was a citizen, and not deport-
able, the CLDL claimed. The CLDL won a month's stay; it is unclear if she was eventually
deported. The Worker, 10 October 1935, p. 2.
11. File 563236, Egan to Vernon, 19 December 1930. Egan pointed out that'' mental''
and "criminal" cases were not classified as "public charge" deportations.
12. Montreal Gazette, 6 February 1931, in File 563236.
13. Ibid. MemoontheS. S. Ascania deportation, 26 January 1931; on using vagrancy
convictions, Memo to Division Commissioners, 26 June 1931; on denials concerning
unemployment as cause for Ascania deportations, Winnipeg Free Press in ibid.,
12 February 1931.
14. In File 563236, 14 February 1931, by editor Charles Bowman.
15. Ibid., Commissioner of Immigration to Division Commissioner, 9 March 1931; Memo
to Deputy Minister from Secretary, 25 February 1931.
16. File 563236, Commissioner to Agents and Officers Conducting Boards of Inquiry,
16 February 1931. "Becoming established" usually meant sticking it out in the hope
that things would improve. For a description of the distress, misery, generally awful
conditions and occasional starvation experienced by some of the British settlers who tried
to stick it out near Tracadie, New Brunswick in the 1930s, see David Millar's interview
with John Bruce, Sound Archives, PAC. Also on Empire Settlement immigrants in
New Brunswick see File 563236, Memo, 7 March 1933. See also Deputy Minister to
German Consul General, 27 March 1931.
17. Ibid., Ottawa to Winnipeg Commissioner of Immigration, 9 May 1931; copies to
all Divisions. The practice persisted and was sufficiently widespread to create protest
and become an issue for the left. See the protest letter sent to the Department by the
September 1931 "United Front" Conference of fourteen "workers' organisations" held
in Hamilton. They demanded "that the municipalities forcing men to sign 'voluntary
deportation' pledges cease." MG 26K, File 92730, 1931.
18. RG 76, File 563236, Ottawa to Toronto office, copies sent to all ports and major
centres, 13 November 1931.
19. MG 26K, File 150484, letter from J. H. Thomas of the British Secretary of State
for External Affairs to Bennett, 2 December 1931. See also ibid., Files 150477-150481
inclusive, For windows, RG 76, File 563236, ADM to Secretary, 7 December 1931.
20. Ibid., 20 June 1932.
21. Ibid.
22. File 156271, 1 December 1926; File 563236, Memo, 2 March 1932; File 156271,
Memo, 2 March 1933.
23. File 563236, Memo, 2 March 1932, for example.
24. E. G. Higgins and F. A. Peake, Sudbury Then and Now: A Pictorial History
1883-1973, Sudbury, Chamber of Commerce, 197[-].
25. File 563236, Immigration Inspector-in-Charge Langlois, Montreal to Ottawa,
23 August 1932; Oscar Ryan, Deported!, Canadian Labour Defense League, 1932, p. 4;
Personal communication, John Ferris, 19 August 1981, Sault Ste. Marie.
26. T.Peterson, "Ethnic and Class Politics in Manitoba," in Martin Robin, ed., Canadian
Provincial Politics, Toronto, Prentice Hall, 1972, p. 90; Winnipeg City Council, Minutes
of Council, 9 June 1930.
Notes 229
27. T. Peterson, ibid.; Minutes ofCouncil, 18 January 1932; and Winnipeg City Council,
Council Papers, File 15357, Council to Honore Parent, 19 January 1932.
28. See Ed Rea, "The Politics of Class: Winnipeg City Council 1919-1943" in C. Berger
and R. Cook, eds., The West and the Nation, Toronto, McClelland and Stewart, 1976;
Ed Rea, "The Rea Report," City of Winnipeg, 1976; Barbara Roberts, "Shovelling Out
Paupers-. Winnipeg City Council and Deportation of the Unemployed, 1930-35," Manitoba
History, Summer 1983.
29. Provincial Archives of Manitoba (PAM), MG 1312, File 892, Box 85, Assistant
DM to Unemployment Relief Committee, 19 February 1932 (hereafter cited as Bracken
papers).
30. Minutes of Council, 29 March 1932, is virtually incomprehensible. See Winnipeg
Tribune 30 March 1932 for a clearer account. The Unemployment Relief Committee was
a tripartite body with federal, provincial and municipal representation. As Louise Carpenter
points out, it "supposedly exerted control over recommendations for the deportation of
public charges." ("Supposedly" is the operative word here.) See Louise Carpenter,
"Deportation of immigrants during the depression," unpublished paper. University of
Manitoba, 1973, p. 20. Copy supplied by Ed Rea. On Simpkin's resolution, Yeas were
Andrews, Cuddy, Flye, Bardal, Simpkin, Simpson, Gray, Blumberg and Ferley. Minutes
of Council, ibid. On deportation rates see Carpenter, ibid., p. 15.
31. Minutes ofCouncil, 4 July 1932, p. 597.
32. The memo in Council papers is headed to Fraser. But it was treated as if it were
Fraser's. Relief Department papers were unavailable, apparently secreted, lost or destroyed.
I was unable to determine the origin of the memo. The 1983 head of Winnipeg's social
welfare services described Fraser to me as a "miserable old bastard who" should never
have been allowed to wield such power over people. The head's father, a 1930s official
in a neighbouring municipality, detested Fraser and brought home anecdotes about him.
Based on my research, 1 have concluded that Fraser consistently lied to the Unemployment
Relief Committee. For example in the Committee's Minutes of 23 November 1933:
Mr. Fraser: "We do not report them for deportation. Our information is given in
accordance with the [Immigration] Act."
See also Roberts, "Shovelling Out the Unemployed."
33. Council Papers, File 15488, "Memo to J. D. Fraser," 27 June 1932. For paying
transportation costs see Unemployment Relief Committee Minutes 1932-35 passim. Such
requests appear to have been routinely granted. See also Council Papers, ibid., Fraser
to Council, 4 July 1932. Louise Carpenter interviewed G. V. O'Brien about his job as
a typist in the Relief Department during this period. O'Brien told her he had spent most
of his first few weeks on the job typing up reports on how much relief had been given
to various immigrants eligible for deportation (ostensibly to keep Department records for
later repayment). O'Brien said he did not realize the "implications" of the task, at the
time. Carpenter, ibid., p. 23.1 was unable to find evidence that the Unemployment Relief
Committee knew about these lists. Carpenter also believes that Councillors remained
ignorant of the extent of deportation.
34. Council Papers ibid. Preudhomme to Ryley, then Chair of the "Special Committee
on Unemployment Relief" [sic] variously titled in the records, 29 June 1932.
35. Some of MacNamara's proposals are startling. For instance, he drew up a draft
proposal for 1933-34 unemployment relief, suggesting that the federal government should
pass laws to commit men who refused work to military-run prison camps. These laws
"could also be made to apply to agitators." Leftwingers on the Relief Committee were
upset and insisted their opposition be recorded in the minutes. MacNamara, as author
of offending Clause 7, modestly abstained. The vote was Yea, four Citizens, Nay, four
230 WHENCE THEY CAME
Labourites. URC Minutes, nd [mid-to-late April 1933]. See also Roberts, "Shovelling Out
the Unemployed," note 22 on anti-Fraser complaints. Reliefers who complained
("agitators") were usually cut off relief.
36. Council Papers, File 15488, dated 11 July 1932, signed by the City Clerk.
37. RG 76, File 563236, Toronto Agent to Eastern Division Commissioner Fraser,
13 March 1931; Fraser to Toronto Agent, 9 April 1931. Fraser said reporting was required
by law. See City Council Scrapbook, 16 January 1932. The vote was 11-6 along general
party lines, 26 January 1932.
38. Council Papers, File 15488, copy of form.
39. Ibid., Preudhornme to J. D. Fraser; Preudhomme's unpublished memoirs "Winnipeg
as seen by a City Solicitor'' do not mention deportation. The manuscript is in the Provincial
Archives of Manitoba.
40. Minutes of Council show no reference. URC Minutes for 16 February 1933 note
receipt of the communication and record a decision to continue to request repayment but
without resorting to legal action. There is no indication of extensive discussion or the
slightest controversy.
41. RG 76, File 563236, Winnipeg Commissioner of Immigration to Ottawa, 26 July
1933 and 18 December 1933; City Council Scrapbook 19 December 1933, 11 September
1934 and 25 May 1933.
42. File 563236, Memo from Winnipeg to Ottawa office, 27 June 1933; Joint Committee
of Winnipeg to Winnipeg Immigration Office, 6 July 1933. The Winnipeg Immigration
official estimated there were 1,000-2,000 demonstrators.
43. Ibid., Commissioner of Immigration to Winnipeg Immigration Office, 6July 1933;
reply, 14 July 1933.
44. Ibid., 26 July 1933; see Preudhomme's letter of 1 February 1933 cited above;
see also URC Minutes of 4 May and 16 May 1932, and passim 1933 and 1934.
45. File 563236, Winnipeg to Ottawa, 18 December 1933.
46. Winnipeg Tribune, 15 and 19 December 1933; Winnipeg Free Press 18 December
1933, "Deportation procedures," described in detail the official steps in deportation
proceedings. A careful reader would realize that these proceedings were arbitrary. "Under-
lying causes'' could easily be found or manufactured. Councillor Simonite said in an inter-
view by Louise Carpenter that someone with good moral character who went on relief
had no worries about deportation. According to him, only someone with some "fault,
some failure in their behaviour'' was at risk of being deported.' 'That was generally the
reason for deportation." He continued, "In some cases, I used to think that was made
up for the excuse of having a case against the person." Simonite claimed to Carpenter
that he was opposed to deportation. Louise Carpenter, ibid., p. 17.
47. File 563236, Memo, nd [January 1934]; Winnipeg to Ottawa, 26 April 1932;
Memo to Minister of Immigration Crerar, 18 November 1935.
48. There are accounts in the Winnipeg Tribune, 21 and 22 December 1933. Louise
Carpenter cites other examples of immigrants going off relief to avoid deportation, even
though they faced virtual starvation. Carpenter, ibid., p. 22.
49. The Winnipeg Tribune and Free Press described the meeting, 19 December 1933.
See also City Council Scrapbooks-, Minutes of Council 18 December 1933; RG 76,
File 563236, December 1933 passim. The City Solicitor had said they were legally bound
to report: Minutes of Council 18 December 1933.
50. File 563236, ADM to McClintock at Toronto, 31 October 1933; "Deportation work,
calendar years 1932 and 1933," nd.
51. Ibid., Memo, nd [January 1934].
Notes 231
52. Ibid., "Immigrants deported as public charges during calendar years 1932 and
1933," nd.
53. Ibid., Copies to all Divisions. Example of Department's false statements in appeal
memos: Sam Kluchnik of Winnipeg. His file (530021) includes the transcript, dated 21 July
1933 (inRG 76).
54. Minutes of Council, 2 and 15 January 1934. RG 76, File 563236, Winnipeg
Commissioner of Immigration to Minister of Immigration, 12 January 1934.
55. For a hard-luck story see Winnipeg Free Press, 20 January 1934, ' 'The Futorski
Case." On embarrassing questions, see ibid., 27 January 1934, and 31 January 1934.
On the balance of power in Council see Brian McKillop, ' 'The Communist as Conscience:
Jacob Penner and Winnipeg Civic Politics, 1934-35" in R. McCormack and I. MacPherson,
eds., Cities in the West, Ottawa, Mercury Series, Museum of Man, 1975. Because of
the crossing of party lines on the deportation issue, partisan power blocs are not as central
a consideration here as on other issues. For example, Andrews, relatively a hard liner
on unemployment and relief issues, who had at first publicised Ottawa's spurious claims
on deportation, by December 1933 was in the anti-deportation camp (albeit only briefly).
Ed Rea suggested that partisan politics may have been a factor; the Liberals (such as
Andrews) may have used the occasion to strike a blow at Bennett's Tories-, personal
communication, 15 December 1981. My hunch is that Andrews must have been angry
at being lied to by Ottawa, and worse, at being made a fool of by not only believing
but repeating those lies - surely a motive for revenge. I do not doubt his sincere outrage
at the situation, nor do I doubt that he was acting on principle. At the risk of sounding
naive, I think the Councillors did act on principle, at least in December and January.
56. Minutes of Council, 29 January 1934. See also Winnipeg Tribune, 30 January 1934.
57. File 563236, Winnipeg Immigration Office to Ottawa, 9 February 1934.
58. Ibid., Minister to Ottawa Legion Headquarters, 22 June 1932.
59. File 81829, Memo re: Duties under the Immigration Act, Blair to D. R. Cansell,
30 September 1931; Saturday Night, 3 March 1934. After many years' research, I am
prepared to say flatly that Gordon was lying; he did not, and he could not, personally
authorize all such deportations. He was probably only vaguely aware of policy and
procedures.
60. Winnipeg Free Press, 23 February 1934. Some municipalities were reporting
selectively. Brandon, Manitoba refused to report public charges in cases where relief was
the sole cause: File 563236, Departmental memo, 14 March 1934. Saturday Night, ibid.
61. My grandfather, Charles Bowman, was skeptical of many government claims of
the period; Citizen, 14 February 1931. Former Relief Department worker O'Brien pointed
out to Carpenter that the number of deportations was greatly diminished when the Relief
Department could no longer report: Carpenter, ibid.
62. Minutes of the URC, 8 February 1934, 22 February 1934; Minutes of Council,
26 February 1934, and 27 February 1934.
63. Minutes of the URC, 8 March 1934; File 563236, City of Winnipeg Social Welfare
Council to Winnipeg Division Commissioner of Immigration, 15 March 1934; Commissioner
to Mrs. Stewart-Hay, 16 March 1934; Commissioner to Ottawa, 19 March 1934.
64. Minutes of Council, 27 March 1934, 9 April 1934, 4 July 1934. For the vote see
Roberts, "Shovelling Out the Unemployed."
65. File 563236, Winnipeg Commissioner of Immigration to Ottawa, 17 July 1934,
10 August 1934, 20 September 1934; Ottawa to Commissioner, 3 August 1934; Minutes
of Council, lOSeptember 1934, URC Minutes, 17 Juiy 1934, 2 August 1934, 6 September
1934, 13 September 1934, 20 September 1934, 11 October 1934 and later.
232 WHENCE THEY CAME
66. SeeMnutes of Council, 10 September 1934, 9 October 1934. In September, Avery,
Dangerous Foreigners, p. 114. The timing is curious; the rates had been falling anyway.
See Roberts,' 'Shovelling Out the Unemployed,'' and especially Mike Goeres' M. A. thesis,
"Disorder, Dependency and Fiscal Responsibility: Unemployment Relief in Winnipeg,
1907-42," University of Manitoba, 1981, p. 284.
67. File 563236, 11 February 1933; drunkenness was a recurring issue. There are
complaints of a drunken deport officer scaring children on the train: File C1599, 28 May
1930. The Montreal Agent during this period was apparently often drunk and was
eventually fired on that account. Ibid., Commissioner of Immigration to ADM, 4 February
1930 ff.
68. Ibid., Division Commissioner to Deputy Minister, 31 July 1931.
69. Ibid., Commissioner to ADM, 4 February 1930; Acting Agent Beard to DPW-
Montreal, 14 February 1930; ADM Jolliffe to DPW-Montreal, 10 April 1930; Commissioner
to Deputy Minister, 28 August 1931, 27 January 1932, 22 April 1932, 22 October 1932;
Toronto Star expose, discussed ibid., Division Commissioner Fraser to ADM, 4 January
1932.
70. Ibid., Dr. Helen MacMurchy, Chief, Division of Child Welfare, Department of Health,
to Miss Burnham, Supervisor of Women's Branch; ADM's memo, 22 April 1932. See
also 29 May 1928, 5 April 1928, 22 May 1930, 28 May 1930, 2 June 1930. Dr. Gurd
to Dr. Page, Chief of Immigration Medical Service, Department of Health, 10 October
1929; Montreal Agent Moquin to Commissioner of Eastern Division, 22 October 1929;
Agent Beard to Fraser, 21 November 1930; Division Commissioner to Deputy Minister,
31 July 1931.
71. Ibid., lOFebruary 1932; Miss Burnham to Deputy Minister, 17November 1932;
Division Commissioner to ADM, 4 January 1932.
72. Ibid., Division Commissioner to ADM, 4 January 1932; the Deputy Minister agreed;
Division Commissioner to Deputy Minister, 31 July 1931; Commissioner to DM, 28 August
1931.
73. Ibid., 1930-35 passim.
74. File 563236, Memo to Crerar, 18 November 1935; 13 February 1934. Memo
discussing 1932-33 public charge deportations, nd [January 1934]; Memo from Ottawa
to Divisions, 23 August 1934.
75. Ibid., Memo from Ottawa to Divisions, 23 August 1934.
76. RG 26, Vol. 16, file on 1930s public charge deportations. The total cases by
nationality were 8, 1, 2, 1, 5, 3, 5, 1, 1 respectively.
77. RG 76, File 156271, Memo, 18 November 1935; File 563236, Memo to Minister,
18 November 1935.
78. RG 26, Vol. 16, "Summary of public charge deportations 1 November 1931 to
31 January 1935," nd; RG 76, File 563236, "Immigrants deported as public charges
during calendar years 1932 and 1933," nd.
79. Figures from Annual Report of the Department of Immigration and Colonization,
1936.
CHAPTER NINE
1. J. F. Hodgetts, The Canadian Public Service. A Physiology of Government,
1867-1970, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1973, p. 341.
2. C. F. Fraser, Control of Aliens in the British Commonwealth of Nations, London,
Hogarth, 1940. See pp. 104, 106, 111, 114.
Notes 233
3. The third, and least likely, was public opinion. The invisibility of what the Depart-
ment did was an important barrier against public opinion. Only in isolated instances did
public opinion prove influential - partly because the Department masked its practices
so well, and partly, as Hodgetts points out (in the context of staff management and other
internal concerns) because ministers and cabinets have protected their flanks, and partly
due to complexity.
4. C. F. Fraser, ibid., p. 114.
5. Report of the Select Standing Committee on Agriculture and Colonization, Minutes
of Proceedings and Evidence and Report, Appendix Number Eight of Select Committee,
Sessional Papers, House of Commons, 1928. Testimony of Deputy Minister Egan. There
is no indication that Parliament was disturbed by Egan's revelations. On this, see Blair
Fraser, "The Built-in Lie Behind Our Search for Immigrants," Maclean's Vol. 78, 19 June
1965. Blair Fraser says, "Canadian immigration policies and practice are a monument
to Canadian hypocrisy."
6. Public Archives of Canada (PAC) Record Group (RG) 76, File 653, 17 June 1926.
RG 76 files hereafter cited by "File" and number only. The power to deport had been
given to Boards of Inquiry, or to one officer acting as a Board, by the 1906 Act. Subsequent
changes had merely increased the paperwork, rather than decreased the power, of such
Boards or officers. Blair to Dandurand, 14 June 1926. (Compare this with the Senate
Debates}. See also, "Memo prepared for the Minister to use in the House," File 653,
29 April 1926.
7. Ibid., Percy Reid to Cory, 19 December 1918.
8. In re: Munshi Singh, 1914, cited by C. F. Fraser, p. 100; File 653, Reid to Cory,
19 December 1918, 14 May 1919.
9. C. F. Fraser, ibid., p. 114.
10. File 563236, Law Reports of Quebec, Mr. Justice Gibson, Quebec, Mr. Justice
Gibson, Quebec Superior Court, commenting on re: Tershinsky vs. Moquin, 1928.
11. Cited by C. F. Fraser, Rex vs. Almazoff, p. 102; Arvo Vaaro case, p. 109. See
also File 513116, on Vaaro, and File 513111, on Dan Chomicki, for information on their
case in the Nova Scotia courts and their ultimate deportations. Case of Rex vs. Almazoff,
1919, in Manitoba Superior Court, cited by Fraser, p. 102; Nova Scotia Supreme Court
decision cited by Fraser, p. 109. For the case, see 1933 Dominion Law Reports, Second
Volume, p. 348.
12. M. R. Konvitz, Civil Rights in Immigration, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1953,
pp. 97-98; William Van Vleck, The Administrative Control of Aliens. A Study in Adminis-
trative Law and Procedure, New York, The Commonwealth Fund, 1932, pp. 48-49, 206.
13. On the U.S. side, see Jane Perry Clark's description of U.S. law and practice, in
Deportation of Aliens From the United States to Europe, New York, AMS Press, [1931]
1968, p. 116. This was done as part of their Columbia University Studies in the Social
Sciences Series (number 351). For Canada, see File 653, passim.
14. U.S. deportations cited by Perry Clark, p. 30. Roscoe Pound, "Social and Economic
Problems of the Law," Annals of the American Society of Political and Social Science,
Volume 137, Number 225, March 1928, pp. 6-9.
15. See the Report of the Immigration Commission, The Immigration Situation in Canada,
Washington, Government Printing Office, 1910, p. 45. See also William Preston, Aliens
and Dissenters; John Higham, Strangers in the Land. Patterns of American Nativism,
1860-1925, New York, Atheneum, 1971; and especially Van Vleck on judicial review,
pp. 149-207.
This page intentionally left blank 
APPENDIX





1912-1917 William J. Roche
Interior
1917-1921 James A. Calder
Immigration and
Colonization
1921 John W. Edwards
Immigration and
Colonization
1922 Hewitt Bostock (Acting)
Immigration and
Colonization
1922-1923 Charles Stewart (Acting)
Immigration and
Colonization
1923-1925 James A. Robb
Immigration and
Colonization
1925 George N. Gordon
Immigration and
Colonization
1925-1926 Charles Stewart (Acting)
Immigration and
Colonization







1871-1873 John Henry Pope
Agriculture
1873-1876 Luc L. de St.-Just
Agriculture
1876-1877 Isaac Burpee (Acting)
Agriculture
1877-1878 Charles A. P. Pelletier
Agriculture






1892-1896 T. Mayne Daly
Interior
1896 Hugh John MacDonald
Interior




1905 Wilfrid Laurier (Acting)
Interior
236 WHENCE THEY CAME
1926 Henry Drayton (Acting) 1930-1932 Wesley A. Gordon
Immigration and Immigration and
Colonization Colonization
1926-1929 Robert Forke 1932 Wesley A. Gordon (Acting)
Immigration and Immigration and
Colonization Colonization
1929-1930 Charles Stewart (Acting) 1932-1936 Thomas Crerar
Immigration and Immigration and
Colonization Colonization
1930 Ian A. McKen/ie
Immigration and
Colonization
Deputy Ministers for Immigration, 1867-1936
1867-1888 Joseph C. Tache 1921-1923 Frederick C. Blair (Acting)
Agriculture Immigration and
1888-1893 John Lowe Colonization
Agriculture 1923 William D. Scott (Acting)
 Immigration and
1893-1897 Alexander M. Burgess colonization
Interior
 1923-1934 William J. Eean
1897-1904 James A. Smart immigration and
mcenor Colonization
1904-1917 William W. Cory 1934.1936 T. Magladery
menor immigration and
1918 Joseph A. Cote (Acting) Colonization
Immigration and
Colonization
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